added: "I am of the same opinion. No doubt, morally speaking, the prisoner has been guilty of a shocking crime, but not of a legal one." The two other judges of the court had to agree to this.

But when it is a man's business either by law or contract to do a certain thing, the omission to do that thing may involve him in criminal liability — the law tries to compel a man to "attend to his business." The next cases illustrate this exception.

UNLESS THERE IS A LEGAL DUTY TO PERFORM THEM.

QUEEN v. HUGHES.

[26 L. J. M. C. 202.]

Some contractors were building a wall on the inside of the shaft of a coal mine. Hughes was employed to put a stage on the top of the shaft in order to prevent trucks loaded with coal from falling down it. One morning while the work was going on Hughes omitted to put on the stage, and in consequence a truck finding nothing to bar its way made a rather hurried descent to the foot of the shaft, and killed several of the men working there. Hughes was convicted, it being held that his position was exactly the same as if he had pushed the truck down the shaft.

REG. v. CONDE.

[10 Cox, C. C. 547.]

Examined in the Central Criminal Court in April, 1867, Jane Tucker gave this picture of the Conde household: "I live right opposite the Conde's house on the first floor. I could see plainly into the room where they lived. I never saw Willie eating. I have

seen him standing against the wall all day; on other occasions for two or three hours at a time. When his mother went out of the room he would sit down on something; but as soon as he heard her coming he would jump up and resume his position at the wall. He used to stand at the wall whilst the rest of the family had their meals. The other children were playing about with something in their hands to eat, or else standing at the table with their mother. I have never seen any food given to Willie. I have observed this for nine months as near as I can recollect." One day Willie died, and the coroner said it was starvation. The prisoner, his mother, was then indicted for manslaughter, and found guilty.

The law made it her duty to supply her child with necessaries, and for the result of this omission she was criminally responsible.

In the first case the duty was cast upon Hughes by his own act or contract. In the second case the duty was cast on the mother by the law-the duty of a parent to supply an infant child with necessaries. Many cases of this kind are to be found in the law books.

One Pargeter was employed on a railroad, and it was his duty to give a certain signal when the line was obstructed. But one day, though he saw the line obstructed, he gave no signal, and a train came along with fatal results, several persons being killed. Pargeter was convicted of manslaughter. R. v. Pargeter, 3 Cox C. C. 191. Elizabeth Bubb was a widow with two children, and the sister of the wife of Richard Hook. His wife having died he went to live with his sister-in-law, taking his child Maria with him, and paying Elizabeth his and his child's board.

Richard was a working man

Having a curious antipathy clothing when the father

and only able to get home once a week. to the child, Elizabeth gave it no food or was absent and from this neglect it died. It was held that she was guilty of murder or manslaughter, according as she had intented or not intended its death. Reg. v. Bubb, 4 Cox C. C. 455. While there was no legal duty in the first instance for the aunt to provide

food for the niece, yet she had, by accepting its charge and receiving compensation, placed herself in the same position as though she had been its parent.

The principles of the cases we have just considered are tersely summed up by Lord Macaulay in his report on the India Code, as follows:

"A. omits to give Z. food and by that omission voluntarily causes Z.'s death. Is this murder? It is murder if A. was Z.'s jailor, directed by the law to furnish Z. with food. It is murder if Z. was the infant child of A. and had, therefore, a legal right to sustenance, which right a civil court would enforce against A. It is murder if Z. was a bed-ridden invalid, and A., a nurse, hired to feed Z. It is murder if A. was confining Z. in unlawful confinement, and had thus contracted a legal obligation to furnish Z., during the continuance of his confinement, with necessaries. It is not murder if Z. is a beggar who has no other claim on A. than that of humanity. "A. omits to tell Z. that a river is swollen so high that Z. cannot safely attempt to ford it, and by this omission voluntarily causes Z.'s death. This is murder if A. is a person stationed by authority to warn travelers from attempting to ford the river. It is murder if A. is a guide who had contracted to conduct Z. It is not murder if A. is a person on whom Z. has no other claim than that of humanity.

"A savage dog fastens on Z. A. omits to call off the dog, knowing that if the dog be not called off, it is likely that Z. will be killed. Z. is killed. This is murder in A. if the dog belonged to A., inasmuch as his omission to take proper order with the dog is illegal. But if A. be a mere passer-by it is not murder."

But the duty must be personal, and there must be some direct connection between the neglect of duty and the injury received. Certain persons, by act of Parliament, were required to make contracts for keeping a public road in repair. They omitted to do so and consequently the road became dangerous, and a traveler was thrown from his wagon and killed. The trustees were held not guilty, Campbell, C. J., saying: "The cases on this subject show a personal duty, the neglect of which has directly caused death; and no doubt where that is the case a conviction of manslaughter is right. But how do these apply to trustees of a highway? How can it be said that their omission to raise a rate or to contract for the separation of the road directly caused his death? If so, the surveyor or inhabitants of the parish would be equally guilty of manslaughter; for the law casts upon them the duty of

keeping the road in repair. To uphold this inquisition would be to extend the criminal law in a most alarming manner, for which there is no principle or precedent."

The next case, Reg. v. Smith, 10 Cox C. C. 82, shows a condition of things not included in these illustrations, but which it is now well settled constitutes a crime by omission, viz: where the sufferer is prevented by the act of the prisoner from obtaining the assistance which he withholds.