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of this detached and most extraordinary | intelligence, and considering the intimate alliance subsisting between Spain and Great Britain, as well as the circumstances under which he is placed in this country, he has urgently requested that I would accompany his representation with a letter on my part in support of it. After the solemn asseverations which you gave me in the month of July, that no intentions hostile to the Spanish interests in Florida existed on the part of your Government, I am wholly unable to suppose that Governor Matthews can have had orders from the President for the conduct which he is stated to be pursuing; but the measures he is stated to be taking in corresponding with traitors, and in endeavouring by bribery, and every art of seduction, to infuse a spirit of rebellion into the subjects of the King of Spain in those quarters, are such as to create the liveliest inquietude, and to call for the most early interference on the part of the Government of the United States.-The Government of the United States are well aware of the deep interest which his Royal Highness the Prince Regent takes in the security of Florida, for any attempt to occupy the Eastern part of which by the United States, not even the slightest pretext could be alledged, such as were brought forward in the endeavour to justify the aggression on West Florida.-I conceive it therefore to be my duty, Sir, in consideration of the alliance subsisting between Spain and Great Britain, and the interests of his Majesty's subjects in the West India Islands, so deeply involved in the security of East Florida, as well as in pursuance of the orders of my Government, in case of any attempt against that country, to lose no time in calling upon you for an explanation of the alarming steps which Governor Matthews is stated to be taking for subverting the Spanish authority in that country, requesting to be informed by you upon what authority he can be acting, and what measures have been taken to put a stop to his proceedings. Mr. Monroe to Mr. Foster.November

2, 1811.

Sir;-I have had the honour to receive your letter of Sept. 5th, and to submit it to the view of the President. The principles which have governed the United States in their measures relative to West Florida, have already been explained to you. With equal frankness I shall now com

municate the part they have acted with respect to East Florida.-In the letter which I had the honour to address to you on the 8th of July, I stated the injuries which the United States had received from Spain, since their revolutionary war, and particularly by their spoliations on their commerce by the last war, to a great amount, and by the suppression of their right of deposit at New Orleans, just before the commencement of the present war, for neither of which had reparation been made. A claim to indemnity for these injuries, is altogether unconnected with the question relating to West Florida, which was acquired by cession from France in 1803.-The Government of Spain has never denied the right of the United States to a just indemnity for spolia. tions on their commerce. In 1802 it explicitly admitted this right by entering into a Convention, the object of which was to adjust the amount of the claim, with a view to indemnity. The subsequent injury by the suppression of the deposit at New Orleans, produced an important change in the relations between the parties, which has never been accommodated. The United States saw in that measure eminent cause of war, as that war did not immediately follow, cannot be considered in any other light than as a proof of their moderation and pacific policy. The Executive could not believe that the Government of Spain would refuse to the United States the justice due to these accumu lated injuries, when the subject should be brought solemnly before it by a special mission. It is known that an Envoy Extraordinary was sent to Madrid in 1805, on this subject, and that the mission did not accomplish the object intended by it." -It is proper to observe, that in the negociation with Spain in 1805, the injuries complained of by the United States of the first class were again substantially admitted to a certain extent, as was that also occasioned by the suppression of the deposit at New Orleans, although the Spanish Government, by disclaiming the act, and imputing it to the intendant, sought to avoid the responsibility due from it; that to make indemnity to the United States for injuries of every kind, a cession of the whole territory claimed by Spain eastward of the Mississippi was made the subject of negociation, and that the amount of the sum demanded for it was the sole cause that a treaty was not then formed, and the territory added. The United States have

considered the government of Spain in-authorising the Executive to accept posdebted to them a greater sum for the in- session of East Florida from the local aujuries above stated than the province of thorities, or to take it against the attempt East Florida can, by any fair standard be- of a foreign power to occupy it, holding tween the parties, be estimated at. They it in either case subject to future and have looked to this Province for their in- friendly negociation. This act therefore demnity, and with the greater reason be- evinces the just and amicable views by cause the government of Spain itself has which the United States have been gocountenanced it. That they have suffered verned, towards Spain, in the measure autheir just claims so long unsatisfied, is a thorised by it. Our Ministers at London new and strong proof of their moderation, and Paris were immediately apprised of as it is of their respect for the disordered the act, and instructed to communicate condition of that power. There is, how- the purport of it to both governments, and ever, a period beyond which those claims to explain at the same time, in the most ought not to be neglected. It would be friendly manner, the motives which led to highly improper to the United States, in it. The President could not doubt that their respect for Spain, to forget what such an explanation would give all the they owe to their own character, and satisfaction that was intended by it. By a to the rights of their injured citizens. letter from the American Chargé d'Affaires Under these circumstances it would be at London, I observe that this explanation equally unjust and dishonourable in the was made to your Government in the United States to suffer East Florida to pass month of last. That it was not into the possession of any other power. sooner made, was owing the departure of Unjust, because they would thereby lose the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United the only indemnity within their reach, for States before the instruction was received. injuries which ought long since to have been redressed. Dishonourable, because, in permitting another power to wrest from them that indemnity, their inactivity and acquiescence could only be imputed to unworthy motives, situated as East Florida is, cut off from the other possessions of Spain, and surrounded in à great measure by the territory of the United States; and having also an important bearing on their commerce, no other power could think of taking. possession of it, with other than hostile views to them. Nor could any other power take possession of it without endangering their prosperity and best interests. The United States have not been ignorant or inattentive to what has been agitated in Europe, at different periods, since the commencement of the present war, in regard to the Spanish provinces in this hemisphere; nor have they been unmindful of the consequences into which the disorder of Spain might lead in regard to the Province in question, without due care to prevent it. They have been persuaded that remissness on their part might invite the danger, if it had not already done it, which it is so much their interest and desire to prevent. Deeply impressed with these considerations, and anxious, while they acquitted themselves to the just claims of their constituents, to preserve friendship with other powers, the subject was brought before the Congress at its last session, when an act was passed

I am persuaded, Sir, that you will see in this view of the subject very strong proof of the just and amicable disposition of the United States towards Spain, of which I treated in the conference to which you have alluded. The same disposition still exists; but it must be understood that it cannot be indulged longer than may comport with the safety, as well as with the rights and honour of the nation.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.

Mr. Foster to Mr. Monroe. July 3, 1811.

SIR, I have had the honour of stating to you verbally the system of defence to which his Majesty has been compelled to resort for the purpose of protecting the maritime rights and interests of his dominions against the new description of warfare that has been adopted by his enemies. I have presented to you the grounds upon which his Majesty finds himself still obliged to continue that system; and J conceive that I shall best meet your wishes as expressed to me this morning, if in a more formal shape I should lay before you the whole extent of the question, as it appears to his Majesty's government to exist between Great Britain and America. I beg leave to call your attention, Sir, to the principles on which his Majesty's Orders in Council were originally founded. The decree of Berlin was directly and expressly an act of war,

by which France prohibited all nations from trade or intercourse with Great Britain under peril of confiscation of their ships and merchandize; although France had not the means of imposing an actual blockade in any degree adequate to such a purpose. The immediate and professed object of this hostile decree was the destruction of all British commerce through means entirely unsanctioned by the law of nations, and unauthorised by any received doctrine of legitimate blockade.-This violation of the established law of civilized nations in war, would have justified Great Britain in retaliating upon the enemy by a similar interdiction of all commerce with France, and with such other countries as might co-operate with France in her system of commercial hostility against Great Britain. The object of Great Britain was not, however, the destruction of trade, but its preservation under such regulations as might be compatible with her own security, at the same time that she extended an indulgence to foreign commerce, which strict principles would have entitled her to withhold. The retaliation of Great Britain was not therefore urged to the full extent of her right; our prohibition of French trade was not absolute, but modified; and in return for the absolute prohibition of all trade with Great Britain, we prohibited not all commerce with France, but all such commerce with France as should not be carried on through Great Britain. It was evident that this system must prove prejudicial to neutral nations. This calamity was foreseen, and deeply regretted; but the injury to the neutral nation arose from the aggression of France, which had compelled Great Britain in her own defence to resort to adequate retaliatory measures of war. The operation on the American commerce of those precautions which the conduct of France had rendered indispensible to our security, is therefore to be ascribed to the unwarrantable aggression of France, and not to those proceedings on the part of Great Britain which that aggression had rendered necessary and just. The object of our system was merely to counteract an attempt to crush the British trade. Great Britain endeavoured to permit the Continent to receive as large a portion of commerce as might be practicable, through Great Britain; and all her subsequent regulations, and every modification of her system by new orders or modes of granting or withholding licences, have been calculated for

the purpose of encouraging the trade of neutrals through Great Britain, whenever such encouragement might appear advan tageous to the general interests of commerce, and consistent with the public safety of the nation. The justification of his Majesty's Orders in Council, and the continuance of that defence, have always been rested upon the existence of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, and on the perseverance of the enemy in the system of hostility which has subverted the rights of neutral commerce on the Continent; and it has always been declared on the part of his Majesty's Government, that whenever France should have effectually repealed the decrees of Berlin and Milan, and should have restored neutral commerce to the condition in which it stood previously to the promulgation of those decrees, we. should immediately repeal our Orders in Council.-France has asserted that the decree of Berlin was a measure of just retaliation on her part, occasioned by our previous aggression; and the French Government has insisted, that our system of blockade, as it existed previously to the decree of Berlin, was a manifest violation of the received law of nations. We must, therefore, Sir, refer to the articles of the Berlin decree, to find the principles of our system of blockade, which France considers to be new, and contrary to the law of nations.-By the 4th and Sth articles it is stated as a justification of the French decree, that Great Britain "extends to unfortified towns and commercial ports, to harbours, and to the mouths of rivers, those rights of blockade, which by reason and the usage of nations are applicable only to fortified places; and that the rights of blockade ought to be limited to fortresses really invested by a sufficient force."-It is added in the same articles, that Great Britain "has declared places to be in a state of blockade, before which she has not a single ship of war, and even places which the whole British force would be insufficient to blockade,-entire coasts, and a whole empire."-Neither the practice of Great Britain nor the law of nations has ever sanctioned the rule now laid down by France, that no place, excepting fortresses in a complete state of investiture, can be deemed lawfully blockaded by sea.-If such a rule were to be admitted, it would become nearly impracticable for Great Britain to attempt the blockade of any port of the Continent; and our submission to this perversion of the law of nations,

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should be abrogated, the blockade of May, 1.806, could not continue under our construction of the law of nations, unless that blockades should be maintained by a due application of an adequate naval force.— America appears to concur with France in asserting, that Great Britain was the original aggressor in the attack on neutral rights; and has particularly objected to the blockade of May, 1806, as an obvious instance of that aggression on the part of Great Britain. — Although the doctrines of the Berlin decree, respecting the rights of blockade, are not directly asserted by the American government, Mr. Pinkney's correspondence would appear to countenance the principles on which those doctrines are founded. The objection directly stated by America against the blockade of May, 1806, rests on a supposition that no naval force which Great Britain possessed, or could have employed for such a purpose, could have rendered that blockade effectual; and that, therefore it was necessarily irregular, and could not possibly be maintained in conformity to the law of nations.

while it would destroy one of the principal | liation on which those regulations are advantages of our naval superiority, would founded. But if the Orders in Council sacrifice the common rights and interests of all maritime states. It was evident that the blockade of May, 1806, was the principal pretended justification of the decree of Berlin; though neither the principles on which that blockade was founded, nor its practical operation, afforded any colour for the proceedings of France.-In point of date, the blockade of May, 1806, preceded the Berlin decree; but it was a just and legal blockade according to the established law of nations; because it was intended to be maintained, and was actually maintained by an adequate force appointed to guard the whole coast described in the notification, and consequently to enforce the blockade. -Great Britain has never attempted to dispute that in the ordinary course of the law of nations, no blockade can be justifiable or valid, unless it be supported by an adequate force destined to maintain it, and to expose to hazard all vessels attempting to evade its operation. The blockade of May, 1806, was notified by Mr. Secretary Fox, on this clear principle; nor was that blockade announced until he had satisfied himself by a communication with his Majesty's Board of Admiralty, that the Admiralty-Reviewing the course of this statement, possessed the means, and would employ them, of watching the whole coast from Brest, to the Elbe, and of effectually enforcing the blockade. The blockade of May, 1806, was therefore (according to the doctrine maintained by Great Britain) just and lawful in its origin, because it was supported by both in intention and fact by an adequate naval force. This was the justification of that blockade, until the period of time when the Orders in Council were issued.-The Orders in Council were founded on a distinct principle.-that of defensive retaliation. France had declared a blockade of all the ports and coasts of Great Britain, and her dependencies, without assigning or being able to assign, any force to support that blockade. Such an act of the enemy would have justified a declaration of the blockade of the whole coast of France, even without the application of any particular force to that service. Since the promulgation of the Orders in Council, the blockade of May, 1806, has been sustained and extended by the more comprehensive system of defensive reta

it will appear that the blockade of May, 1806, cannot be deemed contrary to the law of nations, either under the objections urged by the French, or under those declared or insinuated by the American government; because that blockade was maintained by a sufficient naval force: that the decree of Berlin was not therefore justified either under the pretext alleged by France, or under those supported by America; that the orders in council were founded on a just principle of defensive retaliation against the violation of the law of nations committed by France in the decree of Berlin; that the blockade of May, 1806, is now included in the more extensive operation of the orders in council; and lastly that the orders in council will not be continued beyond the effectual duration of the hostile decrees of France; nor will the blockade of May, 1806, continue after the repeal of the orders in council, unless his Majesty's government shall think fit to sustain it by the special application of a sufficient naval force. (To be continued.)

Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent Garden.
LONDON:-Printed by T. C. Hansard, Peterborough-Court, Fleet-Street,

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