ple primary, from which we start to build up the complex mass.

To express this in logical formula, let us say that the chronological commencement is with an individual presenting the greatest comprehension and the least extension, and that the logical commencement is with an individual presenting the greatest extension and the least comprehension.†

The process of science, therefore, is in the first place analytic, and when the analysis has been carried down to the last elements, the process is reversed, and it then becomes synthetic. And this is true of the mathematical sciences as well as of the physical sciences, although the mathematical sciences are invariably presented in the synthetic form. In them we have the first and most simple appearance of analysis, and the greatest preponderance of synthesis. In the ad

* "All, or almost all, the substances found on the globe of the earth have been subjected to chemical investigation. The result has been, that all the animal and vegetable substances, without exception, and by far the greatest number of mineral bodies, are compounds.”

†To Sir William Hamilton, of the University of Edinburgh, the logical world is indebted for an exposition of the theory of comprehension and extension.

Among the individual objects of natural science, man is the one that presents the greatest comprehension; but the name, man, extends only to himself. The name animal, on the contrary, extends to an immense variety of organized beings, but comprehends only a sensitive organized individual. A blood globule, as a matter of real science, has a great extension, but comprehends only a very simple form of organization. The word being (noun substantive) is

vanced physical sciences, on the contrary, we have the greatest amount of analysis; so great, in fact, that the analytic portion of the science has frequently been mistaken for the whole science. The whole science, however, is not completed until both the analytic portion and the synthetic portion are achieved. Geometry has its preparatory analysis, exactly as chemistry has its analysis; and though no mention is made of this in geometrical treatises, the fact cannot be overlooked when we take a survey of the philosophy of science. Nature does not furnish us with points having no extent, with straight lines having no breadth, with perfect circles, squares, and triangles, &c. On the contrary, nature furnishes us with forms very imperfect for the most part, and very complex for the most part, and these we analyze into the elementary forms of position, (the point,) and direction and ex

that which presents the greatest possible extension and least possible comprehension. What is called the universe, on the contrary, presents the greatest possible comprehension, and the least possible extension. There can only be one universe; but there may be an infinity of beings, or rather an indefinity. Extension appears to represent number, where we begin with unity, and repeat indefinitely; and comprehension appears to represent quantity, where we begin with infinity, and subdivide indefinitely. The difference between number and quantity has been far too much overlooked, apparently from the circumstance that unity is (absurdly) allowed to be divisible. That is, we divide one unit into two units. Now, the fact is, we have doubled the number and halved the quantity. Unity in pure arithmetic is absolutely indivisible until we assign it a value, or quantity, and then it may represent any number; but in pure arithmetic, unity is the one simple.

tent, (the line,) and with these we proceed to construct extent in two directions, (the superficies,) and extent in three directions, (the solid.*)

In politics, therefore, as in every other science, the natural history comes first, and then the science. The most obvious divisions of things as they are, are the first clumsy attempts at analysis; and laws begin, not by constructing the state as it ought to be constructed, but by attempting to remedy the most obvious evils. This is the case even where laws have been made in a good intention. We do not refer to those bad, and unjust, and despotic laws which have prevailed in all European states, but to the best portion of the laws viewed in their best light; and these we maintain to have begun at the latter end of the question, and not at its beginning.

Space, as an unlimited solid, we take to be, not simple, as usually represented, but as compound. The concept space is composite, and may be analyzed into position, direction, and extent. These three concepts are simple, cannot be defined, and form the elementary substantives of geometry. Direction and extent give rise to two different methods. For instance, by measuring the distances (extent) between all the points of a country, (suppose by chain,) we may construct a map, and the map shall have a scale; but we shall not be able to tell, in the least, how to place the map that is, we know nothing about the direction. And if we measure only the direction (suppose by compass) of the various points, we shall also have a map, and this map we shall place correctly, but it will not have a scale—that is, we know nothing about the extent. To have both the direction and the extent, we must combine both methods; and on this account a survey by triangulation requires a measured base line, the only use of which, however, is to give the scale, the form being determined by the direction of the points.

The first and most obvious requirement in a country is some degree of security for life, liberty, and property. This gives birth to criminal law, the great end of which is ostensibly to prevent crimes. Now here we have the whole evidence of history that law began at the wrong end. Law ought to emanate from ethics, and the very first and most important question to determine is, "What is a crime, and what is not a crime?" Instead of ascertaining what was a crime, men assumed the crime, and then proceeded to enact laws for its punishment. They made a synthesis before making an analysis, and made that synthesis the basis of political enactment, and committed murder and robbery, and every other crime, under thé shelter of their legislation. So far as the science of politics was concerned, they were in much the same position as those who made astronomy without observation; that is, they were wholly and totally basing on arbitrary assumption. But wrong proceedings in politics are far more serious than wrong proceedings in other departments, inasmuch as man and man's welfare are concerned; and the laws of former times, and to a large extent of the present time, being based on, superstition, necessarily produced, and continue to produce, effects the most detrimental to society. Even admitting the major proposition of the law, that "crime ought to be punished," the minor, "this act and that act are crimes," was purely arbitrary; it was determined on no principle of stability, was variable, contradictory, often absurd, and very generally unjust. Thus, at one period it was a crime for a man to be free, (as it still is in Russia and the southern states

of America;) at another period it was a crime to have a slave. At one period it was a crime to go to church; at another, to refrain from. going to church. At one period it was a crime to shoot a deer; at another, no crime. At one period it was a crime to be a witch; at another period it was admitted that there were no witches. Now all this diversity is exactly similar to the diversity that prevailed in the physical sciences before Bacon's time. The major principles of investigation were not in dispute; but Bacon, with a grasp of magnificent genius, laid hold of the minors of the sciences, and told men that they must first ascertain them before they could arrive at knowledge.

And so it is in law, the exponent of men's views of political science. The minor proposition, "What is a crime?" requires to be determined on exactly the same principles as we determine "What is a square?" or, "What is the orbit of the earth?" Without this determination, made on principles which are not arbitrary but scientific, law is despotism; and no man in the world is morally bound to obey it, except as Scripture may enjoin him to obey even unjust laws. If legislatures will make arbitrary crimes, that is, make actions legally criminal which are not naturally criminal, no population is bound to obey them. On the contrary, it becomes one of the highest duties. of man to resist such laws to use every effort to procure their abolition; and, if he cannot do so by reason, then to do so by force. The welfare of humanity demands this at the hand of every man; and the base and slavish doctrine of non-resistance is fit,