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seems to be a plausible explanation, so far as it goes. But it does not go far enough.

The question I would like to pose is this: If the Engo text represented, as it did, a significant departure from the Evensen text, why didn't Third World countries join the United States and other countries who condemned it? Third World countries have, by and large, been very quiet on the Engo text, or so it appears to me. I am not saying that their silence means that they assent to it. But I suggest that their silence means that they do not violently disagree with the Engo text and that, in any case, they do not choose to have a public brawl on the subject.

The question I think we should focus on is this: Why has the Third World been relatively quiet on the Engo text, a test which, as Ambassador Richardson said in his July 20 statement, gravely jeopardizes the future of the Conference?

I would like to offer you an answer to this question, an answer I have not heard elsewhere. In my view the bitter struggle over the nature and powers of the proposed International Seabed Authority is a symptom of the trouble in the Conference, not the cause of that trouble. In my view the cause is the betrayal of the common heritage principle by the leading nations in the Conference and not least by the United States. Let me explain what I mean.

To understand what has happened to the common heritage one has to recall that if it has been adopted, Ambassador Pardo's 1967 proposal would now be producing at least $20 billion a year in common heritage revenues. Pardo believed the common heritage area should begin 12 miles from shore, not 200 miles, or even more than 200 miles from shore as the ICNT provides.

Twenty billion dollars is more than 60 times the piddling amount, $300 million a year, by which the ISA is expected to produce in 1987, that is, 10 years from now, if the ICNT is adopted. The delegates from the Third World know that $20 billion a year could do a great deal to promote peace and justice and environmental sanity. They know that $300 million a year can do very, very little.

The atrophy of the common heritage has had a curious but little noticed effect on the Conference. It is making the Third World countries take a much more ideological approach to the nature and powers of the proposed authority. They seem to be saying that if they cannot get meaningful revenues from the common heritage they will at least get an ideological dividend from the concept, that is, a very strong authority with power not only to fix prices and limit production but also to ride rough-herd on any private or state corporations which want to exploit the nodules in the deep ocean. Thus, the authority's value does not come from what it produces. Indeed, some nations want it to produce very little. Its value is rather in how much power it has. It is as if the greater its powers the more valuable it will be, and a symbol of progress toward the very radical new international economic order which certain Third World countries are championing.

The Third World realizes, and I hope you gentlemen realize, that the ICNT is the text of a giveaway treaty, a treaty that awards most of the immense wealth of the oceans to a very few nations, at least half of them developed nations, as I told my African students, and they were very interested.

The exclusive economic zone gives 52 percent of the economic zones of the world to 10 states, six of them developed states. And, as you know, the economic zones contain the overwhelming proportion of exploitable seabed mineral revenue. It is estimated that their oil and gas alone are worth between $20 and $30 trillion.

Last year, speaking of the essentially similar 1976 treaty text, the Revised Single Negotiating Text, or RSNT, Dr. Pardo said: "It will enormously increase inequality between states and consequently world tensions and conflict." It is scandalous but hardly surprising that the preamble to the ICNT omits the word "justice" and does not even mention "the common heritage.

But can the Conference's course be changed?

The salt water talks could play a major role in devising a community-building strategy. A Law of the Sea Treaty which mandates, and funds, an effective antipollution strategy, a Law of the Sea Treaty which mandates, and funds, a multibillion-dollar economic development program, such a treaty could excite the interest and imagination of men and women everywhere.

In my view, a bold and imaginative treaty will permit practical compromises on problems, such as the Seabed Authority, which are almost insoluble when they are approached, as they are now, in a doctrinaire spirit. The same spirit of accommodation may permit compromises on problems of arms control and disarmament which now appear to be insoluble.

I think it is time to have that broad opening up of this question by the Senate of the United States asking what kind of government do we want for 70 percent of the Earth's surface and what kind of constructive relationship can this have with the whole question of peace, the whole question before the SALT talks, and so forth?

I think it is a sad thing that so much of this question is in the hands of experts, of lawyers, of professors, of academics, rather than on the floor of the Senate by the great generalists, the great statesmen we have in that body, and in the House as well.

Now let me conclude as follows: I am hoping that you will raise your sights. I have a number of specific comments in my prepared statement so you can look at the larger picture as well. I hope you do so.

Let us instead reflect, and reflect deeply, on the great potential of this Conference for good and for evil. And then let us try, even at this late hour, to introduce into the Conference some of the vision which Americans, and not least the American business community and the U.S. Congress, brought to the great problem of European recovery in the late 1940's.

Take this great ocean problem to the American people. Suggest a bold and imaginative response to it. If you will, I am confident that the American people will respond to your leadership. And the world, either on land or on sea, will be a much better place for your efforts.

Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Logue and attachments follow:]

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN J. LOGUE, WORLD ORDER RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, VILLANOVA, PA. I am Dr. John J. Logue, Director of the World Order Research Institute of Villanova University. After a four year interval it is a pleasure to return to the United States Senate in order to testify once more on deep seabed mining legislation, especially on S. 2053, the Metcalf Bill and on S. 2085, the Weicker Bill.

In my testimony I will stress their potential effect on the ongoing United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

As I will indicate, I believe that that Conference presented—and still presents--a marvelous, a unique opportunity to build social and economic justice, and to build peace and to save the gravely threatened marine ecological system. It is my view that, properly approached, these “salt water talks” could do more to control strategic weapons and to build peace—than the much publicized SALT talks. In the course of my testimony I will present a very unconventional theory as to why the giant Law of the Sea Conference is in such great trouble and I will make a very unconventional proposal as to how it can get back on its proper course.

As you will see I believe is would be very unwise to pass either of these bills. But sidetracking these bills will not, of itself, get the Conference back on its course. In my view bold and positive action is required if the Conference is not to go under if it does go under, it would be a tragedy. And if you wish me to state as succinctly as I can what is required I would say that what is required is that we restore to the central place in the Conference the concept which inspired the calling of the Conference: the concept of the oceans as "the common heritage of mankind." We are approaching November 1st, the tenth anniversary of Ambassador Pardo's famous speech in the United Nations on the ocean crisis. In that speech he urged us to adopt the common heritage principle as our guide in developing an ocean strate gy. It is a good time for us to take stock of how far the Conference has wandered from, and lost sight of that goal. In my view the Senate of the United States could do a great work by opening up this question of ocean policy to the broadest public discussion.

Perhaps a few words about my background will indicate why I think public discussion and "ocean consciousness raising" are essential if we are to get an adequate ocean policy.

For more than seven years the politics of the sea-I prefer that term to the "Law of the Sea"-has been the major focus of the World Order Research Institute's work. We have tried to closely follow the work of the four-year old United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and before that, of the United Nations Seabed Committee. We have also tried to follow relevant developments here in the United States, since those developments can have a great effect on the Law of the Sea Conference.

As I will indicate, I believe that the Conference presented, and still presents, a marvelous, a unique opportunity to build economic and social justice and peace. Indeed, I believe that, properly approached, these salt-water talks can do more to control strategic weapons-and to build peace-than the much-publicized SALT talks.

It may be of interest to you that I have attended part of each of the six sessions of the Law of the Sea Conference, I have gotten to know delegates from all parts of the world. During part of the 1974 Caracas session of the Conference I was chairman of the nongovernmental organization observers accredited to the Conference. Since I last testified in this legislative area I have lectured on the law of the sea in some thirteen countries. Thus, in January of this year I flew to Kenya to spend two weeks at the University of Nairobi, lecturing to young African diplomats from eight countries. I believe my travels and my wide acquaintanceship at the Conference give me an ununually broad perspective on the problems the Conference is trying to deal with

It may also be of interest to you that our Institute has sponsored four large conferences on the law of the sea, involving diplomats from some forty countries, as well as scholars, environmentalists, students and nongovernmental organization representatives. We have also sponsored two "sail-seminars" on the Canadian square-rigger barba Negra, one from New London, Connecticut to the United Na tions, the other from the United Nations to Manasquan, New Jersey. On those sails we had the same mix of diplomats and other concerned persons. The sail-seminars, which were very successful, were an attempt to bring "the spirit of the tall ships" into the Conference. I am appending to my testimony a 1200-word statement, known as "The Barba Negra Appeal" which was adopted by the diplomats and other persons on the August 22, 1976 Manasquan-to-UN sail. You will note that the Appeal was subsequently endorsed by many distinguished persons, including ocean explorer Thor Heyerdahl; Charles Yost, former United States Ambassador to the United Nations; Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, President of the University of Notre Dame; Arvid Pardo, former Ambassador of Malta to the United Nations; Congressman Donald Fraser; Lord Wilberforce of the United Kingdom; Russell Peterson, former Governor of Delaware and former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality; and many others. The Appeal asks the Law of the Sea delegates to take "as broad a view as possible” of the great work in which they are engaged and to see that the new law of the sea promotes peace and justice as well as protection of the marine environment. It also proposes an interesting revenue sharing formula which would, we estimate, make at least three billion dollars a year in seabed mineral revenues available to promote peace and justice and to protect the marina environment and much more in years to come.

That three billions is about ten times the paltry sum expected under the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT).

Mr. Chairman, with the above introduction I am obviously keeping my promise to you that in my testimony I would look at the proposed legislation-and indeed the Law of the Sea Conference as a whole-in as broad a framework as possible. When I testified before your Subcommittee on Minerals, Metals and Fuels on June 19, 1973, you were kind enough to welcome my rather philosophic approach. Since I have spared you for four years, I hope you will once more permit me to make a few philosophical observations on the law of the sea and then some quite specific comments on the legislation at hand. I hope that this dual approach will be of some help to your committee as you make a judgment on this very important problem.

Let me begin by saying that I had hoped that the new Administration would take a much broader, much deeper and much bolder approach to the conference than had the two previous Administrations. My hope sprang in part from my knowledge that all the top foreign policy makers in the Carter Administration had been members of the Trilateral Commission, a body which, in early 1976, issued a report, "A New Regime for the Oceans”, which proposed a bold approach to the law of the sea. Among the distinguished gentlemen who were members of that Commission last year were Messrs. Carter, Mondale, Vance, Brown, Brzezinski and, last but not least, Ambassador Elliot Richardson, the very capable head of our Law of the Sea Delegation. Their report suggested-a very bold suggestion—that as much as one half the revenues from seabed mineral exploitation within the economic zones of wealthy states should be dedicated to assisting developing nations.

Because of my hopes I wrote a long memorandum to Mr. Carter late last year giving my views on the opportunity presented by the Law of the Sea Conference. It was entitled: "A Memo to President-Elect Carter: A Bold and Statesmanlike Law of the Sea Policy Should be Centerpiece in President Carter's Long-Range Foreign Policy." I am appending a copy of that memo to my testimony. I am also appending a list of the United States members of the Trilateral Commission at the time their law of the sea report was issued, together with the key quotation from the report having to do with international sharing.

In a public lecture at the University of Nairobi on the day before President Carter was inaugurated I said:

Tomorrow, January 20th, 1977, will be a new beginning for my country, a new beginning in many areas. I fervently hope that one of them will be the law of the sea. I hope that our new President, Jimmy Carter, your great President, Jomo Kenyatta, and all heads of government-and all peoples-will rethink this great problem of the oceans. It is time for all of us, citizens as well as statesmen, to ask not, “How much can we grab?” but “How well can we build?”

Mr. Chairman, I believe that we have an excellent delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference and an excellent head of it in the person of Ambassador Richardson. They have worked long and hard to move the Conference toward an acceptable treaty. However, I am sorry to say that we have had no bold, new approach to the law of the sea. And I am afraid that that is one more reason why the Conference is in great jeopardy.

Now, let me get to the legislation at hand. In 1973 I said that I thought the bill then before the Committee, S. 1134, was bad legislation. Today, more than four years later, I have the same basic attitude toward the two bills on which I have been asked to comment, S. 2053, which I think is appropriate to call the Metcalf Bill, and S. 2085, which I would call the Weicker Bill.

Needless to say, I am certain that both bills reflect impatience-and deserved impatience-with respect to the slow progress of the giant United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Nevertheless, I think they are the wrong medicine for the disease with which the Conference is afflicted. The excerpt from my Nairobi lecture suggests what I think that disease is. I would suggest that the disease is "ocean nationalism” or “grabitis". Or, to put it more simply, "nearsightedness.” What is wrong with the Conference?

We are all familiar with the conventional explanation of why the Conference is in trouble. The conventional explanation focuses on the treaty articles with respect to the International Seabed Authority in the treaty_text now before the Conference, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, or ICNT. These articles are judged to be too radical for acceptance by the United States and other developed nations. I tend to agree with that judgment. The next question is, how did such radical articles get into the treaty text? The conventional explanation-and it is a very plausible oneis that the treaty articles on the Authority, for which Minister Paul Engo of Cameroon a friend of mine, was responsible, arbitrarily changed the wording of key articles in a composite draft, the so-called Evensen Text on which there appeared to be substantial agreement within the Conference. This seems to be a plausible explanation, so far as it goes. But it does not go far enough.

The question I would like to pose is this: If the Engo Text represented, as it did, a significant departure from the Evensen Text, why didn't Third World countries join the United States and other countries who condemned it? Third World countries have, by and large, been very quiet on the Engo Text, or so it appears to me. I am not saying that their silence means that they assent to it. But I suggest that their silence means that they do not evidently disagree with the Engo Text and that, in any case, they do not choose to have a public brawl on the subject.

The question I think we should focus on is this: Why has the Third World been relatively quiet on the Engo Text, a test which, as Ambassador Richardson said in his July 20th statement, gravely jeopardizes the future of the Conference?

I would like to offer you an answer to this question, an answer I have not heard elsewhere. In my view the bitter struggle over the nature and powers of the proposed International Seabed Authority is a symptom of the trouble in the Conference, not the cause of that trouble. In my view the cause of that trouble is much deeper. The cause is the betrayal of the common heritage principle by the leading nations in the Conference and not least by the United States. Let me explain what I mean.

To understand what has happened to the common heritage one has to recall that, if it had been adopted, Ambassador Pardo's 1967 proposal would now be producing at least twenty billion dollars a year in common heritage revenues. Pardo believed the common heritage area should begin 12 miles from shore, not 200 miles, or even more than 200 miles from shore as the ICNT provides. Twenty billion dollars is more than sixty times the piddling amount-three hundred million dollars a year by which the ISA is expected to produce in 1987, i.e. ten years from now, if the IČNT is adopted. The delegates from the Third World know that $20 billion a year could do a great deal to promote peace and justice and environmental sanity. They know that $300 million a year can do very, very little.

The atrophy of the common heritage has had a curious but little noticed effect on the Conference. It is making the Third World countries take a much more ideological approach to the nature and powers of the proposed Authority. They seem to be saying that if they cannot get meaningful revenues from the common heritage they will at least get an “ideological dividend” from the concept, i.e. a very strong Authority with power not only to fix prices and limit production but also to ride rough herd on any private or state corporations which want to exploit the nodules in the deep ocean. Thus the Authority's value does not come from what it produces. Indeed some nations want it to produce very little. Its value is rather in how much power it has. It is as if the greater its powers the more valuable it will be as a symbol of progress toward the very radical new international economic order which certain Third World countries are championing.

The Third World realizes, and I hope you gentlemen realize, that the ICNT is the text of a giveaway treaty, a treaty that awards most of the immense wealth of the oceans to a very few nations, at least half of them developed nations. As I told my African students, and they were very interested, the exclusive economic zone gives 52 percent of the economic zones of the world to ten states, six of them developed states. And, as you know, the economic zones contain the overwhelming proportion of exploitable seabed mineral revenue. it is estimated that their oil and gas alone are worth between twenty and thirty trillion dollars.

Last year, speaking of the essentially similar, 1976 Treaty Text, the Revised Single Negotiationg Text or RSNT, Dr. Pardo said “It will enormously increase inequality between states and consequently world tensions and conflict.” It is scandalous but hardly surprising that the preamble to the ICNT omits the word “justice" and does not even mention "the common heritage.” But can the Conference's course be changed?

To change the Conference's direction, to make it "come about” will be a very difficult task. The first step will be to persuade the delegates to ask themselves two

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