rear, and the destruction of the object reared is, or may be, the loss of the cost and profit.

3. In their political aspect. In this aspect, to kill a man may be a crime, or a duty, or neither, (an accident, for instance.) If by accident, the physiological fact is the same, the economical fact the same, but the political fact is essentially different from intentional killing.

4. In their religious aspect. In this aspect, to kill a man may be either a sin or a righteous act; and in this aspect the killing involves all the three previous modes, as intention is taken for granted.

Politics then, in its position, is posterior to political economy, and anterior to religion. It superadds a new concept to economics, and religion again superadds a new concept to politics. Political economy in no respect can be allowed to discourse of duty, nor can politics be allowed to discourse of sin. Economy superadds the concept value to physiology, and the physiologist has exactly the same case to deny the value of the economist that the economist has to deny the equity of the politician, or the politician to deny the religious quality of actions posited by the divine. The four regions are perfectly distinct; distinct in their noun-substantive major, distinct in the end of their inquiries, distinct in their method, and distinct in their practical signification and importance, although all meeting in the organized, intellectual, moral, and religious being, MAN.

Into politics, therefore, no action can be allowed to enter which is not at the same time intentional, and the action of one man, or one body of men, on another man, or body of men.

The substantives, then, that enter the science of politics, are

and the general problem is to discover the laws which should regulate the voluntary actions of men towards each other, and thereby to determine what the order of society in its practical construction and arrangement ought to be. Men have social rules of action; and, from the condition of men on the surface of the globe, men must have social rules of action, whether those rules are right or wrong. A practical necessity exists for some kind of determination; but it is plain from history, that in many cases the practical rules have been altogether erroneous and criminal. It is therefore necessary to discover what the rules ought to be; for the rules determine the political condition of society.

In politics, as in every other science, it is necessary to classify the forms of the matter with which we reason; thus geometry classifies the forms of space into lines, angles, and figures.

Actions, then, are classified into duties and crimes. But as duty and crime are thus viewed subjectively, it is necessary to determine the objective characteristics of a duty and a crime, so as to be able to determine the character of the action itself, without inquiring into its motives. The only requisite would then be to ascertain whether it was or was not intentional, for this intentionality can never be laid aside.

Again, it is not only necessary to take into consideration man, the subject, with whom lies the whole question of human liberty, but the earth, the

object, with which lies the whole question of human property.

The same division that enabled us to classify human actions, will enable us to exhibit the aspects in which the earth is considered.

1. The earth may be viewed as involved in physical science. In this aspect, it is involved in astronomy, mechanics, chemistry, &c.

2. The earth may be viewed as involved in economical science. In this aspect, it is a power of production—a power capable of producing wealth.

3. The earth may be viewed as involved in political science. In this aspect, the power of production has superadded to it the concept, property. Economy can no more discourse of property than it can discourse of duty or crime. Property is a quality altogether incapable of being apprehended in the object itself by means of sensational observation, exactly as the criminality of an action can never be apprehended in the physiological characteristics of an action.

4. The earth may be viewed as involved in religion. "The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof." The difference between the political and the religious mode of viewing the earth as property, is this: In politics, the power of production is viewed as property; in religion, the substance is viewed as property. Politics in no respect treat of the substance, although the feudal system-according to which the king derived his rights from God-assumed the proprietorship of the substance, exactly as the correlative system, the papacy, claimed for its head the spiritual vicegerency of God, and assumed the power of forgiving sin.

The feudal system has transmitted, on this subject of property, a superstition strictly analogous to that of slavery. The slave was an object, not an agent,—a thing, not a being; he was property, and could not possess property. In course of time, however, he passed from the objective and superstitious mode of estimation, and became transformed into a political agent and power. The earth has not yet been transformed into a power; but the whole analogy of scientific progress would, we think, lead to the belief that it will come, ere long, to be viewed in this light.

It is quite evident that the earth cannot function in political economy until it is transformed into a power of production having a value. And, to carry it forward into the science of politics, all that is requisite is to apply the axiom, "an object is the property of its creator;" so that when political economy has determined, by a scientific method which is not arbitrary, what value is created and who creates this value, politics takes up the question where political economy had left it, and determines, according to a method which is not arbitrary, to whom the created value should be allocated.

We have thus the substantives man, will, action, duty, crime, property; but as action of one man upon another necessarily implies an agent and an object, a doer and a sufferer, the same action may be regarded in its relation to the agent and in its relation to the object. Thus the action which is called a crime in the agent, is called a wrong in respect to the person against whom the crime is committed; and again, whatever duty lie upon one man, gives birth to a coëx

tensive and correlative right in all other men. If one man is bound not to murder or to defraud, another man has a coëxtensive and correlative right to be unmurdered and undefrauded; and herein lies the whole theory of human rights. Thus the terms present themselves in the following manner :

Agent or Person acting.
A duty.

A crime.

Person acted upon.

A right.

A wrong.

Finally, then, the principal substantives of the science of politics are-man, will, action, duty, crime, rights, wrongs, and property. And equity or justice is the object-noun of the science in which the relations have to be determined.

From the previous considerations it is evident that political science, if it can be exhibited as really and truly a branch of knowledge, must assume to determine, not merely the laws that should regulate an individual, but any number of individuals associated together. If an action be criminal for an individual, it is no less criminal for ten individuals, or a hundred, or a thousand, or a million. If it be a crime for one man to seize another man and reduce him to slavery, the criminality of the action is in no respect diminished if a whole nation should commit the action with all imaginable formalities. If it be a crime for one man who is more powerful than another to deprive that other of property without his consent, the action is no less criminal if a thousand or a million deprive another thousand or million of their property without their consent. Science can acknowledge none of these arbitrary distinctions. If there be a rule at all,