dered to the conductor his fare from that point to Boone, could it be claimed this would entitle him to ride on that train to the latter place? We apprehend not. The purchase of a ticket from the ticket agent would give him no greater rights; for under such ticket he would be claiming the same right under the same state of facts he would not be entitled to, had he dealt alone with the conductor. The fact that he made use of another agent of the company other than the conductor cannot enlarge his rights, or change the legal aspect of the case. It must be that the transaction with the agent was a mere continuation of the transaction with the conductor. Both had reference to the right of the plaintiff to ride on that train without the payment of fare from Marshalltown to Boone. The payment of such fare to the agent could not, under the circumstances, give him any more or greater rights than if he had tendered the same amount to the conductor."

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. Proxy.- Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, provides that the instrument appointing a proxy shall be under the hand of the creditor, and in the form given in the schedule to the rules. That form is as follows: "I appoint C. D., of, &c., my proxy in the above matter." A creditor gave his solicitor a blank proxy duly signed, and the solicitor filled in his own name, and undertook to act under the proxy. Held, that the proxy was good.-Ex parte Lancaster, 5 Ch. D. 911.

Seaworthiness.-A ship, while lying in the port of S., in a seaworthy condition, was chartered of defendant, by the plaintiff, to proceed to a wharf in said port, take on a cargo of cement, and proceed with it to the port of D. While lying at the wharf she became unseaworthy, though without the knowledge of the defendant, and, while on the voyage, foundered, and the cargo was lost. The jury found the defendant guilty of no negligence. Held, that the warranty of seaworthiness attached at the time the ship was loaded and ready to start on the voyage, and was not satisfied by her being seaworthy while lying in port before the cargo was on board.-Cohn v. Davidson et al., 2 Q.B.D.

455.

Statute. The principle appearing to have been laid down in Couch v. Steel (3 E. & B. 402),

that, whenever a statutory duty is created, any person who can show that he has sustained injuries from the non-performance of that duty, can bring an action for damage against the person on whom the duty is imposed, questioned by all the judges in Atkinson v. Newcastle Waterworks Co., 2 Ex. D. 441.

Statute of Frauds.-1. K. informed his daughter and her intended husband that he had bought a house which should, in the event of the marriage, be his wedding present to his daughter. After the marriage, the daughter and her husband entered into possession of the house, a lease of which K. had bought, subject to payment of certain instalments. K. paid all instalments which fell due in his lifetime, and died leaving a sum of £110 still to be paid, which fell due after his death. Held, that possession following K.'s verbal promise took the promise out of the Statute of Frauds; and that K.'s agreement was to give a house free from incumbrances, and that, therefore, the £110 must be paid out of K.'s estate.-Ungley v. Ungley, 5 Ch. D. 887; s. c. 4 Ch. D. 73.

2. In a contract for the purchase and sale of land, the vendor was mentioned only as a "trustee, selling under a trust for sale." Held, sufficient under the Statute of Frauds.-Catling v. King, 5 Ch. D. 660.

W.

3. Eight persons made an agreement to convey certain land to two of their number, by an absolute deed, and that they should sell the same in lots, and hold the proceeds in trust for the eight. The defendant, in April, 1875, made a verbal offer to W., agent of the owners for the sale of the lots, for some of them. told him that he must purchase subject to certain conditions, printed on a plan of the lands, and which W. made known to him. The last condition was to the effect that each purchaser should sign a contract embodying the conditions, and the payment of a deposit and the completion of the purchase within two months from the date of the contract. W. promised to lay the offer before the "proprietors," and soon after wrote the defendant, saying the "proprietors" had accepted his offer, and inquiring about his wishes as to the title. The next day defendant replied that, unless he was at liberty to build or not, the offer had better be reconsidered. The next day W. answered, saying the acceptance was an unconditional one, and

lent preference, and that the assignee in bankruptcy of a member whose seat had been so sold could not recover back debts paid to other members out of the proceeds.-Hyde v. Woods, 94 U. S. 523.

Grand Jury. An indictment for burglary committed in a building owned by a corporation was found by a grand jury, two of whose members were stockholders of the corporation. Held, no ground for quashing the indictment.-Rolland v. Commonwealth, 82 Penn. St. 306.

Husband and Wife.-A husband and wife are jointly liable for a trespass committed by the wife in his absence, but by his order.-Handy v. Foley, 121 Mass. 259.

Indictment—1. An indictment for murder "by firing a pistol," not showing how the deceased was injured by such act. Held, bad.-Shepherd v. The State, 54 Ind. 25.

2. A statute provides that any person who having a husband or wife living, marries another person, "shall, except in the cases mentioned in the following section, be deemed guilty of polygamy." The following section excepts persons whose husband or wife has been absent for seven years, and is not known to be living. Held, that an indictment on the statute need not negative the exception.-Commonwealth v. Jennings, 121 Mass. 47.

Insurance (Fire).—A policy of insurance on buildings was conditioned to be void from the time that the property insured should be levied on or taken into possession or custody under any proceeding at law or in equity. An execution was issued and delivered to the Sheriff, on a judgment rendered in a proceeding to enforce a mechanic's lien on the buildings; and the sheriff advertised the buildings for sale under the execution, on a certain day, without taking possession in the meantime, and before the day, the buildings were burnt. Held, that the insurers were liable.-Manufacturers' Ins. Co. v. O' Maley, 82 Penn. St. 400.

Insurance (Life).-1. A condition in a policy of life-insurance, making it void if the assured shall "die by his own hand, sane or insane," takes effect if he kills himself while wholly bereft of reason.-De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 232.

2. A child, though of age, has as such an insurable interest in the life of his parent.-Reserve Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kane, 81 Penn. St. 154.

Jury-1. In an action by a wife to recover damages for selling liquor (beer) to her husband, a juror testified, on the voir dire, that he thought the business of making and selling beer was a "perfect nuisance, and a curse to the community;" that he was bitterly opposed to it, and would do all in his power, except raising mobs, to break it down. Held, that he was incompetent to act as a juror.-Albrecht v. Walker, 73 Ill. 69.

2. At the trial of a civil action for conspiracy, the defendants having been previously convicted on an indictment and imprisoned for the same conspiracy, a person who has expressed an opinion that one of the defendants has been sufficiently punished, and who has signed a petition for his pardon, is incompetent as a juror.-Ashbury Ins. Co. v. Warren, 66 Me. 523.

3. The drinking of intoxicating liquor by a jury, even in a capital case, does not of itself vitiate their verdict.-Russell v. The State, 53 Miss. 367.

4. If the record in a criminal case recites that

the jury were "duly sworn," it is sufficient; but if it purports to recite the oath and does not follow the statutory form, it is error.— Miles v. The State, 1 Tex. N. S. 510. So if it does not show that they were sworn at all, but merely that they were "empaneled."-Rich v. The State, ib. 206.

Landlord and Tenant.-The owner of land

who forcibly enters thereon, and ejects, without unnecessary force, a tenant at sufferance, who has had reasonable notice to quit, is not liable for an assault.-Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass. 309.

Indictment.-An indictment for larceny of bottles of brandy is not sustained by proof that the prisoner drew the liquor from casks into bottles which he took with him for the purpose.-Commonwealth v. Gavin, 121 Mass. 54.

Larceny. The stealing, at the same time and place, of several articles belonging to several persons, is but one offence, and a conviction of larceny of one of such articles is a bar to an indictment for larceny of another.-Wilson v. The State, 45 Tex. 76.

Malicious Prosecution.-If A. makes a false and malicious charge against B, by reason whereof B is arrested and indicted, A is liable

to B for malicious prosecution, though the facts charged by him did not amount to an indictable offence, and B was acquitted on that ground.-Dennis v. Ryan, 65 N.Y. 385.

Mandamus.—Mandamus lies against the own ers of a cemetery, to compel them to permit the burial of a person whom the owner of a lot in the cemetery has a right to bury there.-Mount Moriah Cemetery Association v. Commonwealth,

1 Penn. St. 235.

Master and Servant.-The engine in a factory was moved from one part of the building to another, and thereby its shaft was left projecting into a room where it had not been before, and a person employed in that room, while attending to her usual duties the next day, the shaft not having been cut off as it should have been, was injured by it. Held, that the owner of the factory was liable.-Fairbank v. Haentzche, 73 III. 236.

Municipal Corporation —A city has not, unless specially empowered by its charter, power to establish fire limits, and to declare wooden buildings within such limits to be nuisances.Pye v. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312.

New Trial.-1. A verdict cannot be set aside because one of the jury was an infant, if his name was on the list of jurors returned and impanelled, though the losing party did not know that he was an infant until after verdict. Wassum v. Feeney, 121 Mass. 93.

2. A and B were indicted jointly. A was convicted and B acquitted. Held, that A might have a new trial on showing that B could give material evidence for his defence, as he could not, by any diligence, have obtained B's evidence before.-Rich v. The State, 1 Tex. N. S.

206.

Officer.-An office was tenable for six years, and until a successor should be elected and qualified. Before the term expired, a successor was elected and commissioned, took the oaths of office, and died. Held, that, on the expiration of the term, there was a vacancy, and that the incumbent did not hold over.-State v. Seay, 64 Mo. 89.

Partnership. The partnership of A and B was dissolved by the death of A, and B afterwards carried on the same business in partnership with C. Held, that a partner retiring from another firm which had had dealings with A and B, was not bound to notify B of Lis retire

ment, nor liable on a contract afterwards made by the remaining members of his firm with B and C.—Gaar v. Huggins, 12 Bush, 259.

B

Party Wall.-A, owning two adjoining lots of land, conveyed one to B, by deed duly recorded containing this clause: "It is agreed that the partition wall of any building hereafter erected on the granted premises may be placed half on the granted premises and half on the adjacent lot; and the owner of such lot shall, whenever he uses the wall, pay half its cost." built a party wall accordingly. A afterwards conveyed the adjacent lot to C, who conveyed to D, who used the party wall. Held, that he was liable to B, either on the covenant in the deed from A to B, or on an implied assumpsit for using B's property.-Richardson v. Tobey, 121 Mass. 457.

Railroad.-1. A receiver of a railroad was appointed in a suit, brought by holders of bonds of the railroad secured by mortgage, to foreclose. Held, that he should pay, out of the net earnings of the road, wages due, at the time of his appointment, to laborers and other employees for the building and operation of the road, before paying anything to the bondholders.Douglass v. Cline, 12 Bush, 608.

2. The conductor of a railroad train is bound to keep order on the train, and to protect passengers, to the best of his ability, against assaults by other passengers; and if he does not use reasonable exertions to do so, the railroad company is liable.-New Orleans, St. Louis & Chicago R.R. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200.

Tax.-Assessments for making roads were laid on the abuttors in proportion to the frontage of their estates on the road. Held, that this system was unequal and unconstitutional, as applied to rural or suburban property.-Seeley v. Pittsburgh, 82 Penn. St. 360.

Witness.-A and B were jointly indicted. A's wife was admitted as a witness for the State. Held, error, and not cured by the subsequent entry of a nol. pros. against it.—Dill v. The State, 1 Tex. N. S. 278.

GENERAL NOTES.

In the year 1823 some curious evidence was given before a Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into the existing mode of engrossing bills, with the view of ascertaining whether it was susceptible of altera

tions with advantage to the public service. The Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury said: "I have always found the oldest hands the most legible; the court hand, which was the original hand for records, was, perhaps, the handsomest hand that ever was written; the present engrossing hand results from the court hand; I find it more easy to read the engrossing or the Court hand than any other hand whatever." An officer of the Court of the Court of Common Pleas gave evidence to show that modern writing would not remain legible any length of time as compared with the "court hand." There is no doubt that the writing and the ink in England four centuries ago were admirable.

-Mr. James W. Gerard, of the New York bar, was in a case where his client, plaintiff, sat beside him, holding a gold-headed cane. The merits were with the plaintiff, but the jury went out and remained out. Eleven of them were in favor of the plaintiff, but the remaining man would not listen to reason, nor did he seem at all inclined to give any ground for holding out. They so remained for a great length of time. At last this one was induced to say why he would not agree with the others. I never will find a verdict in favor of a man who carries

a gold-headed cane.' This still checked the others; and one of the eleven seemed to begin to waver; and appeared to give in to the propriety of the principle which was involved in this ostentatious exhibition of a gold-headed cane; but he, significantly, called the obstinate one aside, and told him how he himself, while they were all in court, had particularly observed and been offended at this gold-headed cane, and experienced a similar feeling of repugnance against the plaintiff; and that this had caused him to pay particular attention to the cane, and he had ascertained, as a fact, that it was not gold -only pinchbeck-mere brass metal. The obstinate juryman accepted this assurance, and agreed, with his fellows, in finding a verdict for the plaintiff.

A CURIOUS WILL.-We take from the Boston Advertiser the following account of the mode in which a testator punished his avaricious relatives by a clause in his will which was made to depend upon their conduct. The Advertiser says:"A curious will has just been settled in • Berlin, containing a moral worth a wider circulation than a miser's last statement often

obtains. The poor man died, when, to general surprise, it was found he had left 34,000 marks. The 30,000 in a package, signed and sealed, was to be given to his native town in Bavaria ; 1,000 cach to three brothers, and 1,000 to a friend with whom he had quarreled. It was stipulated that none of the four should follow the body to the grave, which suggestion the three brothers gladly accepted, but the quarreler walked alone and forfeited his 1,000 marks, for the sake of paying a last mitigating honor. When the package was opened for the town, it disclosed another will, giving the 30,000 to any of the four who should disregard the stipulation."

ENGLISH LAW.-The Solicitors' Journal thus

speaks of the growth of English law during the past year: "As to the growth of English law during the year, there is little to be said. The last session produced several administrative acts, such as the Prison Act and the Solicitors' Examination Act; but, as regards alterations in the substance of the law, it was almost a blank. There were two or three comparatively small changes in real property law, an amendment of the Factors' Acts, and a useful consolidation of the Settled Estates Acts, but little more. Nor can we point to many judicial decisions of widereaching scope or great importance. The recently devised doctrine of the fiduciary relationship of the promoter has been again laid down; and the doctrine of contempt of court, which at one time threatened to assume alarming proportions, has been opportunely checked by the Court of Appeal, which, in reversing a singular decision of Vice-Chancellor Malins, stated that the exercise of this arbitrary jurisdiction ought to be most jealously and carefully guarded; that a court ought not to resort to it except in cases where no other remedy is to be found;' and that it was 'a power which ought only to be used in extreme cases.' It is in lengthy criminal inquiries and in ecclesiastical law cases that the year has been mainly memo

rable. The case of Clifton v. Ridsdale has pro. bably settled for some time the questions as to external observances; and the case of the Rev. Arthur Tooth, who after being attached by his body until he should have made satisfaction for his contempt,' succeeded in placing his heel on the neck of Lord Penzance, has brought home to the public at large a profound conviction of the mysterious uncertainty of ecclesiastical law."