DEVISE-ESTATE TAIL. 1. The word "leave' has not, in devises of real estate, the effect of confining

the word “issue' to issue living at the time of testator's death. When, therefore, the devise was to the use of R. C. for life, and after his decease, to the use of his issue male or female, in such proportion or proportions as he should think proper to devise the same, with power to charge the lands with a jointure, but in case he should die leaving no issue, then with remainders over; R. C. was held to take an estate

tail.-Croly v. Croly, 1 Batty, 1. 2. Lands were devised to W. “during the term of his natural life, and

in case he has issues, then it is my will they shall jointly inherit the same after my decease.” In a subsequent part of the will, testator gave the residue of his effects real and personal to the said W.; but in case he dies without issue, then, &c. W. died without issue. Held that the words in the first clause, if taken alone, would have given W. an estate for life; and if he had had issues, they would have taken jointly, but that as W. died without issue, the construction turned upon the subsequent devise, and he took an estate tail in the freehold, and the absolute interest in the personalty.—Ward v. Bevil,



1. If lands are devised to trustees to do something for a given purpose,

when that purpose is at an end, the estate ceases. Hence, where lands were devised to a trustee in trust to receive the profits, &c. thereof, for the purpose of maintaining &c. the testator's son till 21, the trustee was held to take only a chattel interest. Morrant and wife v. Gough and another, 1 M. & R. 41. S. C. 7 B. & C. 206. [Note-that the other circumstances of the case were immaterial to the construction

of this devise. See 1 M. & R. 47. 7 B. & C. 211.] 2. If the obligor of a bond without penalty, conditioned for the pay

ment of an annuity, devise as aforesaid, then, inasmuch as the bond does not create a debt in law, the devisee in trust is only liable for the profits wbich accrue during the continuance of his interest as to such arrears of the annuity as grow due after the testator's death. S.C.

ibid. And see CONDITION. EQUITY.-See LANDDORD AND TENANT. EXECUTOR. 1. Stock, like all other personal estate, is assets in the hands of the exe

cutor, and though specifically bequeathed, it vests in him, and till bis assent a specific legatee thereof has no right to the legacy, nor can the bank prevent the executor from transferring the stock.-Frank

lin v. Bank of England, 1 Russ. 575. The bank have appealed. EXECUTORY LIMITATIONS. Limitations by way of devise, or shifting, or springing use, may be made

to depend on an absolute term of 21 years after lives in being. By the Vice Chancellor in Bengough v. Edridge, 1 Simons, 267. Where, therefore, trusts were to be performed after the expiration of a term

in gross of twenty years, from the decease of the survivor of twentyeight persons who were living at the testator's decease ; they were

held valid. S. C. ibid. 173. FEE-FARM.–See Rent. HUSBAND AND WIFE. If a woman executes a settlement in contemplation of marriage, and

conceals it from her intended husband, it cannot stand against his marital rights, and the greater or less interval between the date of the instrument and that of the marriage, though a material circumstance, does not alter the principle. Held by the Master of the Rolls in Goddard v. Snow, 1 Russ. 485. when the interval was 10 months.

But note, that in most of the cases, the period has been much shorter. INSOLVENT DEBTOR. The insolvent debtor is no party to the ultimate assignment, and the ul

timate assignee takes all the estate of the provisional assignee, notwithstanding the insolvent's death in the mean time, and before the hearing of his petition or passing of his examination.

Willis v. Elliot, 1 M. & P. 19. INSURANCE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT. LANDLORD AND TENANT. 1. It seems that in equity, as well as at law, a tenant who covenants to

pay rent during the whole continuance of his lease, is not in the case of an accident by fire, entitled to a suspension of the rent during such time as is occupied in the rebuilding the premises. By the Vice

Chancellor in Leeds v. Cheesham, 1 Sim. 146. 2. If a landlord, subsequently to the lease, insures the demised pre

mises from accident by fire, and the lease has no exception in respect of them, the tenant cannot compel the landlord to expend the money he receives from the insurance office, in restoring any buildings which

may be burnt. Ibid. MORTGAGE. 1. It is now an unquestioned rule of equity, that an equitable incum

brancer who will take possession, may have a receiver; care being taken that the order for the receiver shall not prevent any who have a better title to the possession, from ousting him if they please. In

Tanfield v. Irvine. 2 Russ. 151. per Lord Chancellor. 2. The rights of an equitable mortgage are not taken away by the

mortgagor's not having appeared to the suit, and being out of the ju

risdiction of the court. S. C. 149. 3. The court will direct annual rests, as well in an account of occupa

tion rent, as in an account of rents and profits received ; and it may direct such rests against a mortgagee in possession, from the time at which the mortgage money was discharged, though there has been no direction to that effect in the prior orders under which those accounts were taken, if it was not then known that the mortgage debt was paid

off. Wilson v. Metcalfe, 1 Russ. 530. And see Tithes. OCCUPIER. See Tithes.

PREBENDARY. See Advowson.
A pew in the body of a church may be prescribed for as appurtenant

to a house out of the parish.—Lousley v. Hayward, 1 Y. & J. 583. [Note.—The court denied the distinction as to this point between the

body and an aisle of the church.] PRESUMPTION.-And see Term. Questions of limitation of time, and presumption of surrender, are pe

culiarly questions for a court of law. By the Lord Chancellor, in

Lopdell v. Creagh, 1 Bligh, 271. RECEIVER.-See MORTGAGE. RECITALS.-See Conveyance. RECOVERY, COMMON. 1. The statute 24 G. 2. c. 48. s. 8., which requires that there shall be four

returns inclusive, between the first and second writ of summons to warrant against the vouchers in common recoveries, was merely directory, and such returns may be abridged when the justice of the case

demands it. Still demandant, Raymond tenant, 1 M. & P. 136. 2. The court will not amend a recovery by substituting the name of

one county for that of another, though the mistake is sworn to.—Dol

ling demandant, Rice tenant, Euston vouchee. 1 M. & P. 178. RENT. If a fee farm rent is chargeable on the whole of a city, he who is

entitled to the rent may demand the whole or any part of it from any one who had a part of or in that city; leaving the person who was thus called upon to pay, to obtain contributions from the other inhabitants as he best could. By Lord Eldon, in Attorney Ge

neral v. Corporation of Exeter, 2 Russ. 53. RESTS.— See MORTGAGE. REVERSION.-See ConveYANCE. SETTLEMENT.— See Covenant; ExecutORY LIMITATIONS; Hus



TENANT.-See LANDLORD and Tenant.
A mortgage term was recited in a deed dated 1758, to have been created

several years before, and to have been then assigned in trust to attend the inheritance ; but there had been a clear possession for 60 years without reference to the term, and neither the deed creating it, nor the assignment of it was produced. The court held, that after the expiration of 70 years without payment of interest, it should, on the authority of Doe v. Hilder, 1 B & A. 782. presume the term to be surrendered.—Townsend v. Champernoun, 1 Y. & J. 538.

TITHES. 1. Neither mortgagees, nor persons entitled to tithes, under terms for rais

ing portions or charges, have a right to call for past rents and profits. Hence, the enjoyment of the tithes by the person who is tenant in fee, or tenant for life, subject to such charges, gives him a sufficient title to sustain a suit against occupiers on account of tithes.-Cherry v.

Legh, i Bligh, 306. 2. If the occupier shows a colour of title to the tithes not rendered, a

court of equity will not interfere, but leave the plaintiff to his legal

remedy. Ibid. TRUST.-See ExecutORY LIMITATIONS; TERM. TRUSTEE 1. Where a devisee in trust for sale (such trust working a conversion)

did not execute a conveyance made sixty years back, and purporting to be made by him and the parties beneficially interested ; and possession had, since that period, gone under that conveyance, the title was held unobjectionable. — Townsend v. Champernoun, 1 Y. & J.

538. 2. Where trustee lent money to a postnuptial settlor, which was

secured by a subsequent mortgage ; but the money was, in fact, never paid to the trustees on the trusts of the settlements; they were, nevertheless, held to be constituted specialty creditors by the mort

gage.- Turner v. Byne, 1 Simons, 160. 3. When trustees are directed to keep down the interest, and out of

trust funds to pay off the principal, of incumbrances, the cestuique trusts under the deed may complain in a court of equity, that the funds, being available for, were not applied to that purpose, and that the interest of them is therefore unnecessarily continued. — Per

Lord Redesdale, 1 Bligh, 339. 4. Where a corporation is in possession of funds arising from rates

granted to them by act of parliament, and to be appropriated to certain beneficial purposes, they are, it seems, trustees ; but at all events, they are accountable persons, and the circumstance of the act having provided that they shall furnish parliament with an annual account of the sums which they receive, does not oust the jurisdiction of the court of chancery, which, in such a case, can only be taken away expressly, or by necessary implication. —[S. C.] Attorney-General

v. Mayor, &c. of Dublin, i Bligh, 312. VENDOR AND PURCHASER." 1. When an estate subject to, is sold free from, incumbrances, they

are matter of conveyance only, though their amount exceeds the pur

chase money.--Townsend v. Campernoun, 1 Y. & J. 449. 2. A purchaser, it seems, is not bound to rely on the recitals in deeds,

though more than thirty years old, as evidence of a pedigree, which is unsupported by other proof, or by possession accordingly.-Fort

v. Clarke, 1 Russ. 601. 3. If a personal representative, in whom, as such, a leasehold has

vested, sells it, not in his proper character, or in the course of administering the assets, and the purchaser is aware of the nature of the


transaction, it is assets unadministered, and the administrator de bonis non of the original testator is entitled to have the sale set aside.

-Cubbidge v. Boatwright, 1 Russ. 549. VOUCHER.-See RECOVERY. USE.-See ExecutORY LIMITATIONS. WARREN. The right of warren ought not to be extended by inference to animals not clearly within it. Hence it was held that grouse are not birds of

1.Duke of Devonshire v. Lodge, 7 B. & C. 36. WILL.-See Devise. WILL, REVOCATION OF. An instrument void as a conveyance, does not revoke a prior will.

Where therefore a wife having a power of appointment by will, duly executed that power, and afterwards joined with her husband in a deed, purporting to be an appointment of the same lands, but which was a nullity as to the wife, it was held that the will made in pur

suance of the power, was not revoked.--Eilbeck v. Wood, 1 Russ. 564. WORDS.-See Devise. WRIT.-See Recovery.

EQUITY. ADEMPTION. A testator bequeaths his interest in two policies of insurance on the life

of his wife to his executors, upon trust, after his wife's decease, out of the amount to be received upon them, to provide for certain legacies. His wife having died, he received the money, and invested it in securities of which he died possessed; held that the legacies failed.

-Barker v. Rayner, 2 Russ. 122. ANNUITY. Assignment of 150l. part of the dividends of a sum of stock to which

the vendor was entitled for life, with a proviso that the purchaser should not receive any part of the dividends then growing due, but a proportionable part of the 150l. is a grant of an annuity, and must

be memorialized. Charretie v. Vause, 1 Sim. 153. APPEAL. 1. An appeal from the Master of the Rolls or Vice Chancellor to the

Lord Chancellor is only a re-hearing; evidence may therefore be read which was not read at the original hearing. Williams v. Goodchild,

2 Russ. 91. 2. The taking of an account will not be stayed pending an appeal; nor

does the court generally direct security to be given for the result of

an account.—Nerot v. Burnand, 2 Russ. 56. 3. Pending an appeal, the court will sometimes stay the sale of pro

perty which the decree has directed to be sold ; the appellant giving security for its value.--Ibid.

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