sells liquor to a customer, without a license. Prima facie it being proved that the liquor was owned by the grocery keeper, he is responsible for his clerk's act. Com. v. Nichols, 10 Metc. 259.

3. Where the agent acts without his consent express or implied, or against his orders. Here the master is not liable of course. A coal dealer in Burlington, Vermont, sent his man to deliver some coal to a customer; the man, for convenience of unloading and to lessen the distance drove on the sidewalk. As it was a misdemeanor there to drive a horse on the sidewalk, the coal dealer was indicted. But the court held that he was not liable for his man's act. "It is evident," they said, "that he had no reason to suppose that any such act would be done. State v. Bacon, 40 Vt. 456.

But the agent or servant is criminally responsible in all these

cases.

LIABILITY OF AGENTS OR SERVANTS.

HAYS v. STATE.

[13 Mo. 246.]

Robert Hays, being indicted for selling liquor without a license, pleaded that he was only the servant of the proprietor, and sold the liquors at his order, and for his profit. But the court said that this made no differ"Whoever being of legal discretion acts wrongfully," quoth the judge, "is personally responsible, and the fact that it was done as the agent or by the request or command of a third person is no excuse."

ence.

An agent or servant is not exempt from punishment for crime because he acted under the command of his superior, and for his benefit. The agent may, however, escape punishment when it appears

1. That he acted innocently. In an English case, the proprietor of a mine put his servants to work in the direction of an adjoining mine, belonging to another. The servants, after a time, got beyond the boundary of their mine and commenced taking the coal from the next mine, the master knowing that they had encroached, but the servants thinking that it all belonged to the master. It was held that the master was guilty of larceny but that the servants were not. Reg. v. Bleasdale, 2 C. & K. 765. There was a Hoss and hog case of this kind in Missouri. Hoss coveted his neighbor's hogs which were running around loose in the woods. So he hired a man to catch them, bring them to his barn and mark them. The man, while engaged in the work, was caught himself and taken to the lock-up. But the court held that if the man thought the hogs belonged to Hoss he was not guilty. State v. Matthews, 20 Mo. 55.

But the act must be one not wrong in itself. If a master told his servant to shoot a man, the servant would be bound to know that it was an order he ought not to obey and would be guilty if he did.

2. That he acted under duress. See post, p. 60

LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS.

REG. v. BIRMINGHAM AND GLOUCESTER RAILWAY CO.

[3 Q. B. 223; 1 Lead. Cr. Cas. 158.]

Proceeding by authority of the statute, the justices of Worcester ordered the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Company to build certain bridges over their tracks. The company refused to do so, and, being brought into court for disobedience, objected that no indictment would lie against a corporation. But the court did not agree with this argument, and the railway company was tried, found guilty, and fined.

REG. v. GREAT NORTH OF ENGLAND RAILWAY CO.

[9 Q. B. 315; 1 Lead. Cr. Cas. 166.]

It is not an uncommon thing for a railroad corporation to act as though it owned the world. The Great North of England Railroad Company had obtained no authority to cross with its tracks a street in the village of Hurworth; but what did that matter? It suited its convenience to do so, and that was enough. So it

set its workmen at the road and cut a way through it, and built a wall and laid its tracks, and intimated to the citizens that if they did not like it they could lump it. But they were a public-spirited people, the villagers of Hurworth, and in short order had the company indicted for nuisance. Then, as is their custom, the corporation unlocked its money chest and employed the best legal talent to beat its opponents. No less than three big-wigs argued with great earnestness and at great length that the prosecution was preposterous. When the court referred them to the Birmingham Railway Case, they replied that there the company was indicted for not doing something, while here it was indicted for doing something; that the former was all right, but the latter all wrong. But the court thought the distinction rather transparent. "Why," said Lord Denman, C. J., "should a corporation be liable for one species of offense and not for the other? The startling incongruity of allowing the exemption is one strong argument against it. The law is often entangled in technical embarrassments, but there is none here. It is as easy to charge one person or a body corporate with erecting a bar across a public road, as with the non-repair of it; and they may as well be compelled to pay a fine for the act as for the nuisance."

Then the three big-wigs advanced another argument. "You can indict the man that gave the order" (“if you ever find him out," they whispered to each other); "or, better still, you can indict the men that dug the earth up and laid the rails and hammered the ties" ("send them to jail if you like; low workmen are nothing to us," they whispered again and chuckled),