ADVOWSON.

REAL PROPERTY.

1. Where a prebendary, having the advowson of a rectory in right of his prebend, dies whilst the church is vacant, the right accruing by the vacancy is a distinct independent chattel, and devolves on the personal representative, who may therefore present for that turn.— Rennell v. Bishop of Lincoln, 7 B. & C. 113. Dissentient Lord Tenterden, C. J.

2. Where the advowson of a parish is vested in trustees for the benefit of the parishioners, the election of the vicar must be by voting openly, but the right of voting may by long usage be confined to parishioners who pay church and poor's rates. Edenborough v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 2 Russ. 93.

CHARITIES.

1. It has not been decided from what period a corporate body shall be obliged to account in matters of trust. Where a corporation put in their answer in 1811, and in it had rendered accounts which went back as far as 1791, the account of the charity property was decreed from that time.-Attorney General v. the Corporation of Stafford, 1 Russ. 547.

2. The statute of Elizabeth created no new law on the subject of charitable uses; but only a new and ancillary jurisdiction.—By Lord Redesdale in Att. Gen. v. Mayor, &c. of Dublin, 1 Bligh, 347.

3. It is not a general rule of equity that a charitable gift for the benefit of the poor is to be confined to such poor as do not receive parish relief.—Attorney General v. Corporation of Exeter, 2 Russ. 45.

4. The court is strict with the trustees when there is a wilful misapplication; but not when mistake only.-S. C.

5. And it is reluctant to compel the corporation to make a discovery of property applicable to general corporate purposes.—S. C.

6. When trustees of a charity, under an instrument of doubtful construction, have acted honestly, though erroneously, they will not be charged in respect of past misapplication of the funds.-S. C.

CONDITION.

The doctrine of equity, with respect to conditions precedent in wills, is, that they must be complied with strictly when the property is given over on the devisee's failing to perform them; but the court will interfere, and set up the prior gift when there is no devise over, if the parties can be placed in the same situation, as if the condition had been strictly performed. 1 Russ. 508. Thus when lands were devised in fee, with a direction that the debts due to testator from the devisee's husband should be released, on condition that within two months from the testator's death, the devisee's husband should release all claim to the lands devised, it was held that the husband should

not lose the benefit intended him, from his not executing the release within the prescribed period.-Hollinrake v. Lister, ibid. 500.

CONSIDERATION.-See CONVEYANCE.

CONVEYANCE.

1. Though a deed is expressed to be made for natural love, it may be proved to have been made in consideration of marriage, because the real is consistent with the alleged consideration.-Tanner v. Byne, 1 Simons, 160.

2. A reversion lies in grant, and though the particular estate is only from year to year, and the lands are described as in the grantor's possession, it will pass without attornment, livery, or enrolment.—Doe dem. Were v. Cole, 7 B. & C. 243. 1 M. & R. 33. 7 B. & C. 243.

3. Recitals in a conveyance, whatever effect they may have against the parties to it, cannot be evidence as against third persons.-1 Russ.

604.

CORPORATION.-See CHARITIES; TRUSTEE.

COVENANT.-And see LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Where a person in remainder in tail under a former settlement, covenanted that in case she should become entitled to a certain estate under the limitations of a former settlement, such estate should be conveyed as therein mentioned; and her brother, the antecedent tenant in tail, suffered a recovery, and died without issue, whereby the fee gained by such recovery descended on her; it was held that she took it not under or by virtue of the limitations of the settlement, but by immediate descent from her brother, and was consequently not bound to convey it under the covenant.-Tayleur v. Dickenson, 1 Russ. 521.

DEED. And see CONVEYANCE; COVENANT.

Loss of a deed or instrument is a ground on which the court of chancery will exercise jurisdiction, but with great caution.-Per Lord Chancellor in Barker v. Ray, 2 Russ. 73, 4.

DEVISE IN FREEHOLDS, ESTATE IN FEE OR FOR LIFE. Words will not carry a fee, only because they would otherwise be mere surplusage; and in their ordinary sense the words 'possessed of' do not import real estate. Where, therefore, a testatrix, after giving pecuniary legacies, devised to A. B. her two fields at, &c., likewise the remainder of the personalty, and all she might die possessed of at the time of her death, after the above bequests were discharged, &c.; the devisee was held to take only an estate for life. Monk v. Mawdsley, 1 Simons, 286.

1 The devisor was a feme covert, and the will the execution of a power; but it appears from the reasoning of the court that the case may be stated generally in reference to the above point.-Vid. ibid. 289, 290, 291.

DEVISE-ESTATE TAIL.

1. The word 'leave' has not, in devises of real estate, the effect of confining the word 'issue' to issue living at the time of testator's death. When, therefore, the devise was to the use of R. C. for life, and after his decease, to the use of his issue male or female, in such proportion or proportions as he should think proper to devise the same, with power to charge the lands with a jointure, but in case he should die leaving no issue, then with remainders over; R. C. was held to take an estate tail.-Croly v. Croly, 1 Batty, 1.

2. Lands were devised to W. "during the term of his natural life, and in case he has issues, then it is my will they shall jointly inherit the same after my decease." In a subsequent part of the will, testator gave the residue of his effects real and personal to the said W.; but in case he dies without issue, then, &c. W. died without issue. Held that the words in the first clause, if taken alone, would have given W. an estate for life; and if he had had issues, they would have taken jointly, but that as W. died without issue, the construction turned upon the subsequent devise, and he took an estate tail in the freehold, and the absolute interest in the personalty.-Ward v. Bevil, 1 Y. & J. 512.

DEVISE-TO TRUSTEES, WHETHER THEY TAKE A CHATTEL INTEREST

OR A FEE.

1. If lands are devised to trustees to do something for a given purpose, when that purpose is at an end, the estate ceases. Hence, where lands were devised to a trustee in trust to receive the profits, &c. thereof, for the purpose of maintaining &c. the testator's son till 21, the trustee was held to take only a chattel interest. Morrant and wife v. Gough and another, 1 M. & R. 41. S. C. 7 B. & C. 206. [Note that the

other circumstances of the case were immaterial to the construction of this devise. See 1 M. & R. 47. 7 B. & C. 211.]

2. If the obligor of a bond without penalty, conditioned for the payment of an annuity, devise as aforesaid, then, inasmuch as the bond does not create a debt in law, the devisee in trust is only liable for the profits which accrue during the continuance of his interest as to such arrears of the annuity as grow due after the testator's death. S. C. ibid.

And see CONDITION.

EQUITY.-See LANDDORD AND TENANT.

EXECUTOR.

1. Stock, like all other personal estate, is assets in the hands of the executor, and though specifically bequeathed, it vests in him, and till his assent a specific legatee thereof has no right to the legacy, nor can the bank prevent the executor from transferring the stock.-Franklin v. Bank of England, 1 Russ. 575. The bank have appealed. EXECUTORY LIMITATIONS. Limitations by way of devise, or shifting, or springing use, may be made to depend on an absolute term of 21 years after lives in being. By the Vice Chancellor in Bengough v. Edridge, 1 Simons, 267. Where, therefore, trusts were to be performed after the expiration of a term

in gross of twenty years, from the decease of the survivor of twentyeight persons who were living at the testator's decease; they were held valid. S. C. ibid. 173.

FEE-FARM.-See RENT.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

If a woman executes a settlement in contemplation of marriage, and conceals it from her intended husband, it cannot stand against his marital rights, and the greater or less interval between the date of the instrument and that of the marriage, though a material circumstance, does not alter the principle. Held by the Master of the Rolls in Goddard v. Snow, 1 Russ. 485. when the interval was 10 months. But note, that in most of the cases, the period has been much shorter. INSOLVENT DEBTOR.

The insolvent debtor is no party to the ultimate assignment, and the ultimate assignee takes all the estate of the provisional assignee, notwithstanding the insolvent's death in the mean time, and before the hearing of his petition or passing of his examination. Willis v.

Elliot, 1 M. & P. 19.

INSURANCE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. It seems that in equity, as well as at law, a tenant who covenants to pay rent during the whole continuance of his lease, is not in the case of an accident by fire, entitled to a suspension of the rent during such time as is occupied in the rebuilding the premises. By the Vice Chancellor in Leeds v. Cheesham, 1 Sim. 146.

2. If a landlord, subsequently to the lease, insures the demised premises from accident by fire, and the lease has no exception in respect of them, the tenant cannot compel the landlord to expend the money he receives from the insurance office, in restoring any buildings which may be burnt. Ibid.

MORTGAGE.

1. It is now an unquestioned rule of equity, that an equitable incumbrancer who will take possession, may have a receiver; care being taken that the order for the receiver shall not prevent any who have a better title to the possession, from ousting him if they please. In Tanfield v. Irvine. 2 Russ. 151. per Lord Chancellor.

2. The rights of an equitable mortgage are not taken away by the mortgagor's not having appeared to the suit, and being out of the jurisdiction of the court. S. C. 149.

3. The court will direct annual rests, as well in an account of occupation rent, as in an account of rents and profits received; and it may direct such rests against a mortgagee in possession, from the time at which the mortgage money was discharged, though there has been no direction to that effect in the prior orders under which those accounts were taken, if it was not then known that the mortgage debt was paid off. Wilson v. Metcalfe, 1 Russ. 530. And see TITHES.

OCCUPIER. See TITHES.

PEW. See PRESCRIPTION.

PREBENDARY. See ADVOWSON.

PRESCRIPTION.

A

pew in the body of a church may be prescribed for as appurtenant to a house out of the parish.-Lousley v. Hayward, 1 Y. & J. 583. [Note. The court denied the distinction as to this point between the body and an aisle of the church.]

PRESUMPTION.-And see TERM.

Questions of limitation of time, and presumption of surrender, are peculiarly questions for a court of law. By the Lord Chancellor, in Lopdell v. Creagh, 1 Bligh, 271.

RECEIVER.See MoRTGAGE.
RECITALS. - See CoNVEYANCE.

RECOVERY, COMMON.

1. The statute 24 G. 2. c. 48. s. 8., which requires that there shall be four returns inclusive, between the first and second writ of summons to warrant against the vouchers in common recoveries, was merely directory, and such returns may be abridged when the justice of the case demands it. Still demandant, Raymond tenant, 1 M. & P. 136. 2. The court will not amend a recovery by substituting the name of one county for that of another, though the mistake is sworn to.-Dolling demandant, Rice tenant, Euston vouchee. 1 M. & P. 178. RENT.

If a fee farm rent is chargeable on the whole of a city, he who is entitled to the rent may demand the whole or any part of it from any one who had a part of or in that city; leaving the person who was thus called upon to pay, to obtain contributions from the other inhabitants as he best could. By Lord Eldon, in Attorney General v. Corporation of Exeter, 2 Russ. 53.

RESTS.-See MORTGAGE.

REVERSION.-See CONVEYANCE.

SETTLEMENT. - See CoVENANT; EXECUTORY LIMITATIONS; HUSBAND AND WIFE; TRUSTEE.

SHIFTING AND SPRINGING USE.-See EXECUTORY LIMITATIONS.

SHIP.-See MORTGAGE.

STATUTE.-See CHARITIES.

TENANT.-See LANDLORD and TENANT.

TERM.

A mortgage term was recited in a deed dated 1758, to have been created several years before, and to have been then assigned in trust to attend the inheritance; but there had been a clear possession for 60 years without reference to the term, and neither the deed creating it, nor the assignment of it was produced. The court held, that after the expiration of 70 years without payment of interest, it should, on the authority of Doe v. Hilder, 1 B & A. 782. presume the term to be surrendered.-Townsend v. Champernoun, 1 Y. & J. 538.