But at the present time, and especially in this country, a more liberal spirit prevails, and now the principles of the Christian religion or its sacredness or genuineness may be debated in private or in public by all who will. There is, nevertheless, in all the States such a crime as blasphemy; but the law is not now put in force unless the attack is of the most extravagant nature-so extravagant as to show the utmost malice in the utterer, and to be an injury to public morals.

Disturbing Religious Worship is indictable at common law. The law will not permit the worship of a whole congregation to be interrupted by an individual, even though the individual may think he is only exercising his rights. Let him settle his disputes, say the courts, outside the church, and after the service is over. Mr. Ramsay, who had been expelled from the Pine Street Church a fortnight before Christmas, determined to speak right out in meeting and to let his wrongs be known. So, after the congregation had assembled on Sunday morning, and the first hymn was just finished, he rose up in his place and began to relate to the people his side of the case. The minister tried to shut him up; but he declared he would be heard, and had to be forcibly expelled before the service could go on. It was held that Mr. Ramsay was guilty. "No one," said the court, "has a right to interfere with the religious devotions of others by making known his own grievance, real or fancied, in so boisterous a manner as to disturb and finally break up the meeting altogether, and thus frustrate the object for which it was held; and he can not be heard to say he did not intend the obvious and necessary consequences of his conduct." State v. Ramsay, 78 N. C. 450. Of course any wanton and contemptuous conduct is clearly within the law; as laughing, or swearing, or cracking nuts, or the like. Hunt v. State, 3 Tex. (App.), 116.

A member may disturb the worship as well as an outsider, and even when he is given permission to speak he may exercise his right in such a violent and outrageous way as to render himself guilty of this offense. One Sunday morning after prayer, Mr. Lancaster, of Randolph, Alabama, having obtained leave of the preacher in charge to say a few words, rather astonished the hearers by this speech: "I neither rise to preach, pray, or sing; but I want to talk to the church. I have meditated, thought, and prayed to know what I ought to do. I demand my letter. I cannot live in the church with liars, thieves, rogues, and murderers." This was

hardly complimentary to his fellow-members, and naturally caused much commotion. I presume Mr. Lancaster got his letter; at any rate, he was indicted at a subsequent session of the court for disturbing religious worship. "A member of the assemblage, though he be a member of the particular religious organization having control of the services, is bound to regard its peace and order. No permission given him to speak, or given to a mere stranger, by the leader or conductor of the services, whether he be lay or clerical, can justify or excuse such discourse as is unbecoming the assemblage, and must, by its violence, offend the order and decorum essential to Christian worship." Lancaster v. State, 53 Ala. 398. From all which it appears that the saying that the preacher is the only man that has it all his own way—can say anything he likes without being afraid of being contradicted-is, so far as within the church is concerned, very true. I wonder whether the preacher would be indictable in any case? Probably he would if he unnecessarily dwelt on the sins of his hearers in a personal way until they should make for the door, or should call him to order.

But Mr. Linkhaw's case shows that where a person does a thing he has a right to do, without any intention of disturbing the meeting, he is not guilty of any offense. I take the report of Mr. Linkhaw's case from Mr. Irving Browne's "Humorous Phases of the Law," (San Francisco, Sumner Whitney & Co., 1882) a book which I advise the lawyer to lay in for his next vacation. Mr. Browne's comments on several other cases of this kind I cannot refrain from borrowing in this place, as they are so much better than anything I can attempt. "In Brown v. State, 46 Ala. 175, it is held in effect that one is not punishable for being in undue haste to get to church. Before service commenced the defendants came by on horseback on a gallop some fifty yards from the church, and just then the defendant, Weems, who had been riding behind and was just catching up, called out to the others, 'You have been ahead of me all night, but damned if I am not up with you now.' When they went through the church yard they checked their pace. Afterward they came into the church, and one of them lay down on a rickety bench which made a noise every time he moved. The case does not disclose whether the defendant was moved thereto by the dullness of the sermon. It also appeared that one of the defendants had caught a cow by the tail, up the road, causing her to jump and ring her bell. But even this might have been an innocent mistaking of the cow's tail for the church bell rope, and a desire to

summon the worshipers. At all events the whole party escaped without punishment, on the ground that there was nothing willful in their conduct. * Disturbing the sleep of religious people after they come from service, is not within the statute. Thus held in State v. Edwards, 32 Mo. 550, where the acts complained of took place at a camp meeting, at night, after the assembly had dispersed, and the people had retired to their virtuous couches. The contrary, however, was held in Jennings' Case, 3 Gratt. 624, where Israel having retired to their tents at night, the wicked defendant purloined the tin horn from the preacher's stand, where it was kept to assemble the faithful, and proceeded to make night hideous by enacting the part of Gabriel. But the whole congregation need not be disturbed. It is sufficient if the thoughts of a single worshiper are distracted from divine things. So it was considered in Cockreham v. State, 7 Humph. 11, where one profane person cursed during meeting, in the private ear of an individual Methodist. The congregation must not be disturbed in detail. * And, although the services are over, if the congregation have not actually dispersed but are in the act of dispersing, it will not answer for any one to curse, swear, fight or throw rocks in the church yard (Williams v. State, 3 Sneed, 313), although we know from observation that a little quiet horse swapping in the same place is not objectionable. Even if the congregation assembled for worship have dispersed, still an assembly of the church authorities, for the trial of a member immediately after the service, is held privileged from disturbance. Hollingsworth v. State, 5 Sneed, 518. It is not easy to see how such an assembly can be construed 'a congregation assembled for the worship of the Deity.' It is oftener an assembly for the purpose of 'raising the devil,' and it is generally as difficult to disturb it as it would be to disturb an average political caucus." p. 260.

*

Profane Swearing. The law punishes the violation of the third commandment - provided that the language is used in the hearing of others, and is continued. A man may swear till his throat is sore, but if no one hears him it is no crime; and so a person can not be convicted for a single "damme." Profane swearing may be irreligious; it certainly is coarse and vulgar; but unless it is kept up so as to be a nuisance to those who are obliged to hear it, it is not punishable. For instance, the way our army swore in Flanders, according to Uncle Toby, was not a circumstance to the swearing done by Stephen Powell, in the town of Lumberton. But being indicted, he found a loophole in the indictment to escape through

"It is charged only," said the court, "that he cursed and swore publicly in the street; but whether in a whisper or aloud; once or repeatedly; for a moment or an hour; or whether heard by any or many, is not charged." State v. Powell, 70 N. C. 68.

SABBATH BREAKING.

WILKINSON v. STATE.

[59 Ind. 416; 2 Am. Cr. Rep. 596.]

could only One Sunday

On his farm, twenty-six miles from the nearest market, Wilkinson raised a great many melons. The melon season, like the sugar-making season, is short, depending on the climate and the weather. The summer of 1877 had crowned his labor with a bounteous harvest; the melons were ripening and decaying much faster than with the facilities at his command he could get them to market, for he haul a load to market every two days. in August, there were five or six hundred melons in the patch, dead ripe and ready for the market. A ripe watermelon is a luxury, but a decayed melon may be said to be "stale, flat, and unprofitable." Under these circumstances, Wilkinson, on Sunday morning, loaded his wagon with melons and started for market. "A gent has 'as 'is hi on 'im,

I think can make some sport."

hummed a jealous neighbor who watched the proceeding. The next day the jealous neighbor had Wilkinson indicted for breaking the Sabbath, and the question came before the judges, whether what he did was a work of necessity," and so, excusable.