with infidelity and licentiousness. How often has it occurred in the history of the world, that the licentious principles and open immoralities of a profligate court have infected an entire nation with the virulence of their poison? The profligate Charles the Second, of Great Britain, infected every rank and order of society in the kingdom, with the moral poison which his sentiments and example infused. There is at least one vice, which official persons, if they could be brought to combine their influence, might bring into such disrepute, as to expel it from society. I refer to duelling, which depends entirely for its reputation on the countenance given it by the distinguished and the influential. The good example of the same class of men in respect to gaming, intemperance in drinking, luxury, and extravagance of every kind, if less completely successful, still could not fail to be highly effective and salutary. The opposite example descends from them to men in more humble circumstances of life, until, like a flood, it desolates every village and neighbourhood with the overwhelming mischief and ruin which march in its train. In the most elective government, not all offices are elective, many are filled by appointment; and it is among the most solemn of the responsibilities of those who hold the appointing power, to select, for official trust, those among the citizens, who are most distinguished for industry, for understanding, for public spirit and for integrity, as well as to fill each department of the public service with men whose talents are best suited to its peculiar business, and to unite in each public officer, in the greatest practicable measure, purity of private morals with the lustre of official talents.* * See Gisborne's Inquiry, Vol. I. p. 58, &c. CHAPTER II. DUTIES OF THE CITIZENS TOWARDS THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE. NEXT to the moral duties of civil governors and magistrates. arising from their official situation, come those which are due from the citizens towards those who are invested with any degree of official trust. That the New Testament ranks this among the most important of Christian duties, may be fairly inferred from the strong language which it is accustomed to employ. We are not only to fear God, but to honor the king"; which term is here used to represent civil government and magistracy of every kind. Again, St. Peter says, "Submit yourselves, for the Lord's sake, to every ordinance of man;" that is, to every person whom men have invested with any degree of lawful authority over you, "whether it be to the king, as supreme, or unto governors," that is, all subordinate magistrates, "as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and the praise of them that do well." even They who are thus ordained by men to perform the functions of governors, are to be obeyed for conscience' sake; and are, therefore, said by St. Paul "to be ordained of God." "There is no power but of God," continues he; every form of lawful government and magistracy is sanctioned by the Almighty. "The powers that be are ordained of God," the idolatrous and persecuting Roman government had authority from God to exact obedience from those to whom St. Paul wrote; whence he infers, that "whosoever resisteth the power," whoever refuses just obedience to his lawful rulers, "resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves condemnation." After some further pertinent instructions, he concludes with this comprehensive admonition, "Render therefore to all," i. e. to each magistrate in his proper depart * 1 Peter ii. 17. -- t 1 Peter ii. 13. ment, "their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor."* Civil governors have an arduous, responsible, and burthensome duty to perform; the public interest and safety are committed to their hands; and every good citizen must feel a special interest in them, and in the successful administration of their trust. To this end, they are entitled, from the citizens, to a fair, candid, and even favorable construction and representation of their sentiments, personal conduct, and official measures. They are the agents to whom the entire body of the citizens stand in the relation of principal; and a willingness to misrepresent and embarrass their measures is a willingness to misrepresent and embarrass those, who have been commissioned to act for their benefit, in a situation in which they cannot act for themselves. Even in cases, where their conduct and their measures are of doubtful character and tendency, they are entitled to have the doubt given in their favor. To assail them with indiscriminate abuse, with virulent invective and bitter denunciation, except for unquestionable reasons, is most unjust, unpatriotic, and reprehen sible. St. Peter refers, in strong terms of disapproval, to those "who despise government and are not afraid to speak evil of dignities." Again, "Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people." Such indiscriminate abuse and undeserved crimination of civil governors is attended with manifold evils; it is proper, therefore, to bring it to the test of the consequences, as well as to the standard of Scripture. § It renders them less sensible, if not indeed completely insensible, to the salutary influence of public opinion, when they find themselves fiercely denounced, by perhaps a considerable portion of the citizens, after using their best endeavours to advance the public good. In truth, the natural and almost inevitable effect of faction and unprincipled party spirit is to destroy the force of public opinion, with all its manifold advantages, even upon men of the most upright mind. To a tone of censure and denunciation, which knows not how, and does not care, to discriminate, but is only anxious to accuse and misrepresent, rulers soon come to pay no regard. * Romans xiii. 1-7. Acts xxiii. 5; Exodus xxii. 28. † 2 Peter ii. 10; Jude 8. § See pp. 33-37. Besides, when the loud notes of censure and denunciation come from one side; the other side is, in a measure, compelled to meet this indiscriminate abuse and invective, not only with defensive weapons of like temper, but also with like indiscriminate justification and eulogy of men and measures; until, at length, present effect, and not truth, is the object universally aimed at by those who take an active part and interest in political transactions. Truth, candor, justice, fairness, and even kindness and courtesy, are gradually lost sight of; and abuse, calumny, misrepresentation, denunciation, unmeasured impudence, and falsehood, become the settled order of things in politics, naturally the most dignified, practical, and useful of all the moral sciences, and the most directly pertaining to human welfare and happiness. But, besides putting a fair and equitable construction on the sentiments and measures of rulers, it is the duty of the citizens to give them a fair and reasonable active support, until their conduct has been such as justly to forfeit a liberal confidence. But power is encroaching in its nature; it therefore becomes the citizens to be watchful of the tendency of measures and events, and the conduct of rulers may unquestionably be such as justly to forfeit public confidence and support. But, until the proofs of maladministration become full and distinct, we cannot rightfully refuse to sustain them. Even when an administration comes into office against our wishes and endeavours, and consequently without our confidence, it is still our duty to abstain from prejudging them; - they are still entitled to be judged by their measures, to be tried by their own merits. We are to act for the good of our country, and not from passion, prejudice, or personal pique. No administration of government, however wise and upright, can be respectable and useful, much less successful, unless it be well sustained; and an administration which, if suitably sustained, might have conducted the affairs of the country successfully, may, for want of such sustaining aid, signally fail, to the lasting injury, possibly to the ruin, of the country. The effects of such a result must be felt by the private citizens, as well as by the administration, which they have so disastrously opposed, or failed to sustain. No one will say, that, in such a state of things, the administration alone is the guilty party. They had a right to expect a fair and reasonable support from their constituents, and if this has not been given them, their responsibility is, to say the least, greatly diminished. Such are the moral duties of private citizens towards their rulers, whether hereditary or elective, but it is, if any thing, still more imperative on civil rulers and magistrates, as far as consists with reason and conscience, to aid and sustain each other. The opposition, then, are morally bound to render satisfactory reasons at the bar of their consciences and of their country, why they are found opposing an administration to whose hands the interests of the country have been intrusted. The presumption, in such a case, is certainly against them, and they must remove this presumption by fact and argument; otherwise their course is morally unjustifiable, factious motives may be justly imputed to them, and it is not too harsh to call them an unprincipled faction. But, suppose a number of individuals to be conscientious in their opposition, as assuredly they may be and often have been, by what standard are they to measure their duty to their country? It is not difficult to discover the moral rule which applies to this contingency. An opposition may use all measures justifiable in themselves, to bring back an unwise or wicked administration to the path of right and duty; but they must never lose sight of the honor and interests of their common country,— much less may they do or omit any thing to the injury of the country for the sake of overthrowing the administration to which they are opposed. This line of distinction between a factious and a principled opposition is reasonably definite; so much so, that, guided by it, good men will not vary much from each other in their course. But it is precisely here, in applying this rule, that the most exact knowledge, mature judgment, perfect command of temper, freedom from prejudice, fixedness of principles, and unwavering sense of rectitude and duty, are wanted to insure an upright and patriotic course of conduct. There have been statesmen, who claimed to be patriots of "the first water"; to all appear |