A. It would be advantageous at all times to have ships cruizing in every probable situation that enemies' ships may be found in; but with respect to the particular advantage to the Cape, I do not see any.

Q. I apprehend you do not understand the question: when you speak of advantage to the Cape, do you mean to refer merely to the soil, to the rock, or to its security, or to its trade?

A. If the question be understood as referring to trade, I think such cruizers would be of advantage.

Q. You have described to the Court what you consider to be the strength of the Cape as a military position, do you not think that its security would be materially added to in the event of an attempt upon it, by its having also a naval force for its protection?

A. As far as I can judge, the Cape is extremely strong, and well capable of being defended without ships; but undoubtedly the addition of ships, if the enemy were not superior in naval force, would be an assistance.

PROSECUTOR-When did Sir Home Popham sail from the Cape to the Rio de la Plata? what naval force did he take with him? and what did he leave behind? A. He sailed in the middle of April, 1806, I think the 13th or 14th; took with him the Diadem, Raisonable, Diomede, Narcissus, and Encounter gun-brig; I do not know of any man of war left behind.

Q. Did you return home with Sir Home Popham? A. I did.

The PRESIDENT-Q. Did any ship or vessel arrive at the Cape, from which you obtained intelligence on the day of your sailing, or the day before, relative to Buenos Ayres?

A. Not that I recollect.

Q. When the Volontaire was taken, she had on board a number of English prisoners-do you recollect how many?

A. To the best of my recollection they might amount to nearly 200-between 150 and 200.

Q. Do you know what was the number of her crew? A. I think about 800.

Q. When she arrived, was she very short of water? A. Yes.

Q. If she had not had those 200 prisoners on board, might she not have continued much longer at sea without being very short of water*?

A. Certainly; inasmuch as the proportion those prisoners had used.

Q. You have spoken of the intelligence you obtained from an officer of the Volontaire, relative to the destiny of Willeaumez' squadron. I think you said he was a lieutenant. Did you learn from him by what means he himself was informed of that distination?

A. No; but I considered him and found him a very intelligent man, and one who appeared to me to be much in the confidence of his captain.

Q. Did he tell you that he had seen the orders of Admiral Willeaumez, or that his captain had informed him what those orders were?

A. No.

Q. You have said, that if the whole of the commerce between Great Britain and the East Indies were properly anchored in Table Bay, that it might be defended from the batteries on shore..

A. In giving that answer I meant to say, that as many ships as could be properly anchored in the bay would be protected by the batteries.

Q. Would those ships be protected by the batteries before they approached near the shore in going into Table Bay?

A. Yes, before they got near the shore-the guns are heavy, and reach a long way, and are close down to the shore.

Q. Would those batteries protect the ships some leagues from the shoret?

A. Certainly not.

Q. Would then the commerce of the Cape, or ships bound thither, be better protected by ships of war cruising off the Cape, than without?

A. Yes.

Q. On what day was the Volontaire taken?

A. I think it was the 4th of March.

Q. I think you have said that, from the information

* What a sagacious question!-EDitor.
Another sagacious question!-IBID.

you obtained from the Volontaire, of the state of the French ships at Brest and other ports, you had no idea that the enemy could collect in Europe any force to make an attempt on the Cape?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you obtain from the Volontaire information of the naval force in Holland; of the naval force in Toulon; of the state of the ships that escaped into Cadiz; or of those that were left by the Volontaire in Brest; or of the squadron in Rochefort?

A. No; but in all the conversations that I had with the French officers, which were numerous, I understood it to be their opinion, that the naval forces of the allies of France, as well as herself, were not in a state to attempt offensive operations, generally speaking; upon which I had founded my opinion.

Q. Do you mean, that it was the opinion of those officers, that neither France nor her allies would be capable of sending any squadron to sea?

A. I do not know what might be their opinion of France or her allies being capable of sending out a few cruisers; but I think it was their opinion that they were not in a state to send to sea a naval expedition.

Q. I think you have said that Sir David Baird considered flying artillery as being the most efficacious means of preventing a landing of troops on the

coast?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you understand him to consider that they were so efficacious as to render a naval force unnecessary? A. No: I never heard him speak of the co-operation of a naval force with his flying artillery; but I have frequently heard him express his opinion that the Cape was in perfect security, and his opinion, that the landing of troops, opposed by his army, amounted almost to an impossibility; and I conceive that, had the Dutch made a proper resistance with their flying artillery at Lotspur's Bay, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to have made good our landing.

Q. Is the road between the Cape and Saldanha Bay of such a description as to admit of flying artillery being rapidly transported there, if an enemy should attempt to land on that part?

A. I have never been from the Cape to Saldanha Bay by land, and do not know.

Q. You have said that you do not know that Sir David Baird had ever objected to the whole of the naval force going with Sir Home Popham with the troops?

A. I have.

Q. Can you say that he never did make the objection?

A. I can't say what might have passed between Sir David Baird and Sir Home Popham, when I have not been present; but I think it likely, if he had objected, I should have heard of it.

Q. You have said, that there was no doubt in the mind of any captain of the squadron, that Buenos Ayres was within the limits of the command of the officer commanding at the Cape-have you ever seen any orders or instructions which can justify the belief of its being within such limits?

A. No: but I have ever understood so, and from knowing that the cruisers of the Cape station have gone frequently to cruise at the mouth of the Rio de la Plata, and some as high as Monte Video, I could entertain no doubt on the subject.

Q. You speak of the cruisers having so done from your own knowledge?

A. No: I was not in any one of them, but have heard so from the men of the Diomede who were there.

Q. After leaving the Cape the squadron went to St. Helena: did you find there any of the East India Company's ships, or any other British ships, waiting for convoy to England?

A. Not that I recollect.

Q. You related, that under Sir D. Baird, you thought the Cape nearly impregnable-do you mean to say that the Cape was nearly impregnable after the sailing of the squadron under Sir Home Popham with the troops for Buenos Ayres?

A. I mean to say that the enemy must have sent so large a force to make any impression as would render it next to impossible for them to arrive there with such a force and within such a time of the season, as to afford the smallest prospect of success.

Q. Then when you spoke of it as impregnable, you

took the season into account?

A. I mean that the season was such as would more than make up for the absence of the fleet. It was such indeed, that it was next to impossible to attack it, or if an attack were attempted, it would require a most extravagant force to make a successful landing against Sir D. Baird and his forces. I mean this subsequent to our sailing for Buenos Ayres.

Q. Do you know when the winter is supposed to begin at the Cape?

A. I should conceive the latter end of April.

Q. You left the Cape with the squadron about the 13th or 14th of April,-was there any thing to prevent, from the season, a squadron anchoring there during that month?

A. No: if they chose to risk lying there in bad weather.

Q. Do you know what force Sir David Baird had with him after the squadron sailed?

A. I should think about 6000 men.

Sir HOME POPHAM-Q. Be so kind as to take the letter presented to you by the learned prosecutor, and state on what day does it appear the Tonningen brig was boarded by the French fleet?

A. On the 25th of February.

Q. Is not the Cape considered a very tempestuous station to cruise off, particularly in the winter? A. Yes.

Q. Did we not leave the Raisonable and Narcissus in False Bay a day or two preceding their coming in with La Volontaire, and were they not then returning to Table Bay?

A. Yes, they were, to the best of my recollection. Q. When you said that the Raisonable and Narcissus would have taken the Volontaire if the Diadem had not been at an anchor in Table Bay, did you not assume that the Cape was in possession of the English?

A. Yes.

Q. From the position in which we saw the three ships in the morning, do you not think that La Voontaire could have escaped under the protection of he batteries, provided the Cape had been in posses