munities I know of, the man who would refuse his mite in such a case would be justly regarded as an obstructionist of the worst kind, and would be certainly ridiculed and perhaps hated by the citizens generally. A person who is injured by a libel may sue the libeler for damages, or he may prosecute him criminally. In the civil suit, his claim is grounded on the injury which the publication has done to his property or to his reputation, and if he prove his case, damages will be awarded him to this extent. The criminal prosecution for libel is, however, based upon an entirely different foundation. The gist of the crime is not the injury to the party libeled, but is the breach of the peace which the charge will be likely to produce. Therefore, while in civil actions of this kind, the defendant might defeat the suit if he could show that the publication complained of was true for the law would not permit the plaintiff to recover damages for an injury done to a reputation to which he had no right-yet on a criminal prosecution the truth was no defense. Indeed, this was carried so far that a few years ago the maxim used to be "the greater the truth, the greater the libel," meaning that the injudicious, or spiteful publication of the truth about one would be more likely to sting him to a breach of the peace than if some falsehood were invented about him which he could easily and completely refute. As the Parson said in his sermon in the Laureate's Poem: "A lie which is half a truth is ever the blackest of lies. "For a lie which is all a lie may be met and fought with outright, "But a lie which is part a truth is a harder matter to fight.” The truth is a defense, however, when it can be shown that 1. The publication was for the public benefit. Thus the characters of public men are in some sense public property, and, therefore, to publish of them that they had been guilty of crimes or offenses, or the like, would not be punished criminally if true. 2. That the publication was privileged. Not only those who take part in public affairs, but every person who publishes a book or other literary work, or who takes part in a public entertainment, submits himself to criticism. Therefore criticism of a man's book or his picture is privileged. In like manner, where one is under a legal, or moral, or social duty to give another imformation of a person's character, what he may write to such one is privileged. A., for example, being asked the character of B., who had been his servant, by C. who is about to engage B. as his servant, writes of If B. in a letter to C. the words: "B. is a drunkard and a thief." this is true, or if A. honestly believes it to be true, this is not a libel. But if he goes beyond the necessity of the occasion it is different. Thus, if A. had published this letter in a newspaper it would be a libel. So anything said in parliamentary and judicial proceedings, and their publication afterwards, are privileged. In most of the American States, the common law has been so amended as to permit the truth of a libel to be a justification in criminal as well as in civil cases. CONTEMPT OF COURT. PEOPLE v. WILSON. [64 Ill. 195; 1 Am. Cr. Rep. 107.] A Chicago murderer who had been twice convicted and sentenced to death had twice obtained the aid of the Supreme Court of Illinois in deferring his punishment by granting him a new trial. The citizens began to get tired of this and to talk of lynch law. The newspapers are generally a correct mirror of public opinion, and so one evening the Chicago Journal contained this editorial: 66 THE CASE OF RAFFERTY. "At the time a writ of supersedeas was granted in the case of the murderer Chris. Rafferty, the public was blandly assured that the matter would be examined into by the Supreme Court and decided at once - that possibly the hanging of this notorious human butcher would not be delayed for a single day. Time speeds away, however, and we hear of nothing definite being done. Rafferty's counsel seems to be studying the policy of delay, and evidently with success. The riff-raff who contributed fourteen hundred dollars to demonstrate that hanging is played out, may now congratulate themselves on the success of their little game. Their money is operating splendidly. We have no hesitancy in prophesying clear through to the end just what will be done with Rafferty. He will be granted a new trial. He will be tried somewhere within a year or two. He will be sentenced to imprisonment for life. Eventually he will be pardoned out. And this in spite of all our public meetings, resolutions, committees, virtuous indignation and what not. And why? Because the sum of fourteen hundred dollars is enough nowadays to enable a man to purchase immunity from the consequences of any crime. If next winter's session of the - Legislature does not hermetically seal up every chink and loophole through which murderers now escape, it will deserve the bitter censure of every honest man in Illinois. We must simplify our mode of procedure in murder trials. The criminal should be tried at once, and when found guilty should be hanged at once - and the quicker hanged the better. The courts are now completely in the control of corrupt and mercenary shysters- the jackals of the legal profession, who feast and fatten on human blood spilled by the hands of other men. All this must be remedied. There can be found a remedy and it must be found." The judges of the Supreme Court of Illinois took this as reflecting on themselves, and the editor and proprietor of the Journal were brought before the tribunal and fined. The court held that under the statute which provided that the court should have power to punish contempts offered by any person to it while sitting, it had power to punish as constructive contempt a newspaper article referring to a case then pending in court. All acts calculated to impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice, are considered as done in the presence of the court. A contempt of court is a disobedience to the rules, orders, or dignity of a court. The punishment of contempt is very summary. If the contempt is committed in the presence of the court the officer may be at once fined or sent to jail without any further trial or proof. If it is done outside the court, the party is summoned by attachment, and the punishment is summary as in the first case. The power is confined to courts of record; but it is also exercised by legislative bodies. Contempt of court may be committed by: 1. Inferior judges and magistrates· as by disobeying orders issued from a superior court; or by proceeding in a cause after it has been put a stop to or removed from their jurisdiction by a writ of prohibition, certiorari or supersedeas. 2. Officers of the court-as by abusing the process of the law or deceiving the parties by any acts of oppression, extortion, collusive behavior, or culpable neglect of duty. 3. Jurymen as by not answering when summoned, or refusing to be sworn or give any verdict. In the exercise of their judicial capacity, however, as in giving a verdict, even though it be ever so erroneous, they are privileged. 4. Witnesses as by refusing to come to court when summoned or refusing to be sworn when there. 5. The parties as by disobeying any rule or order of court or non-payment of costs in certain cases, or interfering with the jury or witnesses. 6. And generally by all persons acting in disrespect of the court's authority, as by wrong or indecent conduct in court, interfering with the proceedings or interrupting them. Another class of contempts are those committed by the offender not present in court-for example, by disobeying the writs of the court; by speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges acting in their judicial capacity; by printing false accounts of causes depending in judgment; and by anything, in short, that demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect which, when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority is entirely lost among the people. Harris Cr. L. 90. But in People v. Wilson, it is said that to criticise decisions already made would not be contempt, so long as the decisions were correctly stated, and the official integrity of the judges not impeached. It would be rather severe on a legal writer if the rule were the other way. The case of the Chicago editors given above furnishes a convenient text for a brief homily in this place upon the apparent incapacity of the courts of this country, at the present time, to punish crime with certainty and speed. There is not the slightest doubt that there is a good deal of "contempt" abroad among the people for the courts who seem to impede justice instead of doing justice. This "contempt," welling up into a mighty flood, swept over Cincinnati a few weeks ago, and threatened for a time to make an end of courts and lawyers and criminals at one fell swoop. It manifests itself in the formation of vigilance committees in different parts of the country, and that there is some need for them would appear to be proved by |