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theories were quite satisfactory when promulged; and they have since, either been shaken by the failure of those prospective consequences which were drawn from them, or have been found inadequate to explain the new and extended dif ficulties of the case.

Let ample credit be taken for revolutionary confiscations at home, and military rapine abroad, for the open subsidies, or secret contributions of allies, and for the gifts or loans extorted from neutral powers, by invasion or the menace of war; still the aggregate amount, however enormous in the eye of justice and humanity, must be small when compared to the prodigious expences of France.

...In aid of that ordinary revenue, of which commerce was the most copious source, these extraordinary supplies may, indeed, be thought to have sufficed; but when we suppose the commercial and colonial resources of France to have been ruined by our hostilities during a period of near twelve successive years, the brief term of the late peace excepted; and when we remember that she has not only sustained, during a still longer period, and with scarcely any cessation*, a war arduous and costly beyond all example, but has fed, in

*A most expensive contest with the negroes in the West Indies, filled up the whole interval between the last and pre

sent war.

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addition to her military myriads, those numerous swarms of needy and rapacious upstarts, who have successively fastened on her treasury, and fattened by its spoil; I say, when these exhausting circumstances are taken into the account, the adequacy of the supply to the expenditure, seems, notwithstanding the guilty resources which have been mentioned, a paradox hard to explain. Were the ordinary sources of revenue really lost, those casual aids could no more maintain the vast interior and exterior expences of France,than the autumnal rains in Abyssinia could fill the channel of the Nile, and enable it still to inundate the plains of Egypt, if its native stream were drawn off.

Besides, the commerce and the colonial resources of Spain and Holland are, like those of France herself, apparently ruined by the war.When, therefore, we calculate on contributions from these allies, this common draw-back on their finances should diminish our general esti

mate.

If we look back on the wars that preceded the last, the difficulties in this subject will be enhanced.

To impoverish our enemies, used, in our former contests with France and Spain, to be a sure effect of our hostilities; and its extent was always pro portionate to that of its grand instrument, our

superiority at sea. we intercepted the

We distressed their trade, produce of their colonies, and thus exhausted their treasuries, by cutting off their chief sources of revenue, as the philosopher proposed to dry up the sea, by draining the rivers that fed it. By the same means, their expenditure was immensely increased, and wasted in defensive purposes. They were obliged to maintain fleets in distant parts of the world, and to furnish strong convoys for the protection of their intercourse with their colonies, both on the outward and homeward voyages. Again, the frequent capture of these convoys, while it enriched our seamen, and by the increase of import duties aided our revenue, obliged our enemies, at a fresh expence, to repair their loss of ships; and when a convoy outward-bound, was the subject of capture, compelled them either to dispatch duplicate supplies in the same season, at the risk of new disasters, or to leave their colonies in distress, and forfeit the benefit of their crops for the year.

In short, their transmarine possessions became expensive incumbrances, rather than sources of revenue; and through the iteration of such losses, more than by our naval victories, or colonial conquests, the house of Bourbon was vanquished by the masters of the sea.

Have we then lost the triumphant means of

such effectual warfare; or have the ancient fields of victory been neglected?

Neither such a misfortune, nor such folly, can be alleged. Never was our maritime superiority more decisive than in the last and present war. We are still the unresisted masters of every sea; and the open intercourse of our enemies with their colonies, was never so completely precluded; yet we do not hear that the merchants of France, Spain, and Holland are ruined, or that their colonies, are distressed, much less that their exchequers are empty.

The true solution of these seeming difficulties is this The commercial, and colonial interests of our enemies, are now ruined in appearance only, not in reality. They seem to have retreated from the ocean, and to have abandoned the ports of their colonies; but it is a mere ruse de guerreThey have, in effect, for the most part, only changed their flags, chartered many vessels really neutral, and altered a little the former routes of their trade. Their transmarine sources of revenue, have not been for a moment destroyed by our hostilities, and at present are scarcely impaired.

Let it not, however, be supposed, that the protection of the trade, and the revenue of an enemy, from the fair effects of our arms, is the only prejudice we have sustained by the abuse of

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the neutral flag. To the same pestilent cause, are to be ascribed various other direct and collateral disadvantages, the effects of which we have severely felt in the late and present war, and which now menace consequences still more pernicious, both to us, and our allies. Hitherto

we have suffered the grossest invasions of our belligerent rights, warrantably if not wisely; for the cost was all our own; and while the enemy totally abandoned the care of his marine, the sacrifice could more safely be made; but now, when he is eagerly intent on the restitution of his navy, and when other powers have gallantly stood forth to stem the torrent of French ambition, the assertion of our maritime rights is be. come a duty to them as well as to ourselves: for our contribution to an offensive war must be weak, or far less than may justly be expected from such an ally as Great Britain, while the shield of an insidious neutrality is cast between the enemy, and the sword of our naval power. In the hope of contributing to the correction of this great evil, I propose to consider—

1st. Its origin, nature, and extent.

2d. The remedy, and the right of applying it. 3d. The prudence of that resort.

There are few political subjects more impor tant, and few, perhaps, less generally understood by the intelligent part of the community, than

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