yards and was not present, he could know nothing of the matter. It was not a fact of such a nature as to be better known to him in consequence of the contiguity of residence. It may sometimes be difficult to determine how far the evidence of a particular fact may go to strengthen the testimony of a witness to a more material point in a case; and perhaps no precise and definite rule can be laid down on the subject. In all cases, therefore, so highly penal, where the question is of a doubtful character, I should incline to favor the side of the accused. In the case now under consideration I cannot conceive that the testimony was either directly or indirectly material to the issue."

A person commits perjury not only by swearing falsely to a fact actually in issue, but also when the fact, though not in issue, has a tendency to prove or disprove this fact. But it must be "of some consequence to the point in question."

"If," said Lord Holt, in an old case, "it be a matter that tends to the discovery of truth, though but a circumstance, as that such a one wore a blue coat when he wore a red, it is perjury; but if he tells an impertinent story, nothing to the purpose, then it is not so." Rex v. Greip, 12 Mod. 142. Herein is the test: If the lie can have no influence at all on the question, one way or another, no one suffers from it, and the law does not notice it or punish it. For, as a matter of fact, it is difficult to imagine a case in which a person would be under any temptation to lie about a matter not material in some way or other to the issue, or "of some consequence to the point in question."

A fact may be "material," though evidence of its existence was improperly admitted. Annie Bishop, having charged one Harmer with being the father of her illegitimate child, was asked on the examination, if she had ever had connection with any one else. She denied it. Then Edward Gibbon stepped forward and testified that she must have overlooked the time he and she were engaged in that very act. Edward being subsequently tried for perjury, in telling such a story, it was held that although his evidence had

been improperly admitted—that is to say, his story should have been ruled out for being legally inadmissible yet he was guilty just the same of perjury in telling a lie about it. Reg. v. Gibbon,

L. & C. 109.

OBSTRUCTING LAWFUL ARREST.

REG. v. BROWN.

[1 Cr. &. M. 314.]

Policeman Herbert was no coward. A prize-fight being in full sway, in the presence of four hundred spectators hard customers, too, some of them, we may be sure-Herbert pushed his way into the ring and attempted to arrest the bruisers. But he was incontinently hustled back over the ropes, and when he proclaimed that he was a police officer, the crowd only laughed at him, and told him to go home. Herbert then called on several of the spectators to help him arrest the fighters; but, it is needless to say, got no response. He had to give it up; but, the next day, Mr. Brown, who was one of the parties who laughed when the policeman tried to enlist them in his service, found that he was charged with obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty.

Mr. Brown pleaded "not guilty." The judge, after telling the jury that it was a very important matter that a citizen should assist the officers of the law when asked to preserve the public peace, said that if they were satisfied of the following three things, they would have to convict him:

1st. That the constable saw a crime being committed, or had a warrant for a crime that had been committed.

2d. That there was a reasonable necessity for the constable calling upon other persons for their assistance

and support. "In this case there is no doubt that the constable could not by his own unaided exertions have put an end to the combat.

3d. That Brown was called on for his assistance, and, without any physical impossibility or lawful excuse, refused to give it. "Whether the aid of the defendant, if given, would have proved sufficient or useful, is not the question or the criterion. Every man might make that excuse, and say that his individual aid would have done no good; but the defendant's refusal may have been, and perhaps was, the cause of that of many others. Every man is bound to set a good example to others by doing his duty in preserving the public peace.'

And the jury having found these facts, Brown was convicted.

To prevent the arrest of a criminal, or to obstruct an officer of the law in the discharge of his duty, has always been considered an offense, provided the officer had authority to make the arrest, and the party knew he was an officer. The case above is interesting, as showing that not only positively obstructing an officer, but also refusing to aid him in the execution of his duty, is a crime.

ESCAPE.

STATE v. LEWIS.1

[19 Kan. 266.]

Law-Paw-Guilt- Wilt.- When upon thy frame the lawplaces its majestic paw-though in innocence or guilt — thou art then required to wilt.

Statement of case by reporter.

This defendant while at large

Was arrested on a charge

Of burglarious intent,

And direct to jail he went;

And he somehow felt misused

And through prison walls he oozed,

And in some unheard of shape
He effected his escape.

Mark you, now: Again the law

On defendant placed its paw
Like a hand of iron mail

And resocked him into jail,

Which said jail while so corraled,
He by sockage tenure held.

1 This case was reported by Eugene F. Ware, Esq., of Fort Scott, Kansas, by whose permission I am able to print this poetical version of the decision exactly as it may be found in the nineteenth volume of the Kansas Reports at page 266.