The universality in space and the immortality in time being posited, the general groundwork is laid for the addition of predicates; and these must be derived from the world of material function. The physical sciences must contribute to transform the abstraction into something farther removed from negation. The next attribute is power. And this addition of power very possibly produces pantheism. The idea has now become an infinite and immortal power. And further than this, no physical or metaphysical argument can legitimately extend. Another region must be surveyed before science posits indubitably other attributes which shall transform the power into intelligence; and thus the theology of nature will receive a new extension. Physical science, as such, can afford nothing but an all-pervading power; and if man were never to go beyond the physical sciences, the scientific world would remain (that is, without revelation) at the natural theology of pantheism; and, historically, pantheism is now succeeding the continental scepticism. It has usually been supposed that the contemplation of what is called design in the works of creation proves the existence of an intelligent designer. This argument has been so commonly advanced, and is supposed to be so perfectly valid, that it appears almost a philosophical heresy to call it in question. experience gradually and systematically construct an argument; reason furnishing the metaphysic of necessity, and experience the concrete of reality. Reason is the operation of weaving, and experience the material woven; both are necessary to produce the fabric. Let us examine, therefore, whether this argument, as hitherto advanced, is really conclusive. It may, perhaps, be necessary to observe the fact, that this argument has not convinced a large portion of the scientific world; and, if there be nothing more conclusive, it is evident that such natural theology, taken alone, has failed. We must remind the reader that we are by no means engaged in an attempt to prove the existence of God; but only to trace the mode in which the idea of God arises necessarily in the human reason as actually involved in the spectacle of nature, thoroughly understood; and, therefore, we only endeavor to estimate how much is really and truly furnished by one method, and how much is furnished by another method. And we affirm that neither the mathematical nor the physical contemplation of the universe can legitimately introduce any term into the conclusion which is not a term of mathematics or a term of physics, except those general terms of metaphysic which are anterior to both. And by general terms of metaphysic we mean those which express abstractions and relations, without in the least affirming whether there are or are not any realities which coincide with the abstract terms. The office of metaphysic is to furnish abstract categories (substantial and propositional) into which experience must locate realities; and if we introduce terms which are neither abstract nor yet furnished by physical (sensational) experience, we have an illicit process, and, consequently, an inconclusive argument. And though the argument of design is satisfactory to those who are already believers, (as illustrative of the divine wisdom,) we must remember that a great difference exists between an exposition of God's wisdom and a proof of God's existence, so conclusive in itself that it commands the assent of intellect, as intellect. That there is a proof of God's existence, and of his power and wisdom, so perfectly conclusive that it shall command the assent of the reason of mankind, we have no possible doubt; but that such an argument can be drawn from physical science (farther than power is concerned) we by no means admit; inasmuch as the term intelligence, necessary to substantiate the personality of God, belongs neither to metaphysics, nor to mathematics, nor to physics. All metaphysical dogmas must confine themselves to abstract terms, abstract divisions, and abstract relations. Such are the following: Existence, non-existence, necessity, contingency, creation, created, substance, attribute, cause, effect, condition, change, &c. And whenever these terms are used concretely, and not abstractly, we have left the realm of metaphysic. This metaphysic underlies all human knowledge whatever, and is in reality nothing more than the necessary form of thought. Into this necessary form of thought, the mathematical substantives. identity, equality, number, quantity, space, and force -are located, and the mathematical sciences arise. And again, into the blank categories of the mathematical propositions the facts of sensation are located, and the physical sciences arise. But as the physical sciences do not involve objective intelligence, but only the objective conditions and functions of matter, it is plainly evident that a conclusion which involves intelligence can never be drawn from the bare contemplation of matter; and that, therefore, there must first be the contemplation of mind, and the discovery of the laws of mind, before we can posit legitimately the intelligence of that power which pantheistic physics posits as universal. The argument that there is design in the works of nature is, properly speaking, not physical, but physicopsychological; and the bridge that connects the allpervading power with mind is as follows: In the works of nature, and the operations of na ture, man intuitively perceives by his reason a power or force; and the primordial force, if we make nothing objective but matter, necessarily lands us in pantheism, which is at present the theological credence of a large portion of the scientific men on the continent. And out of this pantheism there is no scientific exit until mind is made objective, and the facts of mind are brought to bear on the facts of physics; so that what was before only a primordial force becomes an intelligent agent, of whom power is the attribute. In the world of matter, two phenomena are apparent. First. The performance of a function. This supplies the material from which man intuitively posits power or force. Second. The adaptation of the physical conditions of matter for the achievement of certain ends. This is the portion that has been called design; but as design implies a designer, the term is illegitimate until it has been determined what a designer is, and what the term design is really employed to signify. If we assume a designer because there is design, we have assumed only a truism; but we have forgotten to establish the most essential proposition, namely, that the adaptation of means to an end is design. Every merely physical argument to prove the intelligence of the primordial force will split on this rock; and it is absolutely necessary, therefore, for man to progress beyond matter science before natural theology can be other than pantheism. Pantheism is the theology of physical science; and if there were no other science beyond physical science, pantheism would be the last final form of scientific credence. Let us, however, still bearing in mind the division of the sciences into The mathematical sciences, (or notion sciences,) The man sciences, Let us ask how the primordial force of pantheism is legitimately transformed into an attribute of an intelligence. Let a designer stand for an intelligence who is possessed of power, and who intentionally adapts means to an end. Design, therefore, will stand for intentional adaptation; and from the contemplation of man we are enabled to make the above definitions without transcending the realm of experience. When we have made man objective, we can affirm, " man can design;" and when we contemplate the product of man's design, we find it expressed in the terms, "adaptation of means to an end," where neither of the terms are psychological, but such as are used legitimately in physical science. And when, on the other hand, we find in nature the adaptation of means to an end, we infer |