(e.) E. asks a ruffian to murder an enemy. The ruffian meets the enemy alone in the woods and kills him.

(f.) F., G., and H., go out with a design to rob. F. commits the robbery. G. stands by ready to help. H. is stationed some way off, to give the alarm if any one comes.

(g.) I. robs a house. J. hides him and helps him to escape to another country.

In the above cases A. is a principal in the first degree, C. is an accessory before the fact, D. is only guilty of the misdemeanor of incitement, E. is an accessory before the fact, F. is a principal in the first degree, G. and H. are principals in the second degree, J. is an accessory after the fact.

The test as to whether a person is a principal or an accessory, is whether he was present or absent at the commission of the crime. If he was present, he is a principal; if he was absent, he is an accessory.

A principal in the first degree is the actual perpetator of the crime. (A., F., and I., in the illustrations above.) He must be present at the place, and do the act with his own hand. But the hand of an innocent agent is considered his own hand in the eye of the law. Smith tells Robbie, a child under seven, to bring him goods from a store without the proprietor seeing him. Robbie does so. Smith is a principal in the first degree. Or, Smith, knowing a note to be forged, asks his friend, Brown, who thinks it genuine, to get it changed for him. Brown does so, and gives Smith the money. Here Smith is a principal in the first degree. The reader will note that, if Brown had known that the note was forged, Brown would have been the principal in the first degree, and Smith an accessory before the fact. "But Smith," it will, perhaps, be said, "was not present when the goods were taken by Robbie, or the note changed by Brown, and your definition above says that he must be present." True; but the law gets around this by considering Smith as being constructively present. Reg. v. Manley, 1 Cox, C. C. 104; Reg. v. Soares, R. & Ry. 25.

A principal in the second degree is one who is present at the commission of the crime, aiding and abetting the commission. Mr. Breese, in the principal case, was this kind of a fellow; and so were G. and H., in the illustration above. G., it will be noticed, was actually present, while both H. and Breese were only constructively present. But, for the purposes of punishment, they are all in the same boat.

An accessory before the fact is one, who, though being absent when the crime was committed, procures or aids its commission. In the illustration above, C. and E. were this kind of people.

It is clear that a person setting another up to commit a crime, is doing a very dangerous thing, for the party selected may not follow his instructions to the letter. He may

(a.) Commit a different kind of crime; or he may

(b.) Commit the selected crime on another person; or,

(c.) The instigator may weaken, and want to get out of the affair.

(a.) That the instigator is guilty in this case.

For instance,

A. asks B. to murder C. by shooting him. B. murders C. by stabbing. A. is an accessory before the fact to the murder of C.

(b.) That the instigator is not guilty in this case. A., for example, instigates B. to murder C. B. murders D. A. is not an accessory before the fact to the murder of D.

But in both of these cases, if the different crime was the probable consequence of the instigation, the instigator is an accessory before the fact. A., for example, describes C. to B. and instigates B. to murder C. B. murders D., whom he believes to be C., because D. corresponds with A.'s description of C. Or, A. instigates B. to rob D. B. tries it, but D. resists, and B. kills D. In both cases A. is an accessory before the fact to the murder of D. Steph. Cr. L. 29.

(c.) The instigator is responsible until he has given the principal notice that the thing is to go no further. A. advises B. to murder C., and afterwards, by letter, withdraws his advice. B. murders C. A. is not an accessory before the fact, if his letter reaches B. before he murders C.; but he is, if it arrives afterwards. An accessory after the fact is one, who, knowing a felony to have been committed by another, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon. This was J.'s position in the illustration above. To this rule there is one exception - the case of a married woman assisting her husband. See ante, p. 4.

Mr. Harris gives an imaginary case, in which each of the four kinds of participation in a crime described above is to be found. A. incites B. and C. to murder a person. B. enters the house and cuts the man's throat, while C. waits outside to give warning in

case any one should approach. B. and C. flee to D., who, knowing that the murder has been completed, lends horses to facilitate their escape. Here B. is a principal in the first degree, and C. in the second degree; A. is an accessory before the fact, and D. an accessory after the fact.

In treason, all the participants are principals. The courts were very hard on treason, and spread the net very wide, so as to catch every disloyal person when possible. And in misdemeanors there are no accessories, all the participants being regarded as principals.

CHAPTER III.

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PUBLIC ALONE.

TREASON.

UNITED STATES v. HOXIE.

[1 Paine, 265.]

The embargo laws which our government passed early in the present century did not at all please Mr. Hoxie, of Vermont. He owned a good deal of timber which would bring a good price in Canada, if he could only get it there. But there were United States officers all along the border whose duty it was to see to it that nothing of the kind went into Canada. Mr. Hoxie was determined that his timber should go. So he built a raft of it and hiring and arming a crew of three score men determined to take it out of the country, peacefully if he could, forcibly if he must. Near the border troops were stationed to prevent such a thing. As the raft passed them the troops fired at the raft, which fire Mr. Hoxie's men returned with spirit, and in dead earnest, Mr. Hoxie joining in the fight very actively. The end of it was that the raft forced its way across the line and to the Canadian soil, the men were paid off, and the timber sold. Mr. Hoxie was subsequently captured and indicted for treason

in levying war against the United States. It was decided, however, that Mr. Hoxie's resistance to the law being for a private and not for a public purpose, he was not guilty of treason.

Treason is always regarded as the highest crime punishable by the law and the penalty is always death. At common law there were two kinds of treason: High treason, which was a violation of the allegiance owing to the king; and, petit treason, which was a violation of the allegiance owing to a superior- thus, for a wife to kill her husband or a servant his master was petit treason. This crime has been abolished, and is now simply murder. So that "Treason," as used at this day means high treason. In England, as in all monarchical countries, treason could be committed in very many ways, for example, by imagining the Sovereign's death, levying war against him, adhering to the king's enemies; killing his wife or son, or violating his wife or daughter, killing the chancellor or judges, and in many other ways. In the United States, however, the crime is strictly defined by the constitution and consists of "levying war against the government or adhering to its enemies."

United States v. Hoxie shows that to "levy war" means to carry on a public war against the government and not a private war for a private purpose. Tested by this rule, the number engaged in the outbreak or resistance to the national authority is not material. In 1851, some slaves having escaped from Maryland to Pennsylvania, the master followed them and with United States officers attempted by authority of the Fugitive Slave Law to take them back. Led by one Hanway, the slaves resisted arrest, and the Federal officers were driven away - the owner being killed. Hanway was indicted for treason in levying war against the United States. On the trial Mr. Justice Grier in charging the jury said: "To constitute the 'levying war' the insurrection must be to effect something of a public nature, to overthrow the government, or to nullify some law of the United States, and totally to hinder its execution or compel its repeal. A band of smugglers may be said to set the law at defiance, and to have conspired together for that purpose, and to resist by armed force the execution of the revenue laws; they may have battles with the officers of the revenue in which numbers may be slain on both sides, and yet they will not be guilty of treason, because it is not an insurrection of a public nature, but