its own gradual melioration; and that, in his subsequent superintendance, foreseeing all the future actions even of his free creatures, he sends into the world agents variously qualified, so that all their actions, though not restrained by any control, may notwithstanding be combined with the most perfect harmony in the production of such a result, as should be agreeable to the wisdom and the beneficence of his own nature. This doctrine is not limited to the public fortunes of nations, for the actions of men, even of those of the meanest order, are supposed to have been foreseen, and to be actually combined in the general plan of providence. Neither, on the other hand, does it suppose the Almighty to interfere frequently for the purpose of rectifying his own work by influencing the wills of his creatures, for it considers all the actions of men without exception as free, and represents the government of God as exercised by his fore

knowledge, introducing agents suitable to the several occasions of society.

There is indeed an obvious difficulty in endeavouring to reconcile the foreknowledge of God with the liberty of man. We are unable to conceive how that which is free can yet have been foreseen, as what has been foreseen must be regarded as certain, which appears to be irreconcilable to the notion of a free action. This difficulty however does not belong peculiarly to the doctrine now proposed, but must equally embarrass every person, who both believes that he is a free and accountable being, and acknowledges that God can foresee and foretel the future actions of his creatures. The prophecies indeed which immediately relate to the introduction and the establishment of a true religion, may be supposed to have received their completion from extraordinary interpositions, controlling for special purposes the actions of men, and suspending their general liberty. But can such

a supposition be applied to the predictions of Daniel, which extend through all time, comprehend all empires, and therefore anticipate the fortunes of the whole of mankind? Divine revelation has indeed expressly asserted the concurrence of the foreknowledge of God with the accountableness of man, in the case of him who betrayed, and of those who crucified our Lord: while it is declared that the son of man goeth, as was determined, woe is donounced against the man who delivered him to the Jews; and while it is yet more particularly said that he had been delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, the hands which crucified and slew him are pronounced to be wicked. To reconcile the apparent inconsistency we must be content with saying, that he who made man, must know the workings of his nature, and that, as the knowledge of a present fact is wholly distinct from the reality of its existence, so to foresee that a being will choose to act in

a particular manner, is not to determine his choice. If however the geometrician should be disposed to smile at a doctrine involved in such a difficulty, though in common with his religion, he should recollect that his own doctrine of parallel right lines is still unexplained, and that all his boasted pride of demonstration rests either upon a questionable axiom or upon an unauthorised definition.

Another difficulty presents itself in the perplexing question of the origin of evil, but one which is perhaps diminished by the doctrine now proposed, instead of destroying its evidence. It cannot but surprise us that vice and misery should at all exist in a world, which had been framed by a gracious being, possessed of wisdom and power to accomplish the purposes of goodness. It may indeed be sufficient to say, that to form a world of creatures free to act according to their imperfect natures, unavoidably introduced some portion of vice or moral evil,

and that where moral evil had been admitted, physical evil or pain must necessarily follow. But whatever solution of this difficulty may be offered, the actual existence of evil in human society is manifest and certain ; and the question here to be considered, is whether the system now proposed creates any additional embarrassment. A theory which combines all the actions of man in one great plan of moral government, must indeed include crimes as well as virtues, and represent the former, not less than the latter, as instrumental to the purposes of God. But why should such a representation be considered as derogating from his majesty? The crimes have been actually committed, whatever we may deem of their remoter consequences; and if they are represented as instrumental to the gracious purposes of God, they are however also represented as the free actions of guilty creatures, not as directed and sanctioned by the divine authority. Can it then detract from