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WAR IN DISGUISE,

&c.

THE

HE hope of Peace, which long, though faintly, gleamed from the North, has vanished; the political atmosphere of Europe is become darker than ever; and the storm menaces a wider range, as well as a lengthened duration.

At such a period, it is natural to cast forward an anxious glance toward the approaching events of war, and to calculate anew the chances of a happy or disastrous issue of this momentous contest: but it is wise also to look backward, to review the plan on which the war has hitherto been conducted, and inquire, whether experience has not proved it to be in some points, erroneous or defective.

The season seems favourable for improvement, especially in our offensive measures, since new

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relations will, in all probability, demand an important change in them; while the acquisition of allies, however powerful and active, will diminish in no degree the duty of putting forth our utmost exertions.

Fatal might be that assistance in the war, which should lead us to cherish less carefully our own independent means of annoyance or defence. The arch enemy of the civilized world, in the prospect of having a new confederacy to contend with, like Satan when opposed to the angelic phalanx, is" collecting all his might," and seems to be preparing, for his continental foes at least, an impetuous attack; nor are their preparations of a character less decisive

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"One stroke they aim,

"That may determine, and not need repeat."

A single campaign, if disastrous to our allies, may realise some of the late threats of Buonaparte. He may acquire" a new line of coast, new ports, "new countries," and then, he fairly tells us the consequence" the defeat of our confederates "would be reflected back upon ourselves"would leave France more at liberty than ever "to turn her whole attention to her war, with "this country, and to employ against us still aug"mented means of annoyance;" it would render our dangers, as he truly says, " more imminent,"

though, I trust, he is mistaken in the insulting conclusion, that it would " insure our fall*."

The plan which this exasperated enemy has formed for our destruction, is of a nature far more formidable than that which he ostentatiously displayed. The flotilla at Boulogne, and the army of the coast, have chiefly excited our attention; but the restitution of his regular marine, and the increase of the confederated navies, have been the Usurper's more rational dependence, and the means of war which he has been indefatigably labouring to provide. Enraged at the interruption of this plan by his quarrel with Austria, he now avows in his complaints, its real nature and magnitude. He asserts to the Germanic Diet, ❝ that he has been employing all the resources "of his empire, to construct fleets, to form his "marine, and to improve his ports †;" nor is the important fact unfounded, though alleged by Buonaparte.

These dangerous efforts may be in some measure diverted by the new continental war; but they will not be wholly suspended; and should we again be left singly to sustain the contest,

* See an official article in the Moniteur of August 16th or 17th, copied into the London papers of the 28th.

+ Paper presented by M. Bacher to the Diet of Ratisbon, Moniteur of September 11th.

they will, of course, be resumed on their former scale, with renovated vigour and effect.

In preparations like these, consist the chief danger, not only of England, but of Europe; for the fall of this country, or what would be the same in effect, the loss, at this perilous conjuncture, of our superiority at sea, would remove from before the ambition of France almost every obstacle by which its march to universal empire could be finally impeded.

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Nor let us proudly disdain to suppose the possibility of such a reverse. Let us reflect what the navies of France, Spain, and Holland once were; let us consider that these countries form but a part of those vast maritime regions, the united resources of which are now at the command of the same energetic government * and if these considerations are not enough to repel a dangerous confidence, let those great maritime advantages of the enemy, which the fol lowing pages will expose, be added to the large account; for I propose to shew, in the encroachments and frauds of the neutral flags, a nursery and a refuge of the confederated navies; as well as the secret conduits of a large part of those imperial resources, the pernicious application of

* Genoa alone, it is computed, can supply 10,000 able

seamen.

which to the restitution of his marine, the Usurper has lately boasted-I propose to shew in them his best hopes in a naval war; as well as channels of a revenue, which sustains the ambition of France, and prolongs the miseries of Europe.

In the retrospect of the last war, and of the progress we have yet made in the present, one singular fact immediately arrests the attention.

The finances of France appear scarcely to be impaired, much less exhausted, by her enormous military establishments, and extensive enterprizes, notwithstanding the ruin so long apparently imposed on her commerce. Poverty, the ordinary sedative of modern ambition, the common peace-maker between exasperated nations, seems no longer to be the growth of war.

The humblest reader in this land of politicians, if he has raised his eyes so high as to the lore of Poor Robin's Almanack, has learned that-"War begets poverty, poverty peace, &c."; but now, he may reasonably doubt the truth of this simple pedigree; while the statesman, must be staggered to find the first principles of his art shaken by this singular case.

In fact, political writers have been greatly embarrassed with it; and have laboured to account for it by the unprecedented nature of the interior situation and policy of France, or from the rapacious conduct of her armies; but none of these

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