Descartes, Spinoza and the New PhilosophyT. and T. Clark, 1904 - 245 ページ |
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absolute abstract activity affirms Albert Burgh Aristotle attributes axiom of causality axioms Cartesian philosophy causality certainty chimæra Church clear and distinct Cogito Conatus conceived conception conclusion consciousness definition Descartes desire determination divine doctrine doubt Elwes emotions endeavour error essence eternal Ethics existence experience explain extension fact final causes finite freedom human mind imagination imperfect infinite influence intellect intelligence kind of knowledge Kuno Fischer laws ledge Leibniz limited look Malebranche mathematics meaning mechanical mediæval mental method Middle Ages mind and matter mode Natura naturata nature necessary necessity objective reality particular things pass perception perfect physical possible present presuppositions principle problem proof properties proposition quæ quam quantity of motion question reason regard relation res extensa scholasticism Scholium sensations sense soul Spinoza spirit substance teleological thinking thought tion true idea truth understand unity universe volition W. H. HUDSON
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47 ページ - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.
159 ページ - Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.
157 ページ - In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
198 ページ - If they cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them not a little in their search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving...
48 ページ - I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change ; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for...
73 ページ - ... a pure production or fiction of my mind, for it is not in my power to take from or add to it ; and consequently there but remains the alternative that it is innate, in the same way as is the idea of myself.
212 ページ - I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.) From symbols, eg, from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things (II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding things KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST KIND, OPINION, or IMAGINATION.
68 ページ - But as to all the other qualities of which the ideas of corporeal things are composed, to wit, extension, figure, situation and motion, it is true that they are not formally in me, since I am...
146 ページ - What that character is we shall show in due time, namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature.