ments with her, as he did not scruple to liken to the family compact, and one of the avowed objects of which new compact was "the breaking up the colonial and monopolizing systems "of all nations."

The American government had too much wisdom and jus tice to enter into the proffered league; but offered to nego. tiate a new commercial treaty; which the rulers of France and their successors, finding the United States deaf to their fraternal overtures, thought it best to decline.

From this explanation, added to the facts in the text, it will appear, that the claim which America and other neutral states might speciously set up to a qualification of the rule of the war 1756, on the score of relaxations, prior to the late or present war, in the colonial system of France, is of a very narrow extent; and far short of what the author suggested as a proper subject of amicable concession on the part of this country.

Waving the consideration, that the special privileges of free ports, cannot reasonably be regarded as relaxations of the colonial monopoly in general, so as at all to affect the principle in question, in respect of places not within the limits of those privileged districts; the utmost latitude of the trade allowed in those free ports to foreigners, was the exportation of rum, taffia, and molasses, and the importation of enumerated articles; and the latter, as has been observed, did not include the grand staple of North America, flour, in finding a market, for which, the landholders of that country are more largely interested, perhaps, than in all the rest of the commerce that passes under their flag.

The enumerated articles of importation were, wood or lumber, pit coal, live animals, fatted beef, salted fish, rice, Indian corn, vegetables, green hides, peltry, turpentine, and tar; but the last ordinance, that of 1785, materially abridged the commerce in one of the chief articles, salted fish, by imposing heavy duties on that commodity when imported by foreign

ørs, and giving bounties on its importation from the national fisheries; which, together, would have amounted to a prohibition of the former, if natives could have fully supplied the demand.

As to the principal staples of the West Indies, sugar, coffee, cotton, &c. the privileges even of the free ports, in no degree extended to them; nor were they ever at any time exported in time of peace in foreign bottoms, unless by smugglers. So far, we see, were the United States from raising their views to a trade in these valuable articles, that when they agreed to give an unlimited and perpetual right of exportation from their ports to the French colonists, duty free, in respect of all merchandize whatsoever, they bargained only in return for the free exportation of molasses.

212 and 217, (S).

It would be difficult to notice without ridicule, if the gravity of the subject, and respect for the government and people of the United States, did not restrain all risible emotions, a menace to which the neutralisers have lately resorted.

These French and Spanish agents gravely tell us, that if we do not acquiesce in their own injurious pretensions, "the government of America will prohibit the exportation of if flour and other provisions to the British West Indies, and starve our sugar colonies."

Asking pardon of that wise and highly respectable government, for admitting, for argument's sake, the supposition of such a preposterous attempt, how, I would ask these gentlemen, do they hope to make the prohibition in any degree effectual?

America, during the last war, indignant, not at imaginary

wrongs, not at the temperate resistance of her own unneutral conduct, but at gross, unprovoked, insulting, multiplied injuries from France, interdicted all commerce whatever with that country and its colonies, armed at great expence to obtain redress, commenced even some actual hostilities, and in every part of the United States the public feelings heartily engaged in the quarrel; yet the prohibitory law was widely and openly evaded, and the French islands were perhaps never more copiously supplied with American provisions, earried in American bottoms. Their ships cleared out for St. Bartholomew and ran into Guadaloupe; they cleared out for Baracoa in Cuba, or Jamaica, and ran into the ports of St. Domingo, even into ports occupied by Rigaud, the most furious partisan of the French government. They returned to America with cargoes shipped in those colonies, disguising the contraband transaction, in all cases, only by the flimsiest veils.

These facts are sufficiently attested by the records of our Court of Appeals in Prize Causes; for great numbers of these smugglers were captured by our ships of war, from an opinion that, on account of the inchoate hostilities between the United States and France, they were lawful prize, as being engaged in a trade with a common enemy.

These alarmists might be further posed by another case, still more closely applicable in its circumstances, to that with which they threaten us.

The countries now composing the United States, were once hostile to our sugar islands, and the direct commercial intercourse between these enemies was cut off by mutual prohibitions, Yet the latter were not starved. The advocates of the revolted colonies then predicted that dreadful consequence, but were wholly disappointed. The prices of American provisions and lumber, were not even advanced to the same dearth which they have attained during the last and present war. Let it be observed too, that at that period our own

laws rigidly excluded the direct trade in question, and were well inforced, but the neutral islands were the convenient magazines in which the American cargoes were deposited, and from which our planters were supplied.

In that unhappy case, the possibility of which is for the ar gument's sake supposed, the same entrepôts would be an effectual resource; and the supply of our islands would be restored to the very same channels, through which, by the effects of the American intercourse act, it now always flows in time of peace. But this is said only on the supposition that his Majesty's government might not choose to admit of the trade in hostile bottoms. Should our ports be opened to them, with safe conducts, the vessels of the United States would bring in their native commodities as freely as at this moment, in spite of war and prohibitions. The only difference would be, that our planters would be much more cheaply supplied than at present; for in the case supposed, the trade to the hostile colonies would be in great measure cut off by our cruizers, and the produce of the United States therefore would find scarcely any other safe West India markets than our own. One of the many disadvantages which our colonies sustain in the present state of things, is that the permission to ship sugar, coffee, and cotton, naturally induces the neutrals to prefer the ports of our enemies to those of our own islands, by which the former obtain a pre-emption of the outward cargoes, and their price in the latter is raised.

The menace to which these remarks are opposed, would in truth have far more terrors for the American farmers than for our own planters, were it capable of being carried into effect. To tell that numerous and important class of American citizens, that they should not send their produce to market, would be like bidding them " hold their breath and die."

And under what circumstances, is the American government supposed to adopt and enforce so strong a measure? It must be at a juncture the most difficult and alarm

ing that can be imagined; at a time when, by the ruin of its commerce and its commercial revenue (infallible conse quences of a war with this country) it would have no resources for the great, and extraordinary demands of maritime war, but very heavy interior taxation.

By the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States to Congress in December 1801, the public revenue of every description was estimated annually to produce from 1802 to 1809, inclusively, as follows :—

The ordinary establishment was estimated at

per annum...........

Which would leave a surplus of.....................7,100,000 dollars for the payment of interest and reduction of the prin cipal of the public debt.

From these premises it appears, that external commerce contributes more than nine-tenths of the whole revenue of the country; and that if this source of supply were cut off, all the present internal duties, with the aid of the proceeds of public lands, would be so far from sufficing to keep down the interest of the subsisting debt, that they would not satisfy one third of the expences of the peace establishment: there would remain a deficit of 2,400,000 dollars to be provided for, beyond the interest of the public debt, before any war fund could be raised.

Now that the exterior commerce of America, if not wholly cut off, would be soon reduced to a very low ebb by a war with Great Britain, cannot be doubted: internal taxes there. fore would be necessary to supply the loss of revenue, and to