"so there is no necessity for laying your hands on Us," with a very big U. But again Lord Denman shook his head. "The public," said he, "knows nothing of the former; and the latter, if they can be identified, are commonly persons of the lowest rank, wholly incompetent to make any reparation for the injury. There can be no effectual means for deterring from an oppressive exercise of power for the purpose of gain, except the remedy by an indictment against those who truly commit it, that is, the corporation, acting by its majority; and there is no principle which places them beyond the reach of the law for such proceedings."

Corporations have led the courts a hard race. In the early history of our law, a corporation being a rather uncommon creature, the judges found a good many reasons for not treating them as individuals were treated, because they had few of the attributes and powers of individuals. It was argued that as they were not authorized to do anything but certain legal acts, if they did anything illegal the act was beyond the authority of the hand or agent which did it, and being unauthorized it ought not to bind the principal. The courts at first assented to this argument, but such has been the growth of these concerns that public policy has compelled a change in this respect. "The old rule," said Bigelow, J., in a Massachusetts case, "had its origin at a time when corporations were few in number, and limited in their powers and in the purposes for which they were created. Experience has shown the necessity of essentially modifying it; and the tendency of the more recent cases in courts of the highest authority has been to extend the application of all legal remedies to corporations and assimilate them, as far as possible, in their legal duties and responsibilities to individuals." Com. v. Proprietors, 2 Gray, 345.

The old rule that a corporation could not be held on a contract not under its corporate seal; that it could not be liable for a trespass, a malicious prosecution, or a libel in a civil action, is now completely exploded, and it is well that it is so.

The two cases above lay down the modern view of the law that a corporation may be liable criminally as well; both for non-feasance

i.e., not doing what it ought to do, and misfeasance, i.e., doing what it ought not to do. The distinction that the three big-wigs tried to make when they were arguing before Lord DENMAN, was a very subtle one. And if they had succeeded they would have been able to whip the devil round a post in grand style. Indicted, for instance, for not building a proper bridge, they would have replied that their offense was building an improper bridge, and not indictable. And in a case like Com. v. Proprietors, where a corporation was indicted for nuisance in not constructing any draws in a bridge over a river, they would have argued that they were guilty of a misfeasance, i.e., obstructing navigation in the river, and were not liable.

But it is still the law that corporations are not indictable for offenses which require criminal intention to make them crimes, or which consist of a violation of those social duties which men are charged with. Thus treason, murder, perjury, or such offenses, they cannot be guilty of.

[2 Burr. 1125; 1 W. Bl. 273; 1 Lead. Cr. Cas. 1.]

When Richard Webb, of the parish of St. Luke, in the county of Middlesex, paid for a thing he was accustomed to get it, and when he paid for a gallon of beer he expected to get a gallon of beer. So when, having ordered of Mr. Brewer Wheatly, eighteen gallons of that foamy beverage the barrels came, he paid for eighteen gallons. When it subsequently turned out that the barrels held only sixteen gallons, Richard Webb was wroth and tried to have the brewer sent to prison for cheating him.

However, he did not succeed, for the court told him that his loss arose from his carelessness in not measur

ing the beer before he paid for it. "The offense that is indictable," said Lord Mansfield, "must be such a one as affects the public. As if a man uses false weights and measures, and sells by them to all, or many of his customers, or uses them in the general course of his dealing; so if a man defrauds another, under false tokens. For these are deceptions that common care and prudence are not sufficient to guard against. So if there be a conspiracy to cheat; for ordinary care and caution is no guard against this. Those cases are much worse than mere private injuries; they are public offenses. But here it is a mere private imposition or deception; no false weights or measures are used, no false token is given, no conspiracy; only an imposition upon the person he was dealing with in delivering him a less quantity instead of a greater, which the other carelessly accepted. It is only a non-performance of his contract, for which non-performance he may bring his action. The selling an unsound horse as and for a sound one is not indictable; the buyer should be more upon his guard." And all the other judges concurred with him, Mr. Justice Wilmot being especially positive, saying: "The matter has been fully settled and established, and upon a reasonable foot. The true distinctions that ought to be attended to in all cases of this kind and which will solve them all, is this:that in such impositions or deceits where common prudence may guard persons against the suffering from them, the offense is not indictable, but the party is left to his civil remedy for the redress of the injury that has been done him; but where false weights and measures are used, or false tokens produced, or such methods.

taken to cheat or deceive as people cannot by any ordinary care or prudence be guarded against, there is an indictable offense."

In a popular sense a "crime" means a degrading and immoral act. But in the law there are very many degrading and immoral acts, which are not crimes; and there are very many 66 crimes," which are neither degrading nor immoral. The only definite meaning which a lawyer can attach to the word "crime" is an act or omission which the law notices and punishes. It is not at all necessary that the act should be immoral or bad in itself. Philosophers have pointed out the absurdity of an act being right on one side of a river and a crime on the other. Yet so it may be. "When English law," says Stephen, "prevailed within the Indian Presidency towns and not in other parts of India, it would have been true to say that Suttee was or was not murder, according as it was or was not carried on within the Mahratta ditch. In the same way it was morally right according to Hindoo views and morally wrong according to English views." What is "criminal 99 (using this word in the legal sense) in one jurisdiction is not criminal in another, and what is criminal to-day may not have been criminal yesterday, and may not be criminal tomorrow. In one country the law punishes Sabbath breaking; in another, the first day of the week is regarded as a day for festivity and amusement. To manufacture or sell intoxicating liquor may be innocent in one State, and criminal in another. Embezzlement was regarded as a mere breach of trust for many years; but becoming alarmingly frequent was made by statute a crime. The patriarchs of the Bible were good men, but if they lived in our generation and indulged in the marital practices which are recorded of them, they would spend most of their days in the penitentiary.

Even acts which savor of immorality or vice are not always "crimes." Seduction and adultery, though acts of immorality, are not crimes in England, nor in some of the States. The law of the United States, or of any other country, never punished a man "for ingratitude, for hardheartedness, for the absence of natural affection, for idleness, for avarice, sensuality, pride," or vices of this character. "Sinful thoughts and dispositions of mind might be the subject of confession and penance," but they are never punished by the law.