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good Graces of a Minifter. Even at the Treafury, there Anno Tr.Geo.II. are Methods for ftopping and retarding the Payment of thatMoney which is due to an Officer, if he happens to be out of Favour with the chief Man at the Board. Profecutions and vexatious Suits of feveral Kinds may be fet up against him. Such Things, I fay, may be done, and, I fay fo, because I know it by Experience. I have had ******

If our Army, my Lords, were properly regulated, and both Officer and Soldier rendered as independent of Minifters as other Subjects are, I fhould perhaps find no Fault with keeping it up, were it more numerous than it is; but from what I have faid, it will appear, that, as long as it continues under its prefent Regulation, it will always be extreamly dangerous for any Officer to incur the Difpleasure of a Minifter; and as fome late Precedents may perhaps make Officers believe, that their Commiffions depend upon a Tenure very different from what they were formerly thought to depend on, therefore, unless fome new Regulations are made, I fhall always think a numerous Standing Army of the most dangerous Confequence to our Liberties; for which Reason I shall always be for reducing it as much as poffible; and as no Danger nor Inconvenience can enfue from the Reduction now propofed, I think it ought to be agreed

to.

The Lord Bathurst.

My Lords,

I was a little furprized to hear the least Objection made a- Lord Bathurfi. gainst the Regularity of any thing faid by the noble Lord that spoke laft. *In my Opinion, he neither faid, nor attempted to fay any thing but what was extreamly proper, and what ought to have great Weight in this Debate; for if any Means have been lately made use of, for making the Officers of our Army fubfervient to an Adminiftration, both in their civil and military Capacity, it is high Time for us to return to our antient Conftitution, which never admitted of a Standing Army's being kept up within this Kingdom in Time of Peace. The noble Lord has, 'tis true, but lately into this Houfe; but he came, my Lords, by a very antient Title, which makes his Cafe very different from those who come by a new Title; for as those who come by

come

an

In both Houfes of Parliament, fome Rules for fpeaking are eftablifhed, and no Member is to be interrupted, unless he attempts to tranfgrefs thofe Rules. If he does, any Member may rife up, and object againft his proceeding in that Manner. This was twice the Cafe with refpect to fome Things faid by the noble Lord; being interrupted by the Earls of Cholmondeley and Ila; but the Houfe allowed him to proceed what he had begun,

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Anno 11.Geo.II, an old Title, have, from their Infancy, a Prospect of coming here, they may be fuppofed to have ftudied our Methods of proceeding from their Infancy; whereas no fuch Suppofition can be made in favour of those who come in by a new Title. Accordingly the noble Lord, ever fince he took his Place, and particularly upon this Occafion, has fhewn us, that he is perfectly acquainted with our Forms and Me thods of Proceeding. He began his Difcourfe, by reprefenting to us the Danger of making Gentlemen's Commiffions in the Army ferve as a Handle for fubjecting them to the arbitrary Will of a Minifter. He fhewed us that this would be the Cafe, if we fhould allow their Commiffions to be made precarious; and if he knew any other Methods that might be ufed, or that had been used, for rendering the Officers of our Army fubfervient to an Administration, was there any thing more proper, was there any thing more neceffary, to be laid before us on this Occafion? My Lords, what he faid upon this Subject was fo far from being improper, that, I think, it highly deferves our Confideration : It ought to be enquired into, before we give our Opinion upon the prefent Queftion, or at least before we pass the Bill now under our Confideration; for if any Methods have been, or can be, made ufe of, for making an Officer fuffer, on account of what he fays in this Houfe, or on account of his not being in the good Graces of a Minifter, we ought either to difband our whole Army, or, in this Bill, we ought to make fuch Regulations as may prevent fuch Practices for the future.

After having faid thus much with respect to Order, I must beg Leave, my Lords, to take Notice of fome Things that fell from a noble Lord who fpoke last but one. His Lordship was pleased to fay, that in every Country there must be a military Force kept, of fome Kind or other; that the military Force kept up, ought to be fufficient for defending the People against Invafions and Infurrections; and that this military Force muft now, in this Kingdom, always confift in a Standing mercenary Army, because of the Difufe of Arms and military Difcipline among the reft of our People. I fhall grant, my Lords, that every Country ought to be provided with a military Force, of fome Kind or other, fufficient for protecting the Country against foreign Invafions, and the Government against factious or feditious Infurrections; but I am far from thinking it neceffary to have that military Force modelled into a mercenary Standing Army; and if it were, I am far from thinking, that Army ought to be fo modelled, as to be under a flavish Subjection to the Crown, or to any one Man in the Country.

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Suppofe, my Lords, it were neceffary for us to keep a Anno 11. Geo. Ir. Standing Army always in Pay Suppofe we could contrive no other Sort of military Force, upon which we could depend, for preferving us from Invafions and Infurrections ; yet I can fee no Reason for having that Army under fuch Regulations, as must keep both Officers and Soldiers under a fort of flavish Submiffion to the Crown, and confequently to him who happens to be the favourite Minister at the Time; which will be the certain Confequence, if it fhould be once established as a Maxim, that Officers may be preferred and even turned out of their Commiffions, at the arbitrary Will of a Minifter. This gives a Man fuch an arbitrary Power over the Army, that no Society ought to grant it even in Time of War; for it was this that enabled feveral Roman Generals to make ufe of the Armies of their Country for conquering their Country, and at laft enabled Julius Cæfar, by the fame Means, to fubdue the Liberties of his Country. But to grant fuch a Power in Time of Peace, is not only quite unneceffary, but abfolutely inconfiftent with the Liberties of a free People; for, as that Army muft in fome measure be Slaves to the Crown, or rather to the Minifters of the Crown, it is not to be expected that they will long continue to have a Regard for the Liberties of the People; and if the Army be fufficient for protecting the People, they must be fufficient for fubduing and enflaving the People, as foon as their Superiors fhall give them the Word of Command.

Our Liberties and Properties, my Lords, depend upon. the Laws of our Country, but it is by the military Force of the Country only, that thofe Laws can be made effectual; and if ever that military Force fhould happen to fall under an abfolute Dependence upon those who have a Mind to render our Liberties and Properties precarious, our Laws will be of no Significance. Our Liberties and Properties therefore depend, at leaft, as much upon the Officers of our Army, as they can do upon our Judges. By Experience we know how precarious our Liberties and Properties were, whilft our Judges depended upon the arbitrary Will of Minifters ; can we expect they will be fecure, as long as the Officers of our Army are fubject to the fame fort of mean and flavish Dependence? By the Act of Settlement we took Care to prevent, for the future, our Judges from being under any fuch Dependence, by enacting that their Commiffions fhould be quam diu fe bene gefferint, and that their Salaries should be established; and if we must for ever hereafter keep up a certain Number of regular Troops, which I fhall always call a Standing Army, I think it is abfolutely neceffary for us to make the fame Regulation with refpect to the 1737-8. Officer's

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Anno 11.Geo.II. Officers of that Army. This, I fay, my Lords, is abfolutely neceffary for the Prefervation of our Liberties and Properties; and, if ever we do make fuch a Regulation, I hope it will be made in fuch a Manner, as to put it out of the Power of our Judges to weaken it, by any Interpretation they can put upon it; for as they have, by their Interpretation, rendered their own Commiffions more precarious than the Law, I am convinced, defigned them, we can hardly expect they will fhew a greater Regard for the Commiffions of the Officers of our Army.

Whilft the Commiffion of every Officer of our Army, lies at the Mercy of an ambitious Prince or guilty Minister, (and how many Princes can be faid not to be ambitious, how many Minifters can be faid to be innocent ?) I fay, my Lords, whilft this is the Cafe, we are expofed to the Danger of having our Liberties and Properties taken from us, not only against Law, but according to Law; for as there are now, as there always must be a great many Officers in both Houses of Parliament, we can hardly expect that they will all either think or vote freely, when they know, that the Lofs of their Commiffions must be the Confequence of their thinking, or voting, contrary to the Sentiments of the prime Minifter. If this were the Cafe, I believe few of them would make an Enquiry about the Right or the Wrong of any Question; the only Enquiry would be, whether fuch a Lord, or fuch a Member, feemed to approve of it; and the Prince or Minifter would always take Care to have a proper Beacon in each Houfe of Parliament, for directing his Officers how to avoid thofe Shoals, upon which their Commiffions might be Ship-wreck'd; by which Means a guilty and rapacious Minifter might ride triumphant over our Liberties and Properties, or an ambitious Prince might get fuch Laws paffed, as would render both precarious.

I muft, upon this Occafion, my Lords, in a particular Manner, recommend the Cafe of our Officers to the Confideration of the reverend Bench. None of them, I am fure, would vote against their Confcience for any Confideration; but, I hope, they will confider what Difficulties a reverend Prelate would labour under, if it were in the Power of a Minister to ftrip him of his Temporalities, in cafe he should, upon any Occafion, take upon him to differ in Opinion from the Minifter, and vote according to his own Confcience. Thank God! the Prelates of our Church are, by the Law as it now ftands, fecured against being brought under fuch Difficulties; and if they were not, I am perfuaded they would, in fuch a Cafe, defpife every earthly Confideration; but the Officers of our Army are, and always, muft be, but Laymen;

Laymen; and therefore they can never pretend to have fuch Anno 11. Geo II• a Contempt for the Vanities of this World.

The antient military Force of this Kingdom, my Lords, confifted in the Bravery and Difcipline of our Men in general, and the Officers of our Armies were fuch as neither depended upon the Crown for their Support, nor for their Commands in the Army: They were generally fuch as held their Commands by their Tenures, or fuch as were chofen by their respective Counties. The chief Command only belong'd to the King, and even in that, he was always obliged to depute fome Perfon, who was not only a Man of great Fortune, but of a good Character in his Country: for, our Armies, in thofe Days, would not have fubmitted to the Command of a Man, who was fufpected of being the mere Tool of a Court. It was by fuch Armies that we defended ourfelves against foreign Invafions: It was by fuch Armies that we defended ourfelves against Court-Favourites, and thereby preferved our Liberties. What we now call our Militia, under the Command of the King's Lieutenants, is but a late Invention; which was never authorized by Parliament till after the Restoration, when every Thing, that could any way be pretended to as a Prerogative of the Crown, was agreed to and confirmed by Parliament.

Our Militia was then, 'tis true, my Lords, put under the abfolute Direction of the Crown, but at the fame Time it was put under fuch Regulations, as have made it as useless as it is harmless; which really feems to have been the Design of fome of thofe who were the Contrivers of that Scheme: They feem to have foreseen, that the Militia they were then about to establish, would be useless, and therefore, the Ifles of Purbeck and Wight, which are the Places moft expofed to Invafions, were excepted out of the Act, and continued upon their antient Footing. Whether the establishing our Militia in fuch a manner, as to render it ufelefs, was contrived by the Court, with a Defign to make ftanding Armies neceffary, or if it was contrived by the true Lovers of Liberty, because they could not ftem the Torrent, which was then fo ftrong, for granting the King an abfolute Power over the Millitia, I fhall not pretend to determine; but this I will pretend to foretel, that if the whole military Force we provide for our Defence against Invafions and Infurrections, be put under an abfolute Subjection to Court-Favourites, they may for fome Time defend us against Invafions and Infurrections, but we cannot expect that they, who are themselves Slaves, will defend our Liberties against the Encroachments that may hereafter be made upon them by Minifters and Court-Favourites. For this Reafon, if a standing Army be now the only military Force we can truft to, and therefore a 1737-8 Pp 2

fort

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