v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558.

2. Defendants covenanted, in consideration of $50, to dig a ditch through plaintiff's land, and also to cause proceedings to be stayed on an indictment pending against plaintiff for creating a nuisance. Held, that the whole covenant was unlawful, and that no action would lie for a breach of either branch of it.-Lindsay V. Smith, 78 N. C. 328.

3. A promise of a married man to marry when a divorce shall be decreed in a suit then pending between himself and his wife, is void as against public policy, and no action lies for a breach of it.-Noice v. Brown, 10 Vroom, 133.

Indictment.-1. An indictment for burning a house, with intent to defraud the insurers, describing them only as "the A. Insurance Company," is bad; for, if the insurers are a corporation, that fact must be averred; and, if they are a voluntary association, their individual names must be set out.-Staaden v. The People, 82 Ill.

432.

2. Indictment not signed by the prosecuting officer held sufficient.-State v. Reed, 67 Me. 127.

3. Indictment for murder, describing the assault, and charging that, of the mortal wound inflicted by the prisoner, the deceased did [then and there] instantly die, held good, if the words in brackets were inserted; but bad, if they were omitted.-State v. Lakey, 65 Mo. 217; State v. Steeley, ib. 218.

4. Indictment for aiding to escape from jail a prisoner committed on a charge of felony, held good, without showing what particular felony the prisoner was charged with.-Stark v. Addcock, 65 Mo. 500.

Insurance (Fire)--1. A policy was conditioned to be void, if at any time during its continuance the buildings insured should become vacant or unoccupied. The buildings were vacant when the policy was issued, and the insurers knew the fact; afterwards they were occupied, and were again vacated before a loss happened. Held, that the insurers were liable.-Aurora Ins. Co. v. Kranich, 36 Mich. 289.

2. Insurance was made on a building which stood on leased land, which fact was not expressed in the policy; and this, by a condition in another clause of the policy, made the insurance void. But the insurer's agent knew

Insurance (Life).-1. The assignee of a policy of life insurance cannot recover on the policy, if he has no insurable interest in the life.

(One judge dissenting.)—Missouri Valley Life Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 18 Kans. 93.

2. A life-insurance policy provided that, if, after the payment of two or more annual premiums, the policy should at any time cease by reason of non-payment of premiums, then, upon surrender of the policy within a year from such time, a new policy should be issued for a sum proportionate to the premiums actually paid. The policy lapsed by a non-payment of premium; but was never surrendered, nor was a new one issued. Held, that a proportionate sum was nevertheless recoverable; and this whether the assured died before or after the expiration of a year from the lapse.-Dorr v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 67 Me. 438; Chase v. Phoenix Ins. Co., ib. 85.

Interest.-A promissory note bearing interest at a rate greater than that allowed by law, in the absence of special agreement will bear interest only at the legal rate, as damages, after maturity.-Duran v. Ayer, 67 Me. 145; Eaton v. Boissonault, ib. 540.

Judgment.-1. J. S. died seised of land, which his heirs sold, reserving a lien for the purchasemoney. Afterwards, creditors of J. S. filed a bill in the United States Circuit Court, making all but one of the heirs parties, and by virtue of a decree made in that suit the land was sold for payment of the debts of J. S. Held, that the heir, who was not a party to that suit, was not bound by the decree from enforcing his lien in a State court.-McPike v. Wells, 54 Miss. 136.

2. In ejectment, the defendant claimed title under a deed of the administrator of J. S., appointed by the Probate Court of C. County. Held, that the plaintiff could not show that the Probate Court had not jurisdiction to make such appointment, because J. S. did not reside in C. County. (Overruling former decisions.)— Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 250.

Larceny.-1. A. stole goods in New York, and sent them into Massachusetts by an agent,

5. A mortgagee, after condition broken, not in possession, cannot replevy a chattel which was a fixture and subject to the mortgage, and which has been wrongfully severed and removed by the mortgagor or his assigns.Kircher v. Schalk, 10 Vroom, 335.

Municipal Corporation.-1. A city was authorized by statute to make and maintain reservoirs and hydrants"in such places as may be deemed proper." A building in the city was destroyed by fire, which might have been extinguished but for the neglect of the city in cutting off the water from a hydrant near by. Held, that the owner of the building had no cause of action against the city.-Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 311.

2. A city was authorized by statute to purchase a ferry, and run it "in such manner and upon such rates of ferriage as the board of aldermen shall from time to time determine." The city purchased the ferry, and afterwards the council voted to run it free of toll after a certain future day. Held, (1) that the vote was illegal; (2) that, on application made before the day fixed, a mandamus should be granted to compel the city to collect tolls.-Attorney-General v. Boston, 123 Mass. 460.

3. A city was authorized by statute to issue bonds to a certain amount. Held, that it might issue bonds to a greater amount, to pay for necessary street improvements, though no such power was expressly given by its charter. (Three judges dissenting.) Williamsport v. Commonwealth, 84 Penn. St. 487.

Negligence.-Action to recover for injuries caused by the falling of defendant's wall on plaintiff,

while engaged in removing a wall on the adjoining estate, very near to, but distinct from, defendant's wall. It appeared that both walls belonged to buildings which had been burnt six months before, and were left standing to a height of ten or fifteen feet, with rubbish piled nearly to their top. It did not appear that defendant's wall was dangerous, or could have fallen while both buildings stood, or while they remained as they were after the fire; or that defendant had notice, or was bound to know, that the wall on the adjoining estate had been, or was to be, removed. Held, that the action was not maintainable. - Mahoney v. Libbey, 123 Mass. 20.

2. Plaintiff, while passing along a highway, was injured by the fall of a brick from a wall which defendant was building. Held, that defendant was liable, if he was negligent in not providing safeguards or barriers for the protection of passers-by, though his servants were not negligent in handling the bricks.-Jager v. Adams, 123 Mass. 26.

3. An inspector of coal oil branded empty barrels "approved," and left them with a manufacturer, who filled them with oil below the test, and sold them to a dealer, who sold to A. some of the oil, which exploded when used to fill a lamp, and killed A.'s wife. Held, that the inspector was liable to a suit on his official bond for A.'s benefit.-St. Louis County v. Fassett, 65 Mo. 418.

4. In an action at common law to recover for injuries caused to plaintiff's vessel by a collision arising from the negligence of those in charge of defendants' vessel, it appeared that the former did not carry the lights prescribed by act of Congress. Held, that this was not conclusive evidence of negligence; and that evidence that she did carry such lights as were usually carried by vessels in these waters was admissible, not to excuse the plaintiff, but to show negligence in the defendants who had

knowledge of the usage.-Hoffman v. Union Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 385.

Officer.-1. The office of clerk of a city court was usurped by one who claimed under an appointment by the court, which appointment was not authorized by law; and he held the office de facto, and drew the salary, which

by law was payable quarterly by the city, until he was ousted by quo warranto at the suit of the clerk de jure. Held, that the latter could not afterwards recover of the city the salary paid to the usurper.-Dolan v New York, 68 N.

Y. 274.

2. A city officer was nominated by the mayor and confirmed by the common council; he ought, by law, to have been appointed by the mayor alone. Held, that the appointment was well enough. (One judge dissenting)-People V. Fitzsimmons, 68 N. Y. 514.

3. In a quo warranto, the question was whether the term of office of the defendant, who held an office tenable for three years, had expired. Held, that the term began to run

Statute. The court refused to declare a private statute void, without further evidence than the agreement of counsel that it was passed without the notice required by the Constitution.-Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C. 119. Surety.-1.. The official bond of a sheriff was conditioned that he should account for moneys collected by him within a certain time. Afterwards, the time was extended by statute. Held, that the sureties on the bond were not discharged.-Prairie v. Worth, 78 N. C. 169.

2. Action against the sureties on an official bond. Plea, that before the making of the bond the officer had held the same office, and had embezzled moneys, and was a defaulter; of all which the obligee at the time of making the bond had notice, but the sureties had not. Held, good.-Sooy v. The State, 10 Vroom, 135.

Tax.-1. By force of an amendment to a city charter, changing the limits of the city, lands which were subject to a lien for unpaid city taxes were brought outside the new city limits before the day fixed for their sale. Held, that the lien was lost.-Deason v. Dixon, 55 Miss. 585.

2. The Constitution provides that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value A statute enacted that every owner or harbourer of any dog should pay one dollar for the privilege of keeping him. Held, that dogs were not property, nor such payment a tax, within the meaning of the Constitution-Ex parte Cooper, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 489.

3. A foreign coal-mining corporation sent coal by rail through the State to tide-water, whence it was shipped to other States. All its business was done at an office in another State, where all orders were taken. Held, that the State could not tax it, either on the coal awaiting shipment at tide-water, or on that delivered from its cars in the State, direct from the mines, on orders transmitted through the foreign office.-State v. Carrigan, 10 Vroom, 35. Trespass.—One who was in possession of land, under a parol contract to purchase it, dug clay from open pits on the land, and made it into bricks. Held, that he was not liable as a trespasser for so doing, though he afterwards

Trust. Testator gave lands to a charitable use, under the direction of a trustee, to be appointed by a court. When the will was made, that court had no power to appoint a trustee for that purpose; but, before testator died, such power was conferred on the court by statute. Held, that the court might appoint a trustee.-Mann v. Mullin, 84 Penn. St. 297.

Verdict. A jury, by consent of parties, returned their verdict to the clerk of court, and separated. The next morning, it was discovered that the verdict was for the plaintiff, not specifying any sum; whereupon the court reassembled the jury, and they found a proper verdict. Held, regular.-Maclin v. Blcom, 54 Miss. 365.

Warranty.-Land was conveyed with warranty; afterwards, the State, having title paramount, sold the land. Held, that the grantee might abandon the land, and sue on the covenant, though he had not been evicted or molested by the State or its grantee.—Green v. Irving, 54 Miss. 450.

Way.-A statute permitting owners of coalbeds on both sides of any stream to have a right of way either over or under such stream, between such coal-beds, for the purpose of mining the same, held, unconstitutional.Waddell's Appeal, 84 Penn. St. 90.

Will.-1. By statute a nuncupative will is valid if made in the last sickness of the testator. Held, that it need not be shown, to establish such a will, that the testator had not time to make a will in writing, or that he had no hope of recovery.-Harrington v. Stees, 82 Ill

50.

2. A testator erased certain clauses in his will, with the intent of revoking them only. Held (1), that the whole will was not revoked; (2), that those clauses were; (3) that the property covered by them, in the absence of any thing in the will showing a contrary intention, passed by a general residuary clause.—Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass. 102.

3. A will written and signed with a pencil, held, valid.-Myers v. Vanderbilt, 84 Penn. St. 510.