fallen creature, but that a revelation from the Creator is as really a natural source of knowledge, belonging to this earth and to the human race, as is the world of material phenomena, or the world of mental phenomena. The fall of man did not entail revelation. Revelation was anterior to the fall, and was a portion of man's terrestrial lot. It was a thing not miraculous, but common; and it would appear that the revelation we now have is the substitute for the ordinary communication that would have taken place between the Creator and the intelligent beings he had called into existence. That there was a direct communication between God and his human creatures, is plainly affirmed in Scripture. Revelation, therefore, (that is, communication from the world of spirit,) is not to be regarded as accidental to the world, but as part of man's lot on earth, quite as much one of man's original sources of knowledge as sensation or intellection.

But setting aside this view, and adhering only to the traditional element, we may ask, What became of man's knowledge of God? It has been, of course, preserved in the books of Scripture, and in the minds of a small portion of the human race; but with regard to the great mass of mankind, those not specially enlightened by supernatural means, what became of man's knowledge of God? In every country of the world it has presentea itself in a corrupted form. False gods, and false views of God, have universally prevailed. Superstition (credence without evidence) has universally destroyed some of the attributes of the true God, and substituted for them some invention of man's imagination. And not only has theology in its

general form been corrupted in the intellectual apprehension; but in the practical acknowledgment of God in worship, men have introduced superstitious and erroneous ceremonies, symbols, and offices, which were also corrupt, and, in many cases, absolute abominations.

Against the traditions of false gods and erroneous worship, science enters the lists. Science assumes as its first proposition to base credence on evidence, and thereby to evolve truth instead of error or su perstition.

Consequently science, taking its birth, will invariably manifest itself in scepticism. And this scepticism, much as it has been abused, is really and truly a valid process when brought to bear on a superstition; and the Christian religion is now valid, because it has stood before every attempt of scepticism, and fairly triumphed over every effort that man has made to impugn the divinity of its origin. In every country, therefore, that has a traditional worship, it is a natural consequence that that worship should be tested by scepticism, whenever it happens that men resolutely apply a scientific method, and proceed to posit truth only when it is substantiated by evidence. Scepticism in its legitimate form is doubt, and doubt is one of the great elements of humanity absolutely requisite to place knowledge on a secure basis.

Let us grant then that a scientific method, originating in a country, will naturally come into contact with the traditional elements already prevalent in that country; and also, that it is the property of a scientific method to destroy superstition, and to substan

tiate truth — first, in its most general form, and then gradually to enter more and more specially on the accurate survey of the universe with which man is acquainted. Truth can have nothing to fear, but every thing to hope, from the most accurate survey that man can possibly take of the region open to cognition.

As an historical fact, the cultivation of science in Britain and France was accompanied by scepticism, far less terrible in the former country it is true, but not the less arising from the prevalence of a scientific mode of grounding credence on evidence.

Let us, then, endeavor to ascertain how a true knowledge of God must naturally grow.

1st. Scepticism enters into a contest with traditionalism, and as in every country there has been either a false or a corrupted religion, scepticism (setting aside scriptural reformation, which is not, properly speaking, scientific *) has to achieve the destruction of

* As Mr. Morell has well observed, philosophy reasons, but does not preach. Thus the advancement of natural theology consists in developing its propositions, and substantiating their trueness. A scriptural reformation, on the contrary, consists not merely in the substantiation of propositions, but in the circumstance that men accept the propositions of Scripture as rules of life. But although philosophy, in one sense, is purely speculative, we must not overlook the fact, that ethics, while inquiring what is true, has for its question, "What ought to be done?" And if, from the natural relations of man to man, there arises a system of human ethics, (or rules of action,) so, if the existence of God be established by a purely scientific method, must there necessarily rise a system of theological ethics, establishing in general terms what ought to be the conduct of the human creature in reference to the divine Creator. This branch, which the great Dr. Chalmers expounded under the name of "ethics of theology," we have termed Dikaistic, (see

superstition; but in place of superstition it has nothing to substitute.

2d. That man should permanently refrain from a theological credence is out of the question. There is either nothing whatever, or there is some permanently enduring something that was anterior to man, that underlies all the operations of nature, and that constructed, and continues to construct, all the varied mechanisms, physical and mental, with which man is acquainted; and this permanent element which man posits, in accordance with the laws of his reason, is what is meant by God. God, therefore, has a necessary existence to the human mind; and the main question is not, Whether there is an eternal and allpervading power; for man cannot conceive that there is not; but, What is the character of that immortal Power that sustains the universe? what, in fact, are the attributes of God?

And in the growth of these attributes, that is, in the addition of predicate after predicate to the substantive idea, lies the process by which a natural theology, purely scientific, must ultimately be developed, and actually command the human credence in the same manner as any other truth.

The first positing of the theological idea is, logically, universal existence in space and immortal existence in time. This is the first step towards a scientific

table in the Appendix,) from Sixaios, righteous; and it should answer the question, "How ought man to act, rightly or righteously?” It is plain, however, that from the fall of man, dikaistic cannot satisfy, but only direct, in general terms, to the fountain of divine satisfaction. It is a perfectly valid branch of knowledge, but altogether inadequate for man's fallen necessities.

theology purely rational and objective; and it is absolutely necessary that it should be objective, otherwise we abandon the scientific method, and launch into mysticism. An infinite and immortal substance may be termed that portion of natural theology which is furnished by the mathematical contemplation of the universe.*

* Historically, the celebrated argument of Samuel Clarke comes under this head. Another, and well-constructed argument, is that of Moses Lowman. Neither of these arguments is pure; both authors attempting to prove more than can be proven by their method. An à priori argument cannot prove a fact, only a rational necessity. Geometry does not prove that there is space; it only proves what the relations between the forms of space must be. And so an à priori argument in reference to theology cannot prove that there is existence, but only what the rational necessities of the forms of existence must be in the human apprehension. The form of this argument may be concisely expressed as follows:

1. Major. If there be existence actual, there must be exist

ence necessary.

2. Minor. There is existence actual.

3. Conclusion. There is existence necessary.

The major proposition is an abstract conviction of the human reason, and is à priori; and, in fact, all à priori propositions should be announced in the hypothetical form.

The minor is derived from experience, and consequently the argument is not à priori.

To extend the argument, it is necessary to discover what the characteristics of the existence actual really are, and thereby to infer, by a reflex process, the attributes of the existence necessary. The growth of the theological argument depends on the qualification and quantification of the actual existence known to man; and, therefore the scheme of natural theology depends on the extension of the sciences. But then again, experience cannot discourse of infinite attributes, and reason must, à priori, determine the infinity of the attributes, although reason could not possibly determine the existence of the attributes without experience. And thus reason and