me no trifling matter, and there fore it makes a most material difference. I allude, my lords, to the declaration of his majesty, where it is stated that the French, from the outset of the negotiation, agreed to proceed upon the basis of actual possession, subject to the interchange of such equivalents as might be for the advantage and honour of the two countries. Now I confess, that, after a most careful examination of these papers, I have found nothing in the whole of them that can be considered as a certain and unequivocal foundation for such a declaration. Before the arrival of lord Yarmouth in London, the basis of actual possession was so far from being agreed upon, that another very different was expressly stated to be the grounds upon which the French government would enter upon a negotiation. Lord Yarmouth, indeed, gives a statement in writing as a conversation which he had with Talleyrand, and he, no doubt, firmly believed that Talleyrand had proposed the basis of actual possession. But in looking over the papers, and examining with all the attention in my power the written account which the noble lord has given of that conversation, I can find nothing that can afford a distinct, precise, and unequivocal proof that the basis of actual possession was clearly agreed to by the French minister. It was not sufficient, then, that lord Yarmouth understood that the basis of actual possession had been acceded to by Talleyrand. But you ought to have demanded a precise and categorical recognition of that basis as a preliminary step, before you gave full powers to treat to your negotiator. This would have avoided all obscurity. There could have

been no room, at least no fair grounds, for cavilling after this. I do not by any means object to previous communications: these may be useful and even necessary. Neither do I object to their production; but, as they form no part of the essence of the proceedings, they cannot be admitted as the only proof of the particular basis agreed upon. This ought to be clearly seen from the written and essential documens, and of all others this is the point upon which precision is necessary. sary. But more particularly in the present instance, the utmost precision is to be expected, after the declaration which has been made by his majesty, that the French government, from the beginning, admitted the basis of actual possession.

Lord Sidmouth contended that though the basis of uti possidetis was not distinctly laid down in the written communications of the French government, yet that the tenor of all that occurred during the negotiation, afforded such strong presumption as amounted to complete proof, when taken together with the circumstance, that lord Yarmouth had been authorised to state that principle as the basis on which the negotiation was to be opened. Adverting to the state of the continent, he allowed that we had nothing on which we could rely for co-operation in our future contests with France, but Russia; it was certainly therefore impossible to look at the continent without alarm, but he would admit that there was not any cause for dismay. While the connection between that power and this country existed, hope would remain. It ought also to be considered, that the power which France now possessed was chiefly to be ascribed to C 4

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the military genius of her chief. With his death it would decrease if not terminate, and even during his life it could by no means be regarded as permanent. If this man were not to be a sole instance of the immutability of fortune, a single reverse would be more fatal to him than to any distinguished conqueror of former times.

Lord Grosvenor approved the principles exemplified by ministers throughout the whole course of the negotiation.

Lord Eldon and lord Lauderdale spoke on the subject, when the address was agreed to nem. diss.

On the 5th of January the same business was brought on in the house of commons; when

Lord Howick rose, and spoke in substance as follows:-" Sir, the papers relative to the late negotiation, which were laid before this house by command of his majesty, having been so long in the hands of every member, it now becomes my duty, in conformity to the usage on such occasions, to submit to you such propositions as the consideration of them naturally suggests, and to move an address containing the sentiments which the house, I flatter myself, must be disposed to convey to the throne upen a subject so interesting to the public. In rising to perform this duty, I cannot but feel a deep regret, a deep and poignant regret, at the failure of an effort, on our part made with sincerity, and pursued with good faith, to put an end to the war upon terms advan. tageous to this country, and to all Europe; a regret in any circumstances justifiable and becoming, but at present aggravated by the events which have lately occurred upon the continent, and which seem to render the attainment of

that object more difficult and more distant than ever. But besides these subjects of regret and of sorrow, I feel myself affected by painful emotions of a more private and personal nature. It is impossible for me to forget by whom, had it so pleased God, this important bu siness would have been opened to the house. I cannot therefore present myself to your notice on this occasion, without being reminded of the infinite loss I have personally sustained in being deprived of my friend, of my instructor, without whom I should have felt no confidence in myself; and in reflecting upon the worth and the talents of Mr. Fox, the loss which the public have sustained is irresistibly forced upon my recollec tion. But if any thing could support and encourage me in the discharge of the duty now imposed upon me, it is the knowledge I possess of the principles and opinions which Mr. Fox held upon this subject, till he ceased to think at all; it is a. knowledge that every sentiment of his heart, every effort of his faculties, was directed to secure the power, the peace, and the prosperity of his country. If I could suppose that the object of the proposition with which I shall conclude, would obtain that general concurrence it has received out of doors, and which indeed it has received in another house of parliament, my task would be generally lightened. But I know too well the severity of criticism, which I must expect to encounter here; and aware of the doubts which some gentlemen have signified respecting the conduct of the nego tiation, the best way of removing them will be to give a clear and detailed statement of the whole transaction, to show that on the

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one hand the honour of the crown and the interests of the country were not committed by any unworthy concessions; and on the other hand to satisfy those, if there be any such, who may be inclined to disapprove of the result, that no means were left unemployed to obtain such a peace as might be consistent with the honcur, the interests, and the prosperity of this nation. I do not know whether it will now be necessary to employ any argument to prove that peace is always desirable, and that it was proper with the view of obtaining it to negotiate. The question how ever is, whether admitting the general proposition to be true, did we stand in such a situation at the opening of the negotiation, as made it advisable to conclude a peace upon such fair and reasonable terms as we had a right to expect? I apprehend, then, that after the failure of the third coalition, after the fatal day of Austerlitz, there are few who will dispute that peace was desirable, provided it could be obtained without any sacrifices of our honour, without stripping us of the means of renew. ing the war, in case it was rendered necessary by the conduct of the enemy. Nay, some may think, that, without calculating upon its long duration, peace upon such terms was desirable, to procure a temporary repose, If these were the views which our situation naturally suggested, what were the principles on which negotiation was to be undertaken? Here I may refer for an answer to the second let ter of Mr. Fox, in which he says, that the object of both parties should be a peace honourable for both, and their respective allies; and at the same time of a naure to secure, as far as in their power,

the future tranquillity of Europe.' These principles I beg the house to keep in mind in judging of the conduct of ministers in the whole of the negotiation. Out of these sentiments, so expressed by Mr. Fox, grew several other points, and the leading principles or basis of the whole transaction. First, it was implied that we were to negotiate in conjunction with Russia; and secondly, that we should negotiate on the basis of actual possession, because, in order to be honourable, the negotiation must be equal; and it could not be equal, unless it presumed that neither party was reduced to the necessity of making concessions for purchas ing peace. A peace negotiated upon such a principle, as that indicated in the letter of Mr. Fox, necessarily must have been honourable to ourselves, because it preserved our honour and our good faith, and looked to the general tranquillity of Europe. That the first overture came from France, I believe will now hardly be disputed. On a former day the right honourable gentleman opposite (Mr. Canning) told us, that though the cause of the country was clear upon the face of the transaction, yet it was necessary for the vindication of ministers, as the attorneys for the nation, that they should prove three points: first, that the offer had been made by the enemy; secondly, that it was an offer to negotiate on the basis of actual possession; and thirdly, that we had observed good faith to our allies. As I have said, that the overture came from the enemy will hardly be disputed. That in answer to Mr. Fox's letter respecting the assassin, an answer was received from M. Talleyrand, inviting a friendly discussion, is evi

dent

dent from the papers on the table. But, say the honourable gentlemen, it was on a different basis from that of actual possession. To be sure, it was; but what was the answer of Mr. Fox? Did he accept such an offer? Did he not answer distinctly that such abasis was wholly inadmissible, and the basis of the treaty of Amiens must of itself lead to confusion and embarrassment; as, besides other objections, it was capable of being interpreted in four different ways? It is unquestionably true, that considering the state of things at the commencement of the present war, no good could be expected from a negotiation on the basis of the treaty of Amiens, and Talleyrand quickly gives it up; and, indeed, falls into a train of observation that necessarily implies a basis of actual possession. He says, that it was not this nor that which led to the rupture of the peace, but causes quite independent of any state of possession; while he says, in express words, the emperor desires nothing which England possesses. You are great at sea, France is powerful by land, and France is willing to make great concessions for the sake of peace.' What else could such observations lead to, but a recognition of the basis of actual possession? I do not, how ever, mean to say that the letters of Talleyrand make any direct of fer of the basis of uti possidetis. I have quoted them in explanation of the sentiments he entertained, and illustrative of what afterwards occurred. The offer of treating on the basis of actual possession was indeed directly made in another shape; and Talleyrand's letters show that he himself was aware that it was the only fair basis applicable to the situation of

the two countries. In the letters, indeed, between Mr. Fox and M. Talleyrand, the discussion was chiefly upon the manner of treat ing, whether jointly with our allies, or separately. The proposal to treat separately was distinctly rejected by Mr. Fox in his answer to M. Talleyrand's dispatch, which I have just quoted. Talleyrand in his reply still insists on separate negotiations, and resorts to argu ments about the failure of the coalition, telling us that we had no concern in those transactions which the arms of France had dis comfited, forgetting that formerly Great Britain had been held forth as the author and inciter of these wars; forgetting too the unpa ralleled achievements of the 19th of October, followed up by the success of sir Richard Strachan, by which France must have so deeply felt the share which this country took in the events of that war. Talleyrand, too, talks of the danger of being outvoted in some new parliament or congress of the dif ferent powers. But it is needless to dwell upon the sophistry and absurdity of these reasonings. They vanished before the concise and luminous statements of Mr. Fox in his letter of the 20th of April, in which he shows how little such matters had to do with the real merits of the discussion. But this dispatch of the 20th of April remained unanswered so long, that it was thought by this government that the overture made by the enemy would have no further result; and indeed it is evident from the last paragraph of Mr. Fox's letter that he considered the matter as all over. Here, then, I would ask, whether up to this period of the negotiation there is any thing which any man can blame, any thing