country, and acquire to themselves immortal hon

our."

On the 5th. day after their landing, the British attacked the Americans on Long Island, commanded by Gen. Sullivan. The variety of ground and the different parties employed in different places, both in the attack and defence, occasioned a succession of small engagements, pursuits, and slaughter, which lasted for many hours.

The Americans were defeated in all directions. The circumstances which eminently contributed to this, were the superior discipline of the assailants, and the want of early intelligence of their movements. There was not a single corps of cavalry in the American army. The transmission of intelligence was of course always slow, and often impracticable. From the want of it, some of their detachments, while retreating before one portion of the enemy, were advancing toward another, of whose movements they were ignorant.

In the height of the engagement Washington passed over to Long Island, and with infinite regret saw the slaughter of his best troops, but had not the power to prevent it; for had he drawn his whole force to their support, he must have risked every thing on a single engagement. He adopted the wiser plan of evacuating the island, with all the forces he could bring off. In superin

tending this necessary, but difficult and dangerous movement, and the events of the preceding day, Washington was indefatigable. For forty eight hours he never closed his eyes, and was almost constantly on horseback. In less than thirteen hours, the field artillery, tents, baggage, and about

nine thousand men, were conveyed from Long Island to the city of New York, over East River, and without the knowledge of the British, though not six hundred yards distant. The darkness of the night and a heavy fog in the morning, together with a fair wind after midnight, favoured this retreat. It was completed without interruption some time after the dawning of the day.

The unsuccessful termination of the late action, led to consequences more seriously alarming to the Americans, than the loss of their men. Hitherto they had had such confidence in themselves, as engaged in the cause of liberty and their country, that it outweighed all their apprehensions from the exact discipline of the British troops; but now finding that many of them had been encircled in inextricable difficulties from the superior mili tary skill of their adversaries, they went to the opposite extreme, and began to think but very indifferently of themselves and their leaders, when opposed to disciplined troops. As often as they saw the enemy approaching, they suspected a military manœuvre, from which they supposed nothing could save them but immediate flight. Apprehensions of this kind might naturally be expected from citizen soldiers, lately taken from agricultural pursuits, who expected to lay aside the military character at the end of the current year. Washington, tremblingly alive to the state of his army, wrote to Congress on the sixth day after the defeat on Long Island, as follows; "Our situation is truly distressing. The check our detachment lately sustamed has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled their minds

with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition, in order to repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off; in some instances, almost by whole regiments, in many by half ones, and by companies at a time. This circumstance of itself, independent of others, when fronted by a well appointed enemy, superior in number to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable; but when it is added, that their example has infected another part of the army; that their want of discipline and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government, have rendered a like conduct but too common in the whole, and have produced an entire disregard of that order and subordination which is necessary for an army, our condition is still more alarming; and with the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops. All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained, and which I more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia, or other troops than those inlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations have hitherto prescribed. I am fully convinced that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence be left to any but a permanent army.

"Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to every exigency, far exceed that which is incurred by calling in daily succours and new in

listments, which, when effected, are not attended with any good consequences. Men who have been free and subject to no control, cannot be reduced to order in an instant; and the privileges and exemptions they claim, and will have, influence the conduct of others in such a manner, that the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder, irregularity, and confusion they occasion."

In fourteen days after this serious remonstrance, Congress resolved to raise eighty eight battalions to serve during the war. Under these circum

stances, to wear away the campaign with as little loss as possible, so as to gain time to raise a permanent army against the next year, was to the Americans an object of the greatest importance. Gen. Washington, after much deliberation, determined on a war of posts. Recent events confirmed him in the policy of defending his country by retreating, when he could no longer stand his ground without risking his army. He well knew that by adopting it he would subject himself to the imputation of wanting energy and decision; but with him the love of country was paramount to all other considerations.

In conformity to these principles, the evacuation of New York was about this time resolved upon, whensoever it could no longer be maintained without risking' the army. Arrangements were accordingly made for a temporary defence, and an ultimate retreat when necessity required. The British, now in possession of Long Island, could at pleasure pass over to York Island or the main. Washington was apprehensive that they

would land above him, cut off his retreat, and force him to a general action on York Island. He therefore moved his public stores to Dobbs' ferry, and stationed twelve thousand men at the northern end of York Island. With the remainder he kept up the semblance of defending New York, though he had determined to abandon it, rather than risk his army for its preservation.

While Washington was making arrangements to save his troops and stores by evacuating and retreating, the British commander was prosecuting his favourite scheme of forcing the Americans to a general action, or breaking the communication between their posts. With this view he landed about four thousand men at Kipp's Bay, three miles above New York, under cover of five men of war. Works had been thrown up at this place, which were capable of being defended for some time, and troops were stationed in them for that purpose; but they fled with precipitation without waiting for the approach of the enemy. Two brigades were put in motion to support them. Gen. Washington rode to the scene of action, and to his great mortification met the whole party retreating. While he was exerting himself to rally them, on the appearance of a sinall corps of the enemy, they again broke, and ran off in disorder. Such dastardly conduct raised a tempest in the usually tranquil mind of Gen. Washington. Having embarked in the American cause from the purest principles, he viewed with infinite concern this shameful behaviour, as threatening ruin to his country. He recollected the many declarations of Congress, of the army, and of the inhabitants, preferring liberty to life,.