with Scripture until men of science have agreed what geology actually does teach.*

3d. Natural theology, purely scientific, is an attempt to solve the mystery of the universe by the natural powers of the human intellect. It is, therefore, an attempt to posit such a major as should account to the reason for the whole facts of cognition. And consequently every realm, and every branch of cognition, does necessarily bring its contribution to natural theology. It is true that any branch of cognition may be considered in its separate isolation, and investigated in its internal detail alone; but as all branches of cognition actually do meet in the one universe with which man is acquainted, "What is the one major substance of that universe that makes matter to be; and the one major power of that universe that makes matter to function; and the one major intelligence that makes mind to be; and the one major moral Ruler, who makes mind to function towards a definite end?”

Had the universe been a blank space, and man only a disembodied reason capable of contemplating that space, but incapable of making himself and his own mental operations objective, he would only have posited an infinite and invisible space. Had he been presented with such a physical universe as really exists only at rest, but still been disembodied and capable only of contemplating the material world existing in space, he would have posited substance, quality, and condition,

* At the same time, an objection from one science may be fairly met and triumphantly overthrown by an argument from the same science.

and drawn the line of distinction between the infinite substance and the finite manifestation.

Had the physical universe begun to function, (move,) he would have posited power; and had the functions been regular, or apparently in accordance with the relative conditions of the various portions of matter, he would have posited constructivity as well as productivity.

And if he were then endowed with a body, and with the power of reflection on his own existence and his own operations, he would have posited a mental power and mental construction. And if he found within his intellectual nature a reason for acting in one direction rather than another, and a conscience which laid on him the duty of obeying his reason rather than his passions, he would posit a moral intelligence with all the preceding attributes. But then it must be remembered, that if in his ignorance he failed at first to apprehend the unity of design presented by the actual construction of the physical universe, he would posit as many different powers as there appeared to be different qualities of forces, and would endeavor to unite these secondary powers in some higher unity, so as still to make the facts of experience coincide with the dogmas of his reason. And thus, though he would posit power in the general, he would require to elaborate the sciences of the powers of nature before he was in a condition to speak of the character of the major power.* And so with morals. Man may, it is

* “A considerable portion of the qualitative properties of matter or, to speak more in accordance with the language of natural

true, posit a moral deity in the general, and speak of punishments and rewards, instead of mere occurrences; but what he never can determine, until he has admitted the first propositions of moral science, is the character of the moral Ruler of the universe.* This character may be taken from revelation, or it may be assumed; but proven, in the same manner as any other portion of science, it never can be, till moral science is actually achieved and taught as a branch of knowledge. If, then, moral science has not yet been evolved, but is only in course of preparation through the evolution of political economy, it is plainly evident that all speculations as to the moral character of the Deity are not to be ranked as natural theology.†

philosophy, of the qualitative expression of forces--is doubtless still unknown to us; and the attempt perfectly to represent unity in diversity must, therefore, necessarily prove unsuccessful." -HUMBOLDT's Cosmos, chap. i. 63.

* It must be distinctly remembered, throughout this argument, that those who do admit man to be a moral being have all the elements of a genuine natural theology, and are imperatively bound by its conclusions.

† We speak, of course, not of such natural theology as is elaborated by the Christian, who has the problem of the universe solved for him by revelation, but of such natural theology as should convince the world in the same manner as a correct system of astronomy convinces the world. When the fact of God's moral existence is made perfectly indubitable to the Christian through revelation, he can easily corroborate his belief by perceiving the marks of the divine hand in all the works of nature. But it must be remembered that the very question of natural theology is this very fact; and if the fact is really involved in the phenomena of nature, (as no doubt it is,) the scientific world may ultimately find

If natural theology be an inference from the whole realm of knowledge, it is plain that if a portion of that realm, and this the most important portion, has not yet been accurately surveyed, natural theology must necessarily be incomplete; and as it is plainly apparent that moral science has not yet been reduced to ordination, nor can be so reduced till political economy is developed as a teachable branch of knowledge, it is also plain that moral theology, which depends on moral science, is still incapable of assuming a scientific form.

And this we imagine to be the present position of science and natural theology. Natural theology, at present, is little more than constructive pantheism the universal prevalence of a power that constructs

itself absolutely obliged to admit the fact, and the sceptic will be regarded in much the same light as one who should deny the Newtonian theory of planetary arrangement. But for this natural theology, moral science is absolutely requisite. The French philosophers of the last century denied that man was a moral being, and the English sensationalists of the present day maintain the same proposition. And if the proposition were true, moral theology would be not only impossible, but absolutely unintelligible.

But if moral science were once made, (and it can be made if man be a moral being,) such a proposition would be universally rejected as untenable; and it would become a matter of indubitable truth, not only that man was an accountable being, but that there must necessarily be a great moral Being to whom humanity is to render account. And as this truth is involved in man's rational contemplation of the universe, the whole world, if it continue to progress in knowledge, must necessarily come to it at some period or other. But this natural theology cannot evolve for the world, until moral science has been so perfected as to be beyond the reach of question.

and operates being, in fact, the theology of the scientific world. Nor, unless the scientific world accepts revelation, can natural theology assume a higher character until moral science be achieved, and then moral theology must follow. If it still be a matter of dispute among men of science, whether man be a moral being, or only a politico-economical being, it is perfectly evident that science has no groundwork for the establishment of a moral universe; and if the universe within the range of cognition be assumed non-moral, there can be no reason for substantiating a moral cause as the originator and director of the universe. Nor are we to admit mere assumptions, and presumptions, and speculations, as science in the world of morals any more than in the world of matter. Either it is true that a definite rule of moral action can be discovered by the reason, or it follows of course that rules of action are not naturally imperative; and if they be not naturally imperative, it can only be a superstition to consider them as obligatory. So that the possibility of moral science must be granted, or else we must grant the non-imperative nature of all moral rules whatever; for certainly the logical destruction of natural morals would entail the destruction, not only of all actual revelation, but of all possible revelation. If there be no natural reason which lays on man an imperative obligation to act rightly, there can be no reason for acting in accordance with a divine rule which specifies the items of which that rightly consists; and as revelation does not reveal man's moral nature, but only his moral condition, and the mode by which that condition can be amended, it