man, representing his name as being Wiley, presented this document to the Superintendent of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad at Chicago: "THE DELAWARE AND HUDSON CANAL COMPANY, "To any Railroad Superintendent : "The bearer, T. H. Wiley, has been employed on the A. & S. R. R. as brakeman and freight hand. He goes West to find a more lucrative position. Any courtesies shown him will be duly appreciated and reciprocated should opportunity offer. "H. A. FONDA, Superintendent." It was held that this was not the subject of forgery. "The writing, if genuine," said Breese, J., "has no legal validity, as it affects no legal rights. It is a mere attempt to receive courtesies on a promise of no legal obligation to reciprocate them." Waterman v. People, 67 Ill. 91. The forgery need not be of the whole instrument. Generally the only false statement is the use of a name to which the party is not entitled. It does not matter whether the name wrongly applied be a real or fictitious one. Of course the forgery need not be in the name; it may equally be in any other part of the instrument. For example, it is forgery to fill in without authority a blank check; or to alter the date of an accepted bill, so as to show an earlier day of payment, or to put an address to the name of the drawee of a bill of exchange with intent to make the acceptance appear to be that of a different person, or to tear off a condition whereby a non-negotiable instrument is made negotiable. Harris Cr. L. 219. The alteration, however, must be material, and therefore it is not forgery to add to an instrument words which the law would supply, or to put the name of a witness to a paper which the law does not require to be attested. State v. Gherkin, 7 Ired. (L.) 206. Forcible entry and detainer consists in "violently taking or keeping possession of lands and tenements, with menaces, force and arms, and without the authority of law." While a criminal offense, it is more commonly prosecuted in this country as a civil action for a penalty. Receiving stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, is a crime, whether the intent is to aid the thief in concealing or escaping with them, or to appropriate them and sell them. Formerly the receiver could not be convicted until the thief had been, but this is now altered by statute. Malicious mischief. Every person who willfully or maliciously injures or destroys any real or personal property belonging to another is guilty of malicious mischief. At common law this misdemeanor did not apply to injuries to real estate; now, however, it includes both species of property. INDEX. ABANDONMENT. Of attempt does not palliate it, 66. ABDUCTION. The crime defined, 182–185. Prostitution does not mean mere fornication, 182-185. ACCESSORIES. Liability of principals and accessories, 71. Different degrees of, 71-73. Principal in first degree, 73. Principal in second degree, 73. Accessory before the fact, 74. Accessory after the fact, 74. ADULTERY. (See also HOMICIDE.) Not punishable at common law, 122. "Living in adultery " indictable by statute, 121, 123. Master not liable for criminal acts of servants, 22. Agent liable for criminal act done at command of principal, 24. "ANONYMOUS." Who the gentleman is, 89. APOSTACY. Defined and explained, 112, 113–115. APPELLATE COURTS. My assize sermon to the, 172–181. ARREST. (See HOMICIDE.) ARSON. Defined and explained, 280. Must be malicious, 280. House must be a "dwelling-house," 280. There must be some "burning,” 281. Burning must be intentional, 281. ARTIST. Imitating artist's signature on spurious picture not forgery, 312. ASSAULT. (See also CONSENT; ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MUR- The least offer of violence enough, 194–196. Battery distinguished from assault, 197, 199. Executed violence makes a battery, 198, 199, Cases in which force may be applied, 204-207. Parent on child, 204. Schoolmaster on scholar, 203. Guardian on ward, 205. Master on servant, 205. Officer of the law on criminal, 206. To enforce a right, 206. In defense of person or property, 207. But force must be moderate and not beyond occasion, 204–207. Words do not constitute an assault, 212-213. Offer of violence unexecuted on a condition being complied with is nevertheless an assault, 214-216. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON. Defined and explained, 219. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT MURDER. Defined and explained, 217-220. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT RAPE. Defined and explained, 221-224. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO COMMIT RAPE—Continued. Intent to have connection not enough; party must be ready to use force on woman, 221-224. The North Carolina negro case, 223, 224. ASSIZE SERMON. My assize sermon to the appellate judges, 172-181. ATTEMPTS. Indictability of, 62. Preparation not attempt and not indictable, 63-65. Voluntary or involuntary abandonment of, no defense, 66. To commit an impossibility indictable, 68-70. First marriage must be legal, 124, 125. Second marriage need only be a form, 126, 127. Defined and explained, 283-285. "Breaking" a requisite, 285. Entering open door or window not a breaking," 286. But coming down chimney is, 287. "Entering" also requisite, 288. Breaking and entering must be "at night," 288. And in a "dwelling house," 289. Intent must be to commit felony there, 289. Constructive breaking explained, 291-292. Drunken man cannot commit, when, 21 BURIAL. (See NUISANCE.) CAPACITY. (See INFANTS; LUNATICS; HUSBANnd and Wife.) Defined and explained, 80. |