Stoppage in Transitu.-W., a trader in Falmouth, purchased goods of B., a merchant in London. On Oct. 27, 1876, B. sent an invoice to W. The goods were put on board the same day. The steamer sailed October 29, and arrived at Falmouth October 31, when the goods were put into the warehouse of C., wharfinger and agent of the steamer company. In the evening of October 30, or the morning of October 31, the bill of lading arrived. October 30, W. absconded, and, November 4, he was adjudged bankrupt. The same day, B. telegraphed to C. not to deliver the goods. It appeared that C. was in the habit of receiving goods and holding them at the risk of the consignee, and that he had the exclusive right as against the steamer company of delivering the goods. One condition of delivery was, that the freight should be paid. C. testified that he considered himself in all cases the agent of the consignee from the time of the arrival of the goods on the wharf. Held, that the goods were still in transit when B.'s message arrived. C. was not agent of the consignee.-Ex parte Barrow. In re Worsdell, 6 Ch. D. 783.

Telegraph.-Held, affirming the decision of the Common Pleas Division, that an action cannot be maintained against a telegraph company by the receivers of a telegram, for negligence in the delivery thereof, in consequence of which negligence the receivers suffer damage. Dickson v. Reuter's Telegraph Co., 3 C. P. D. 1; s. c. 2 C. P. D. 62; 1 Legal News, 37.

Vendor and Purchaser.-A tenant for life without power to lease undertook to grant a sixty years' lease at 6d. rent, with a covenant for quiet enjoyment, the lessee to erect a house, as he in fact did. The lessee died, and his son paid rent to H., who had come into possession of the fee. Subsequently, H. conveyed the property to the plaintiff, subject to the sixty years' lease, which he supposed valid. The plaintiff sued for immediate possession. Held, that he was entitled.-Smith v. Widlake, 3 C. P.

D. 10.

Watercourse.-See Mine, 2.

Will.-1. Testator left £6,000 in trust for his two daughters J. and A., for their respective lives, in equal moieties, and "from and immediately after the several deceases of each of

descendants or them surviving," upon trust to pay, assign, and transfer the principal fund "of her or them so dying unto her or their child or children, or other lineal descendants, respectively,

such child or children, or other

lineal descendants, to take per stirpes and not per capita, to be paid .. to them respectively when and as they respectively shall attain the age of twenty-one years." The income to be applied meantime, if necessary, for their support; "nevertheless, the shares of the said child or children," in the principal, "shall be absolute vested interests in him, her, or them immediately on the decease of his, her, or their respective parent or parents." In case a daughter should die without leaving "issue or lineal descendants her surviving," there was a gift over to the other daughter and her issue and lineal descendants, in similar form; and, in case both daughters should so die, a gift over to third persons. Held, that the children of a daughter who died before their mother's death did not take.-Selby v. Whittaker, 6 Ch. D. 239.

2. Testator began as follows: "As to my estate, which God has been pleased in his good providence to bestow upon me, I do make and ordain this my last will and testament as follows (that is to say)." He then devised a farm; then, in an informal way, another farmhe then made seven money bequests and a gift of shares in a company, gave his executors £100 each, and made M., R., and O. his "residuary legatees." He possessed other freehold lands besides those mentioned in the will. Held, that such lands passed to M., R., and O., as "residuary legatees."-Hughes v. Pritchard, & Ch. D. 24.

3. Testator gave his brother J. S. all his real and personal estate, with full power to give,. sell, and dispose of it in any way he should see fit, and appointed him sole executor. The will then proceeded thus: "But provided he shall not dispose of my said real and personal estate, or any part thereof, as aforesaid, then, and not otherwise, I do hereby give, devise, and bequeath my said real and personal estate, or such part or parts thereof as he shall not so dispose of, in the manner following." The testator then proceeded to dispose of his property by a series of trusts, entails, and

.

contingent remainders; and, after some specific legacies, gave to H. and D., two of the beneficiaries, the household furniture, &c., to hold in trust as heirlooms for whoever should | succeed under the provisions of the will to the property in the house; gave the residue of his property to the said H. and D., upon trust to sell and convert "with all convenient speed after the death of the survivors" of himself or his said brother J. S. and the said H. and D. were, in this part of the will, appointed executors. The expression, "the survivor of myself and my said brother" J. S., occurred in several places in the will. J. S. died in the testator's lifetime. Held, that the gift to J. S. was a gift for life, with power of appointment and a gift over on J. S.'s failure to appoint, or on his death in testator's lifetime; and this latter event having happened, the gift over took effect on the death of the testator.-In re Stringer's Estate.

Shaw v. Jones-Ford, 6 Ch. D. 2.

4. A testator recited that his son had become indebted to himself in various sums, and bequeathed to the son the sums mentioned, and released him from payment thereof. Between the date of the will and testator's death, the son became still further indebted to the father. Held, that these sums were not covered by the will, under the Wills Act (1 Vict. c. 26).Everett v. Everett, 6 Ch. D. 122.

5. A testator gave, devised, and bequeathed "all the real and personal estate which I am or shall or may be entitled to under the will of my late uncle J. M." to the defendants. He bequeathed to the plaintiff the residue of his personal estate. Between the date of the will and the testator's death he received £800 from his uncle's estate, and invested £600 thereof in railway stock. He purchased before his death £3,500 more of this stock; and at his death the whole £4,100 stock was standing in his name. Held, that the defendant was entitled to the £600 stock.-Morgan v. Thomas, 6 Ch. D. 176.

6. A testator provided that his residuary estate should be divided into sevenths, gave one-seventh to each of his two sons absolutely, and the remaining five-sevenths to trustees to pay the income to his five daughters, Elizabeth, Sarah, Eliza, Mary, and Hannah, during their respective lives, in equal shares. Upon the decease of Elizabeth, the trustees should pay

one-fifth of the fund to the children of Elizabeth; upon the decease of Sarah, one-fifth to the children of Sarah; upon the decease of Eliza, one-fifth to the children of Mary; and upon the decease of Hannah, one-fifth to the children of Hannah. The testator made mention in a subsequent part of the will "of the issue of any of" his daughters, without discriminating. Held, that the will must be construed by interpolating a provision for the children of Eliza on her death similar to that made for the others, and a clause stating that the provision for the children of Mary should take effect on the death of Mary, instead of on the death of Eliza.-In re Redfern, Redfern v. Bryning, 6 Ch. D. 133.

THE EARLY FRENCH BAR.

In the earlier period of the French bar the proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts were conducted wholly in the Latin language; in the secular courts the vulgar tongue alone was used; but the technical terms of the law, the pedantry and affectation of lawyers and judges rendered their speech nearly, if not quite, incomprehensible to the public at large;

so that the French that was heard in the courts was as different from that of the common people as was that of the prioress of Chaucer :

66

And French she spake full fayre and fetisly,
After the scole of Stratford atte Bowe,
For French of Paris was to hire unknowe."

Thus when, in 1393, the kings of England and France were treating for a truce, the English commissioners could not understand the language of the French lawyers who represented their adversary; and Froissart says that the English excused themselves in the discussion by saying, "that the French which they had known from infancy was not of the same nature and condition as that which the clerks of law used in their treaties and proposals.' As the English of the higher classes of that day, such as would be selected for agreeing on a truce with the enemy, generally understood French quite as well as their own language, it would seem that the dialect of the bar of which they complained must have been peculiarly barbarous and uncouth. Such, however, was the fashion of the age; science and learning of

all kinds veiled themselves in obscurity, and sought to enhance the popular respect by an air of profound mystery.

At a time when the spiritual courts engrossed a large part of the legal business of the country, and when causes in the civil courts were often tried by wager of battle, the demand for lawyers was limited; the functions and station of lawyers were somewhat uncertain, and the bar could hardly claim the dignity of being a separate institution. In the ecclesiastical courts, the preparation, management and trial of causes was entrusted to persons who had taken clerical or priestly orders; a class of men who, however, not being content with this exclusive privilege, appeared also as advocates in the secular courts, notwithstanding there was a rule, more often broken than kept, which forbade them to appear except in their own courts, unless in cases where the interests of the church were concerned; a wide and vague exception, since it might be asserted that the church was concerned in all questions touching good morals, which are in some way involved in nearly every judicial proceeding. The superior learning of the clergy, joined to the veneration in which they were held by the people, gave them great advantages in enabling them to intrude themselves into the secular courts, where they affected to appear less in the guise of partizans than as defenders of morality and religion. Some of these made the practice of law a regular pursuit; they possessed ability and sometimes achieved distinction; at least one of them became a bishop and another a pope. They had a double chance of promotion, from the crown and from Rome. Since we perceive that the secular lawyers adopted the style of the spiritual brethren, and accepted their canons of taste, there is reason to suppose that the influence of the latter outweighed that of the former; but there is but little or no evidence extant of any hostility growing out of the rivalry of these two orders, which might otherwise have been brought forward as a reason for the fact that in all the subsequent and long protracted struggles between the crown and the Roman See, the bar uniformly ranged itself on the side of the crown. At first, no doubt, the clergy found a pretty easy victory over lawyers deficient in learning, practicing before ignorant courts; but as the laws and recognized customs

of the country increased in number, and grew more diversified in detail, it became more and more difficult to keep up with the rules of decision under two different codes of laws; the result of which was that the clergy were gradually forced to recede to their own tribunals.

The French bar, as understood in modern times, traces its lineage to the ordinances of St. Louis, dated in 1270, which prescribed in some measure the duties of advocates. Three things were required of them, loyalty, courtesy, disinterestedness. It seems that it required such a quantity of words to display these three qualities that it soon became necessary to add a fourth; for, in a very few years later, brevity was also strictly enjoined; and this last quality appeared to be the most difficult of all to be attained. Before the close of the thirteenth century a magistrate gave the following charge to the bar: "Good method is needful to advo

cates, and to all sorts of people who have to plead for themselves, or for others; and when they set forth their pleas they should compress the facts in as few words as they can, the contention being, however, all comprised in the words; for the memory of man retains more easily a few words than many, and they are more agreeable to the judges who receive them." Time and again the courts renewed the protest against that prolixity which in early times seemed to be almost inseparable from the law, and which in a variety of forms still adheres to it.

There is something even pathetic in the appeals of judges, who must have suffered much, against the prevailing redundancy of the pleadings, written and oral. Advocates were implored "to leave off all digressions in order that they might go straight to the material points, to avoid useless replies and repetitions, not to employ subterfuges and circumlocutions," which then, for the first time, began to be called chicanery.

Then, as if all patience were well nigh lost, the charge proceeded to recommend to the bar that" in speaking they should not open their mouths inordinately wide; neither should they gesticulate at random with their heads and feet; nor disfigure their faces with contortions; nor display a great pomp in small cases; in short that their voices and discourse should be in harmony with the subject on hand."

In those days the court of Parliament and