was held immaterial. "If," said Holroyd, J., "the oath administered by the prisoner to the poachers was intended to make the people believe themselves under an engagement, it is equally within the act, whether the book made use of was a Testament or not." Res. v. Brodribb, 6 C. & P. 571. And in modern times, in recognition of the conscientious scruples of some persons against an oath, a witness is allowed to "affirm," i.e., to simply declare that what he says is true, under pain of punishment if it is false. So that an oath, however administered, if binding on the conscience, or an affirmation, is within this part of the definition.

2. It must be willfully false. The "Anonymous case, post, p. 89, illustrates this requisite.

3. The party must be lawfully required to depose to the truth. People v. Travis, post, p. 92, illustrates this part of the definition.

4. It must be in a proceeding in a course of justice. See State v. Keenan, post, p. 94.

5. The matter must be of "some consequence to the point in question." See State v. Hathaway, post, p. 96.

Subornation of perjury is procuring another to commit perjury, which he actually commits in response to such procurement.

PERJURY- OATH MUST BE WILLFULLY FALSE.

ANONYMOUS.

[1 Wash. C. C. 241.]

A bankrupt being examined under oath as to his property was asked: "At what time did you own the brig Abigail, and when did you cease to own her?" and answered, “I cannot tell exactly the time; I believe it was at the latter end of 1799 that I first owned her. I ceased to own her I rather think in the year 1800." The truth was that at no time during that time did the bankrupt own the brig, but he was honest in his answer, having made a mistake in consulting his documents of title.

The bankrupt was declared "not guilty" of perjury.

Mr. "Anonymous appears in the reports as a litigant very frequently. He is generally a person of influence with the reporter, and the case in which he figures is apt to have reflected rather severely on his conduct or character. His counterpart is to be found in the gentleman who, after drinking too much wine at dinner, stumbles into the lock-up, and being fined next morning at the police court, arranges it with the newspaper, in whose report of the police proceedings he appears next day as Mr. Smith or Mr. Brown.

In order to constitute the crime of perjury the oath must be willfully false. That the facts were not as the party swore they were, does not make him guilty if he believed them to be true. That he in good faith made a mistake, or thought he was telling the truth,

or relied on the advice of counsel, may all be set up in his defense. The case of United States v. Connor, 3 McLean, 573, is an example of this. Connor was a bankrupt. In order to get a discharge he swore to an inventory of all his property; but it was subsequently discovered that he had omitted to state that he had an interest in some property which he did not include in the inventory. He was convicted by a jury, but on appeal was more successful, for there it was seen that he had made out the schedule as it was on the advice of a lawyer. "A bankrupt," said Mr. Justice McLean, "is bound to exhibit a true schedule of all his property, and if he fail to do this willfully and fraudulently he is guilty of perjury. But if he, being unacquainted with the requirement of the law, shall be advised by his counsel after the facts have been fully stated to him, that certain items of property are not required to be stated in his schedule, and he omits them, he is not guilty of perjury."

It is not necessary, however, that the party should swear abso lutely. One may be convicted of perjury in swearing that he believes a thing to be so and so, when he knows it is different. In an English case, a party by the name of Pedley, was asked whether he had sold certain goods of his by himself or through a broker. He answered: "I believe I sold them by a broker," knowing all the time he was lying. DeGrey, C. J., said it was a mistake which mankind (including Pedley) had fallen into that a person could not be convicted of perjury for deposing on oath according to his belief. R. v. Pedley, 1 Leach, 367. In another case, a witness swore that he "thought" a certain writing was not his. The jury having found that in truth and in fact he "thought" that it was his, it was held that he was liable to an indictment for perjury. "If a witness," said Lord Denman," says that he thinks a certain fact took place, it may be difficult indeed, to show that he committed willful perjury, but it is certainly possible." And both his associates agreed with him, Patterson, J., saying: "There would be an easy mode by which witnesses might, in many cases, escape the consequences of perjury, if using the saving words 'I think' made them not indictable." Reg. v. Schlesinger, 10 Q. B. 670.

And the witness must be careful not to fool the court by a double entendre. A facetious fellow who was testifying before Lord Mansfield went rather too far in this direction. Being called to prove the health of a person, he swore that if he continued two hours in the way he left him he would be a dead man. This was pretty good evidence that he was as good as dead, until it turned

out that the person was in fair health, but was taking a drink when the witness left him, and had the bottle to his mouth. The wit was sent to prison though, "true it was," in the words of the old reporter, "in a sense of equivocation, that had he continued pouring the same liquor down even for much less time than two hours, he was infallibly a dead man."

PERJURY- OATH MUST BE REQUIRED BY LAW.

PEOPLE v. TRAVIS.

[4 Park. 213.]

The, schooner Hope having been wrecked in Lake Erie, Jacob Travers, the captain, in order to obtain the insurance, made before a notary a statement of the affair on oath. The statement was false in many particulars and Jacob knew it; consequently he was indicted for perjury.

But for the reason that the oath was not taken in any proceeding required by law, the captain was declared not guilty.

PANKEY v. PEOPLE.

[2 III. 80.]

There was something rotten in Johnson County, Illinois, and the grand jury, acting on what Mr. Pankey told them, proceeded to indict one of the officers for taking illegal fees. Mr. Pankey's testimony on the subject being given under oath to the grand jury, and being false, he was subsequently indicted for perjury.

The Supreme Court decided that as taking illegal fees was not indictable by law, the grand jury had been meddling with something not their business, and Pankey could not be convicted. "One of the essential