members of the official board, it became public property at once, and the other members of the board had no power to consider the information confidential.-Patterson v. The Gas Light & Coke Co., 3 App. Cas. 239; s. c. 2 Ch. D. 812. Protest.-See Bills and Notes, 5. Publication.-See Patent. Railway. By the Railway and Canal Traffic Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, § 2), railway companies are forbidden to "give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to or in favor of any particular person or company," in the mat In Perpetuity-Bequest of two hundred and forty shares railway stock, and four-sevenths of the residue of testatrix' property to trustees, inter of carrying and forwarding freight. Plaintrust to accumulate the income until twelve months after the death of B., and then for such of B.'s four children as should be living at the expiration of said twelve months, "and the issue then living, and who shall attain the age of twenty-one years or marry, of any of the said children who shall have died,” absolutely. Held, that the bequests were void, as contrary to the rule against perpetuities. The gift was to a class the members of which might not be ascertained within twenty-one years from the death of B.-Bentinck v. Duke of Portland, 7 Ch. D. 693. Pleading and Practice.-See Negligence. Power-Power given to trustees under a will to appoint to the husband of testator's daughter, in case she should marry with their approbation, the income of the daughter's property after her death, during his life, or such part as the trustees should think proper. The daughter married before the testator's death, and with his consent. The trustees had, at the daughter's death, made no formal approval of the marriage, and made no appointment. Held, that the husband was entitled to a life-interest in the property.-Tweedale v. Tweedale, 7 Ch. 633. Principal and Agent.-It was the custom of the defendant, through his agent S., in the usual course of business, to make certain advances on goods shipped by third parties, and to draw on the plaintiff for the amount so advanced. In the course of business, S., as agent, rendered a final account to the plaintiff, and in it charged plaintiff with certain advances, which it turned out afterwards had never been made. He then drew on the plaintiff for the amount, received the money, and appropriated the amount falsely charged to his own use. Held, that the plaintiff could recover the amount from the defendant.-Swire et al. v. Francis, 3 App. Cas. 106. See Factor. Profits and Losses.-See Partnership. tiff had a brewery at B., where there were three Ratification.-See Company, 3. Sale. A man brought into market pigs from his infected herd, out of which many had died, and had them sold, stating that they were to be taken with all faults. Held, that he was not liable in damages to the buyer on whose hands the pigs died.-Ward v. Hobbs, 3 Q. B. D. 150 ; s. c. 2 Q. B. D. 331. See Vendor and Purchaser.-Vendor's Lien. Shipping and Admiralty.-L. duly registered as "managing owner" of a sloop, traded with her for some time, employing E. as captain, and paying him regular wages. A verbal agreement was then made between them, that E. should take the ship where he chose, engage the men, and render accounts from time to time to L.; and L. was to have one third of the net profits. While this agreement was in force, and while the sloop was discharging a cargo under a charter-party, expressed to be between the charterers and E., "master, for and on behalf of the owners" of the sloop, she, through the negligence of E., caused damage to the plaintiff's ship. Held, that L. was responsible as well as E., for the negligence of E.-Steel v. Lester & Lilee, 3 C. P. D. 121. See Bill of Lading; Demurrage. Solicitor.-See Attorney and Client. Specific Performance.-1. Defendant agreed to purchase the lease of a house, subject to the approval of the title by his solicitor. Held, that disapproval of the title, on reasonable grounds and in good faith, by the purchaser's solicitor, released the purchaser from the obligation to specific performance. The stipulation is different from that implied in a usual contract to purchase, that the vendor shall make a good title. Hudson v. Buck, 7 Ch. D. 683. 2. Plaintiff made a tender for the lease of a farm at £500 rental, mentioning the farm by name, and two different lots, which he meant to include in it, which amounted in all to about 250 acres. Defendant's agent did not look to see what lots were specified in the plaintiff's offer, but took it for granted that they were the same as those specified in another offer from one A., which he had just before opened, that being an offer for said farm, excluding one of said lots and thus containing about 235 acres. The agent also said that he intended to let the said farm as containing 214 acres only, that being the quantity it contained, excluding the two additional lots; and he offered to grant a lease of 214 acres at £500 rent, the other two lots having been already let to other parties. Held, that a lease for 214 acres should be granted at a rent reduced from £500, in the proportion of 214 to 235.—McKenzie v. Hesketh, 7 Ch. D. 675. Trust.-1. A testatrix left her property to her sister and attached to it a precatory trust that the latter should leave it to K's "children, John, Sophia and Mary Ann." Held, that, in executing the trust, the sister could limit the shares of the daughters to their separate use.-Willis v. Kymer, 7 Ch. D. 181. 3. Two trustees advanced money to A., a builder, on security of land purchased by A., of B., the defendant and one of the trustees, and which A. had built upon. The money was used partly to pay for the land, and partly to repay other sums which A. owed B. The plaintiff, the other trustee, knew that A. and B. had had business relations. A. went into bankruptcy; and the plaintiff filed a bill against B., his co-trustee, alleging that the security was insufficient, and asking that the property be sold, and that the defendant be held to make up the deficiency. -Refused.-Butler v. Butler, 7 Ch. D. 116; s. c. 5 Ch. 554. Vendor and Purchaser.-The plaintiff purchased a piece of property, had the title examined by his solicitor, was advised that it was good, and completed the purchase. He subsequently discovered that certain parties were entitled to the flow of water through an underground culvert, the existence of which he was not informed of, and had not discovered in examining the title. Held, that, after the execution of the conveyance and completion of the purchase, he could not obtain compensation for such defect.-Manson v. Thacker, 7 Ch. D. 620. See Composition; Covenant, 5; Specific Performance, 1. Vendor's Lien.-The respondents purchased of the appellants at various times between Feb. 13 and June 1, 1876, parcels of tea imported by the latter,and lying in a bonded warehouse kept by them. At each transaction, a warehouse warrant, indorsed in blank, was given the indorsers by the appellants, stating that the tea had been warehoused by the appellants Jan. 1, 1876. Subsequently the appellants added to the blank indorsements the name of the respondents, thus 2. A sale and adjustment of a testator's prop-making the goods deliverable to the responderty was made by trustees, under a decree of ents' order alone. Warehouse rent was charged court, and years afterwards, some of the residu- by the appellants from Jan. 1, 1876, to the deary legatees, being minors, brought a bill by livery of each lot, and paid by the respondents. their next friend to have the sale set aside, on The latter having become bankrupt before their the ground that the adjustment was improper notes given for the tea were paid, the appellants and brought about by the fraud of one of the claimed a vendor's lien on the tea sold to the trustees. The bill was dismissed on its merits. respondents and remaining in their warehouse. Held, that as the minors' next friend could not Held, that there had been no delivery, and the respond in costs, the trustee charged with fraud, lien was good.-Grice v. Richardson, 3 App. Cas. who appeared and defended, was entitled to costs out of the estate, as he had defended that, as well as his own character.- Walters v. Woodbridge, 7 Ch. D. 504. 319. Warehouseman.-See Vendor's Lien. Will.-1. A testator left £600 to the children 1 of his daughter by any other husband than "Mr. Thomas Fisher, of Bridge street, Bath." At the date of the will there was a Thomas Fisher living in Bridge street, Bath, who was married and had a son, Henry Tom Fisher, who sometimes lived with his father, and who had paid his addresses to the daughter, and after the testator's death, married her. On the question whether their child was entitled to the £600, held, that evidence of the above facts was admissible to show who was meant by the testator.-In re Wolverton Mortgaged Estates, 7 Ch. D. 197. 2. C., by will, gave £12,000 in trust for his four daughters; as to £3,000 thereof to his daughter S. for life, and at her death to her children then living. If she left no child, the income was to be paid to the other daughters then living, and to the survivor or survivors; and, after the decease of the last surviving daughter, the £3,000 to the child or children of such last surviving daughter, and, if there were no such children, the same was to "be paid to such persons as will then be entitled to receive the same as my next of kin," under the statute of Distributions. A similar provision was made as to the share of each of the other daughters. S. died leaving issue. The other three daughters subsequently died without issue. On the application of the personal representative of the last survivor, held, reversing the decision of Bacon, V. C., that the time to ascertain the class of next of kin was the death of the testator, not the death of the last surviving daughter.-Mortimer v. Slater, 7 Ch. D. 322. 3. A testator recited that his son had become indebted to himself in various amounts, describing them, and bequeathed to the son said amounts, and released him from payment| thereof, and of "all other moneys due from him to" the testator. By a codicil, he released to the son another sum, which the son had misappropriated after the date of the will. At the testator's death the son was indebted to him in other sums, incurred after the date of the codicil. Held, reversing the decision of MALINS, V. C., that the will must speak from the testator's death, and the release applied to all debts incurred before that time.-Everett v. Everett, 7 Ch. D. 428; s. c. 6 Ch. D. 122. 4. Testator left his property in trust for his children, the shares of the sons to be paid them at the age of twenty-five, those of the daughters to be settled to their separate use for life, remainder in trust for their issue. Then followed this clause: "And in case of the death of my said daughters or of any of my sons before they shall attain their respective ages of twenty-five years, or of such of them as shall not have received his or their share or respective shares of and in my estate, for the reasons aforesaid, without lawful issue, or having such, and they shall happen to die, being a son or sons, before he or they shall have attained the age of twenty-five years, or being a daughter or daughters, before the age of twenty-one years or marriage, then and in such case I do hereby will and direct that the share or shares of him, her or them so dying, shall go and be divided equally between my surviving children, and be paid to them or applied to their uses in such manner as his or their original shares are hereby directed to be paid and applied, according to the true intent and meaning of my will." The testator left three sons who attained the age of twenty-five, and three daughters, who all married and attained to the age of twenty-five. Two daughters died leaving issue still living. One son died unmarried, and one leaving issue still living; then the third daughter died without issue, and finally the third brother died. On a petition for the payment of the share of the third daughter to the persons entitled, held, reversing the decision of the Master of the Rolls, that "surviving children" meant "other children," and that the share in question was to be divided into fifths, and paid, one-fifth each, to the issue or personal representatives of the two sisters and three brothers of the deceased.—Lucena v. Lucena, 7 Ch. D. 255. 5. A testator directed his trustees to hold a fund in trust" for my child (if only one), or for all my children (if more than one), in equal shares, and so that the interest of a son or sons shall be absolutely vested at the age of twentyone years, and of the daughter or daughters at that age or marriage." Held, that these interests were at the testator's death vested, though subject to be divested in certain events.-Armytage v. Wilkinson, 3 App. Cas. 355. Two judgments have been communicated to us, one rendered some years ago, in the case of Berthelot v. Theoret, and the other a recent decision by Mr. Justice Sicotte in the case of Sauvé. Sauvé. The suggestion is that these decisions are in conflict, one holding that the cédant has no right of action, and the other that the cédant, and only he, may sue. It must be conceded, however, that there is a very material difference between the two cases. In the recent case an heir had ceded his rights of succession, but this transfer had never been signified upon those sued, and by a private writing the transfer had been cancelled before the suit was brought. The debtor, therefore, had no interest in invoking the transfer. As far as he was concerned it was as though it had never been. In the case of Berthelot v. Theoret, the plaintiff sued for the balance of the price of sale, after such balance had been transferred to another party, and the debtor had accepted notice of such transfer. In the latter case the action was dismissed, and it seems to us rightly. RIGHTS OF RAILWAY COMPANIES. A decision recently given in England by Vice-Chancellor Malins in the case of Norton v. The North Western Railroad Company, is interesting as laying down the principle that railway companies do not possess precisely the same rights over their land as other proprietors. The plaintiff in the case was the proprietor of a hotel erected on land adjoining the land of the company, and there were windows overlooking the company's land, which had been used for several years without interruption. In 1874 the company erected a signal cabin, with a chimney, immediately under the windows, and the plaintiff complained that the smoke entered his hotel by the windows over the chimney. The company, when the smoke was complained of, in the first place demanded a quit rent from the plaintiff in consideration of his windows overlooking the railway, and when that was refused, commenced to erect on their land a high, close board fence about two feet from the hotel windows. The action was for an injunction against the erection of the fence. The pretention of the company was that the fence was to prevent the plaintiff from acquiring by user an easement which would interfere with the erection of buildings that might be required thereafter for the company's business. The injunction, however, was granted, the Vice-Chancellor remarking that a railway company had not all the rights of an owner in fee simple, and that the owner of land adjoining the lands of a railway had the same rights as if the railway had not been constructed. He had a right to have windows overlooking the railway, so long as he did not interfere with the working of the line. DECOY LETTERS. A case of some interest was decided recently by the United States Circuit Court in Missouri, One McAfee, acting as agent for the Society for the Detection of Vice, deposited in the postoffice at St. Louis, with the concurrence of the authorities, a letter in these terms :— "BUTLER, GA., Nov. 14, 1877. "DR. WHITTIER,-Can you furnish me an absolutely sure way to prevent conception? What will it cost? How can I get it? What is the price of your 'Marriage Guide?' Address MISS NETTIE G. HARLAN, Butler, Georgia." The letter was post-marked on the outside as coming from Georgia, and was delivered to Whittier by the mail-carrier in the usual course, In reply, Whittier wrote and deposited in the post-office at St. Louis the following : "MISS NETTIE G. HARLAN, Butler, Ga.-I have what you desire. It is perfectly safe, sure and healthful, and can be easily used. The price is $10, sent by express only on receipt of price. Price of Marriage Guide is 50 cents. Respectfully, "C. WHITTIER, M.D." The letter was directed to Miss Nettie G. Harlan, Butler, Ga., but it was handed by the post-office authorities to McAfee, and on these facts an indictment was found against Whittier under an Act of Congress enacting (amongst other things) that those sending through the mails Every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, &c., and every article or thing in tended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use, and every written or printed card, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where or how, or of whom, or by what means, any of the hereinbefore mentioned matters, articles or things may be obtained or made, &c., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," &c. The question submitted to the court was whether the indictment could be sustained, and it has answered it in the negative. The judges, however, did not decide that decoy letters cannot be used to detect persons engaged, or suspected to be engaged, in violating criminal laws; on the contrary, it recognized the doctrine that such letters may be so used. But it quashed the indictment on the ground that the letter written by Whittier did not give the prohibited information, and hence was not within the statute. The point is a very narrow one, for evidently, if the letter of inquiry had been a genuine one, the reply, stating how the article could be procured, would have brought the case within the statute. Decoy letters are, in truth, not to be commended, nor to be lightly resorted to; but if their use is ever justifiable, it should be for the detection of such an offence as this, the evidence of which is so hard to be procured by other means. "Many frauds upon the postal, revenue and other laws," remarked Judge Dillon, "are of such a secret nature that they can be effectually discovered in no other way. Accordingly, there have been numerous convictions upon evidence procured by means of what are called decoy letters-that is letters prepared and mailed on purpose to detect the offender, and it is no objection to the conviction, when the prohibited act has been done, that it was discovered by means of letters specially prepared and mailed by the officers of the gov. ernment, and addressed to a person who had no actual existence. The books contain many cases where such convictions have been sus tained" Reg. v. Rathbone, 2 Moody's C. C. 310; Reg. v. Gardner, 1 Carr. & Kirwan, 628, &c. "There is a class of cases," continued the judge," in respect of larceny and robbery, in which it is held that, where one person procures, or originally induces the commission of the act by another, the person who does the act cannot be convicted of these particular crimes, although he supposed he was taking the property without the consent or against the will of the owner. Archbold's Crim. Pr. & Ev. 364; Rex v. Eggington, 2 Bos. & P. 58; State v. Covington, 2 Bailey (S. C.), 569; Dodge v. Brittain, Meigs (Tenn.) 84, 86; Alexander v. State, 12 Tex. 540; 3 Chitty's Crim. Law, 925; 2 East's P. C. 665; 1 Bish. Crim. Law (5th ed.), §§ 262, 263. "The reason is obvious, viz; The taking in such cases is not against the will of the owner, which is the very essence of the offence, and hence no offence, in the eye of the law, has been committed. "The offender may be as morally guilty as if the owner had not consented, but a necessary ingredient of legal guilt is wanting. This is strikingly shown by Rex v. McDaniel, Foster, 121; S. C. 2 East's P. C. 665, where Salmon, McDaniel and others conspired to procure two persons, ignorant of the design, to rob Salmon on the highway, in order that they might obtain the reward at that time given for prosecuting offenders for highway robbery. Salmon, accordingly, went to a particular place fixed upon, with some, money, and the two men who were procured, being led there by one of the conspirators, robbed him, and they were afterward prosecuted and convicted, but the conspiracy being afterward detected, the conspir ators were indicted as accessories before the fact to the robbery, and, the facts being found by a special verdict, the case was argued before all the judges, who held that the taking of Salmon's money was not a larceny, being done not only with his consent, but by his procurement.' But this principle must be limited to the cases where the consent will, as a matter of law, neutralize the otherwise criminal quality of the act. 1 Bish. Crim. Law (5th ed.), § 262. Thus, where a prosecution was founded on an act of the Legislature, imposing a penalty on any one who should deal or traffic with a slave without a written ticket or permit from the owner, it is held that the offence is consummated, although the trading was done by the slave in pursuance of instructions of the owner, and in his presence, when the accused was ignorant of such instructions and presence. The reason is, that, "like Eggington's case, supra, this is a contrivance to detect the offender." State v. Covington, 2 Bailey (S. C.), 569, 573; see, also, Regina v. Williams, 1 Carr. & K. 195; Regina v. Gardner, id. 628." -There are now 149 barristers and 5 solicitors in the House of Commons. |