quences of his own act, as in the case of shooting a gun into a crowd, the law will imply from the wantonness of the act, that he intended to kill some one, although it might have been done in sport. If the prisoner's object had been nothing more than to make Carter's horse throw him, and he had used such means only as were appropriate to that end, then there would be some reason for applying to his case the distinction that where the intention was to commit only a trespass or a misdemeanor, an accidental killing would be only manslaughter. But in this case the act done indicated an intention to kill - it was calculated to produce that effect and no other-death was the probable consequence and did result from it and the crime was murder."

"It is a maxim older than the law of England," said Lord Abinger on one occasion, "that a man is not guilty unless his mind is guilty." Reg. v. Allday, 8 C. & P. 136. In other words there is no crime unless there is a criminal intent.

As, however, the law can not look into a man's mind to find out his intent, it is forced to judge of his intention from his acts. Acting on this principle the presumption of law is that a man is held to have intended the natural and ordinary consequences of his acts. The law is summed up by Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. York, 9 Metc. 103, as follows: "A sane man, a voluntary agent, acting upon motives, must be presumed to contemplate and intend the necessary, natural, and probable consequences of his own acts. If, therefore, one voluntarily or wilfully does an act which has a direct tendency to destroy another's life, the natural and necessary conclusion from the act is that he intended so to destroy such person's life. So if the direct tendency of the wilful act is to do another some great bodily harm, and death in fact follows, as a natural and probable consequence of the act, it is presumed that he intended such consequence, and he must stand legally responsible for it. So where a dangerous and deadly weapon is used with violence, upon the person of another, as this has a tendency to destroy life or do some great bodily harm to the person assailed, the intention to take life or to do him some great bodily harm is a necessary conclusion from the act."

And the intent, as in Moses Smith's case, may be transferred. Where a person in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a felony, unintentionally kills another, such killing is murder at common law. If the unintentional killing was done in attempting a misdemeanor, then it is manslaughter. Coke has given an apt illustration of this distinction, which is found in all the text-books on criminal law. A and B. are neighbors, and both own chickens. A. intending to kill and steal B.'s chickens shoots at them, but kills B., who was on the other side of the fence and whom he did not see. C. and D. are neighbors. Under the same circumstances, C. shoots at D.'s chickens not intending to steal them, but merely wanting to wound or kill them for the purpose of annoying D. by injuring his property, C. kills D. E. and F. are neighbors also. E. in shooting at his own chickens to kill them for his own use, kills F., not knowing him to be anywhere near. A. is guilty of murder, C. is guilty of manslaughter, while E. is not guilty of any criminal offense.

And where a statute prohibits an act, and it appears to have been the intention of the Legislature that the person doing the forbidden act should do it at his peril, he is liable for so doing even although he had no criminal intention. See next case.

4

ACTS PROHIBITED BY STATUTE - INTENT IMMATERIAL.

COMMONWEALTH v. MASH.

[7 Metc. 472.]

This was an American Enoch Arden case. Early one morning in November, 1838, Peter went out of his house in Nantucket after telling his wife, Mehitabel, who was cooking the breakfast, that he would return to that meal in the course of a few minutes. But the minutes went by and no Peter. The things on the table got cold, and no Peter. The days came and the days went by for four long years, and still no Peter. Then Mehitabel gave him up, and yielding to the solicitations of William Barrett, was married to him on the 10th of April, 1842. But the wedding bells had scarce ceased ringing and the wedding feast was hardly over, before into the Barrett homestead stalked Peter. Mehitabel fainted, William swore. Now there was an ugly law on the statute book of Massachusetts which said it should be a crime for any person, having a husband and wife living, to marry another person, unless the husband or wife should have been absent

beyond sea for seven years. When Mehitabel had recovered from the shock of her first spouse's appear

ance she was taken to court to answer a charge of bigamy.

And here she was told by the learned Chief Justice Shaw that she had done very wrong and would have to be convicted even though she honestly believed when she married William that Peter was dead, and during his absence had inquired far and near but could obtain no tidings of him. "It was urged in the argument,' said the judge, "that where there is no criminal intent there can be no guilt, and if the former husband was honestly believed to be dead, there could be no criminal intent. The proposition stated is undoubtedly correct in a general sense; but the conclusion drawn from it, in this case, by no means follows. Whatever one voluntarily does, he, of course, intends to do. If the statute has made it criminal to do any act under particular circumstances, the party voluntarily doing that act is chargeable with the criminal intent of doing it. On this subject the law has deemed it so important to prohibit the crime of polygamy, and found it so difficult to prescribe what shall be sufficient evidence of the death of an absent person to warrant a belief of the fact, and as the same vague evidence might create a belief in one mind and not in another, the law has also deemed it wise to fix a definite period of seven years continued absence without knowledge of the contrary, to warrant a belief that the absent person is actually dead. One, therefore, who marries within that time, if the other party be actually living, whether the fact is believed or not, is chargeable with that criminal intent by purposely doing that which the law expressly prohibits."

REG. v. PRINCE.

[L. R. 2 C. C. R. 154.]

Because Henry Prince fell in love with Annie Phillips, of Kingston on Thames, sixteen of England's highest judges had to meet in consultation, and decide a very intricate and difficult question. There would have been no trouble if Father Phillips had not taken a very strong dislike to Henry, or if Annie had been a few years older. But as she was not of age, and the stern parent could not be won over, the lovers agreed to elope. They carried out their plan, but were pursued and captured, and Henry was indicted under a statute which provided that whoever took out of the charge of her father and against his will "any unmarried girl under the age of sixteen years,' should be punished.

Henry's only defense was that he thought she was eighteen years old; that Annie told him so, and her appearance made him believe her statement to be true. But fifteen of the sixteen judges were of opinion that this made no difference. "The Legislature has enacted," said Bramwell, B., "that if any one does this wrong act, he does it at the risk of her turning out to be under sixteen."

There was a statute in Massachusetts making it an offense to admit a minor to a billiard-room without the written consent of his parent or guardian. Samuel Emmons kept a billiard-room, and to it one evening came Austin Lynde and Henry Macdonald. Before he came in, Emmons asked Lynde if he was over twenty-one, to which he replied that he was, and he certainly looked like it, being full grown. So Emmons, believing him to be over age, let him play,