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Gentlemen, there is another subject to which I think it my duty briefly to refer. It will be in the recollection of many who are here, that when I made my opening address at this Institution last year, I adverted to several melancholy cases which had arisen of the loss of ships at sea. I remember stating to the meeting that, having thought it my duty to put certain questions on the subject in the House of Commons, I had received from all parts of the country communications of such deep interest, and tending to excite such vague suspicions and doubts as to the state in which many of our merchant vessels are sent to sea, that I thought it my duty to consult this Institution as to whether, in their judgment, the time had not arrived when it would be desirable to raise some question upon this subject in the House of Commons. The opinion of the meeting was that the subject did require parliamentary attention, and I think it my duty, therefore, to mention to the Institution that, in furtherance of what I understood to be the wish and request of my brother members of the Institution, I did call the attention of the House of Commons to the subject, and moved a resolution praying, in substance, that a commission should be issued to inquire into the cause of the great loss of life and property at sea during the last few years, and to inquire if any and what changes could be made with respect to collisions, over-loading, stowage of cargo, and other matters with a view of giving increased safety to passengers and merchant ships. That resolution I moved in the House of Commons, and a debate, I think I may say of considerable interest, took place, the result being that I did not find it desirable to divide the House on the subject, and in consequence of the turn which the debate took I withdrew the motion, but with an intimation that the subject would not be considered as being at an end; and I am willing to hope that, even as matters now stand, that discussion was not altogether without satisfactory results and some fruits. This year the subject has been again mentioned in Parliament by another honourable member, and some little discussion upon the matter took place. We have again before us that huge Mercantile Marine Bill-a great volume, in factwhich was brought forward last year. I cannot say I have read all the numerous pages of that tremendous Bill, but I believe it is essentially much the same Bill as that of last year. I think the general impression last year in the House of Commons was, and I believe the general impression among those conversant with the subject was, that the provisions contained in that Bill for the corrections of those evils to which I have now adverted were not altogether satisfactory. That is, I think, still the impression of

those who have considered this subject, and it is satisfactory to be able to state that, in the discussion that took place, the present President of the Board of Trade was strongly pressed, in the event of the business of the session being such as not to allow a full discussion of the great Mercantile Marine Bill, to embody that particular portion of the Bill which relates to the safety of ships at sea in a separate measure, and bring it forward during the present session under such circumstances as to allow Parliament fairly to discuss a question so important to the lives of our sailors and the property of our shippers. That is the position in which the case now stands. Of course it will be the duty of those who take an interest in this subject-and I am happy to see some gentlemen among us here who are members of Parliament-to remind the President of the Board of Trade of the promise which he has made, and I am sanguine enough to hope that the session will not pass without the attention of the House being called to this subject. I cannot say, gentlemen, that I am familiar at this moment with the statistics of our losses at sea during the time that has intervened since last year. Whenever I make myself master of those statistics, I think it very probable I may find that, at all events, those casualties which arise from blameable causes have not been so numerous as last year, because I think it probable that the discussions in Parliament last year would act as a warning to those who might have been in need of any such warning. I hope and trust we shall hear of no more Sea Queens in the present year, and I trust, however that may be, or whatever may be the statistics of last year, and however favourable they may appear-whether they are favourable or not I really do not know that Parliament will not be diverted from giving serious attention to this subject, which I myself entirely and fully believe to be necessary. Gentlemen, I think I might here end the observations that I think it my duty to make to you to-day, were it not for one painful subject, which I feel it to be impossible for me to pass over in silence-I allude to that terrible event which cast a gloom over the whole of this country, the loss of her Majesty's ship Captain. Gentlemen, I, perhaps more than most people, have peculiar reason for regarding that subject with the greatest interest. I was not only personally a sufferer, by the loss of a very near connection, who was as promising a young man as ever entered the naval profession, but the share which it was my official duty to take in the construction of that ship has also made me feel a peculiar interest in the subject, and of course has caused me to watch her short career with unusual care and with unusual interest. It so

happened that, in point of form, rather than in point of fact, I think I may say, it devolved on me to order the construction of the ship. When I was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, in the summer of 1866, the position of things which I found was this :— The public mind had been a long time anxiously attending to the suggestions of the unfortunate and ill-fated Captain Coles with regard to this subject. He was a very able man, as we all know, and he had invented what he thought, and I believe rightly thought, a very great invention-a great improvement in the construction of our war ships. He had pressed those views upon successive Boards of Admiralty, and in deference, I think I may say, to those views so urged by Captain Coles, her Majesty's Government, through the Admiralty, presided over by the Duke of Somerset, had built the Monarch as a ship intended to meet the view of Captain Coles, and to solve the great practical problem which had been pressed so much by Captain Coles, namely, that a turret ship might be built as a cruiser. Nobody doubted the possibility of using turret ships for coast defence, but the real problem was whether a turret ship could be a cruising man of war. The Monarch was built to solve that problem. But Captain Coles would not accept the Monarch as a satisfactory solution of his problem. He took great objection (but I will not detain this meeting by dwelling on the points to which he objected) in several respects to the construction of the Monarch, and before the Duke of Somerset left office he decided, and I venture to say wisely and rightly, to call upon Captain Coles to submit his views to the Admiralty, with an understanding that he might select one of our great ship-building firms and build a ship according to his own views; and I think out of a list of six (speaking from memory, I think it was before the Duke of Somerset left office), with the concurrence of the then Board of Admiralty, Captain Coles decided to entrust the building of that ship to the well-known and highly respected firm of the Messrs. Laird, of Birkenhead. It then devolved upon me, after succeeding the Duke of Somerset, to carry out this intention, which I was most thoroughly disposed to do, because I thought it right that the great question raised by Captain Coles should be fairly solved ; and in an interview with Captain Coles, in the name of the then existing Board of Admiralty, I told him to persevere, to build his ship, and I entirely approved of the selection of the Messrs. Laird, as being the best persons to whom he could entrust that duty; and I required that the designs and plans which he intended to adopt should be submitted to the then Board of Admiralty which was acting under me. Well, gentlemen, Captain

Coles shortly afterwards brought his designs and his plans, and showed us a ship which was to be upwards of 300 feet in length, which was to be upwards of 4,000 tons in size, but which was to have a free-board of only 8 feet. In a private conversation in my room at the Admiralty with Captain Coles, I shrunk very much from this free-board of 8 feet. It will be in the recollection of most of you, after I brought forward that melancholy event, the loss of the London, that the Council of this Institution undertook, and in a manner which I have always thought greatly to their honour, carried out, an investigation into the various modes of constructing sea-going ships, and I think they arrived at the conclusion that 8 feet free-board was the very minimum which could be safely assigned to a ship of anything like the dimensions to which I have adverted; but considering the construction of a man of war, and considering the weights of various kinds that she has to carry, I confess it was with great reluctance that I consented to a free-board of 8 feet. But I did consent to it on this groundthat the principle on which I was acting was that Captain Coles should solve his own problem, and that, as he pressed to have a ship with that free-board, it would not have been consistent with the principles on which I was acting to interfere further than to express my doubts and fears with regard to the success of so low a free-board. Gentlemen, you know the result; the ship was proceeded with, the ship was launched, and to the astonishment of everyone, I think-and I confess I can never forget the dismay with which I heard it—instead of a free-board of 8 feet, the Captain was launched with a free-board of only 6 feet. Gentlemen, you must all feel that this serious deviation from the design of the ship has led to many grave questions, and will lead probably to many more grave questions. Such questions as these have arisen, and must arise. What was the cause of the great deviation from the original design? Was that deviation from the original design the cause of the loss of the Captain? That is another question. A third question is, When that great deviation from the design was discovered, what steps were taken? Were proper steps taken to test the effect of that deviation on the stability of the ship? If no such steps were taken, why were they not taken, and who was to blame?" In conclusion, he deprecated the discussion at the meeting of any personal matters on this painful subject, and recommended that it be treated only as a matter of scientific inquiry from which to draw whatever useful inferences and sources of instruction the members may be enabled to do.

The following papers of which we can only give summaries were then read and discussed :

On the Improved Compound Engines as Fitted on Board H. M. S. Briton.-By G. B. Rennie, Esq., M. Inst. C.E., Member.-These engines were adopted by the Admiralty with a view to economy in consumption of fuel, and they are thus made:-The smallest cylinder is 57 inches diameter, and the larger 100 inches diameter; the stroke of piston in both, 2 feet 9 inches. The smaller cylinder is fitted with a sliding expansion valve, to cut off at from one-third to one-fifth of the length of stroke; but in order to have the advantage of the cranks of the two cylinders being at right angles to one another, the steam is not discharged direct from one cylinder into the other, but there is an intermediate chamber or reservoir between the two cylinders, into which the steam is received from the small cylinder and discharged into the large one. This chamber is made of copper and brass, and re-heats the steam within by means of a steam-jacket.

On the official trials of these engines, the pressure of steam in the boilers was about 60 pounds per square inch, and the vacuum in condenser from 27 to 28 inches. Under these conditions, it was found that the power developed by each of the two cylinders was practically identical, and the same pressures were exerted at halfstroke when working "full power." The power obtained at "full power" was 2,148 horses, giving a mean speed of ship of 13-128 knots.

For an engine on the system of the Briton, the consumption of best coal may be taken at 2 pounds per horse's power per hour, when developing about six times the nominal power; at 13 pounds per hour, when developing three times the nominal power; at 1 pounds per hour, when developing twice the nominal power.

Comparisons were made with different classes of engines, which in point of economy of fuel and speed obtained, gave a decided superiority to the Briton engines.

The author's experience led him to think that with these engines there is somewhat less wear and tear than with the ordinary engines, as the pressures and strains are more uniform and less liable to sudden shocks.

In conclusion, he stated his opinion that the "compound" system of engine has been a gradual but marked step in the improvement of steam-ship propulsion with respect to economy of fuel; as important as the injection" condenser over the simple high pressure -discharging the used steam into the atmosphere, or the surface

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