 | T. Binkley - 1973 - 244 ページ
...following statement in §109: Alle Erklarung muss fort, und nur Beschreibung an ihre Stelle treten. (We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.) (See also §§ 109-133; § 496 with § 90; The Brown Book, p. 73) The inconsistency 123 is not diminished... | |
 | Douwe Wessel Fokkema - 1984 - 78 ページ
...may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description...philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems."81 The quotation is from an unexpected source, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations,... | |
 | Paul Feyerabend - 1985 - 272 ページ
...which stands for the thing, we ought simply to describe the language-game of which the sign is part. "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place" (109). "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happened as a 'proto-phenomenon'.... | |
 | Stuart Shanker - 1986 - 344 ページ
...in pursuing various spurious activities which go under its name 'we may not advance any theory ... We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place.' Philosophical problems are not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings... | |
 | T. Samad - 1986 - 210 ページ
...impossible. Wittgenstein, for example, despaired of a formal treatment of language use: §109. . . . We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. (Italics in original.) Our views lie somewhere in between. On the one hand, we agree that cognitive... | |
 | Erich Heller - 1988 - 224 ページ
...the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it ... It leaves everything as it is.32 We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.33 But might we not be "held captive" by a picture "actually used" in language, and can we be... | |
 | Oswald Hanfling - 1989 - 218 ページ
...descriptive' (BB 125). 'We may not', he wrote in the Investigations, 'advance any kind of theory. . . . We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place' (PI 109). These remarks have not, of course, gone unnoticed. Nevertheless there is a continuing tendency... | |
 | Michael H. McCarthy - 1990 - 410 ページ
...whole examination around" (PI 108). "There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place" (PI 109). In our descriptions of linguistic practice, we should focus on "subjects of everyday thinking,"... | |
 | Roy Harris - 1990 - 156 ページ
...description of the workings of language. 'There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.' (PU:109) Or again: 'Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language: it can in the... | |
 | Aryeh Botwinick - 2010 - 279 ページ
...noting a language-game.28 Wittgenstein also says that "we may not advance any kind of theory. . . . We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place."29 "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only... | |
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And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. 
