IV. LET. poor, finite, frail, blind creatures. Our knowledge of the things around us is extremely limited and imperfect— we ought to humble ourselves*— TIM. There is always mifchief in the wind, when a philofopher falleth down and bumbleth himself. But what is your inference from all these lowly confiderations ? TOм. That it is prefumption in fuch worms of the duft to argue about the nature and attributes of God. TIM. But you will allow poor reafon to exercife herfelf in her own province, and when she is furnished with premises, to draw a conclufion. Том. Ay, Ay, there is no harm in that. TIM. When we fee a house calculated to answer various purpofes of Dialogues, P. 42. beauty IV. beauty and convenience, and having LET. in it all the marks of wisdom and defign, we know it could not build itself. The fenfelefs materials could never have prepared and arranged themfelves in fuch order. The timber could not dance, cut and fquared, out of the foreft, nor the marble meet it, hewn and polished, from the quarry. The house therefore must have had a builder. We apply the fame argument, a fortiori, to the cafe of the world, and its Maker, God; and Tully, if I remember right, makes no fcruple to affert, that he who denies his affent to it does not deserve the name of a man. This is the argument called a pofteriori, and lies open to the common fenfe of all mankind. Now, then, let us try the fincerity of that declaration of yours, that IV. LET. that "the queftion is not concerning "the being, but the nature of God." For if you controvert this argument, you certainly mean to fhake our belief in the existence of a Deity. You muft of course attempt to fhew, that the world might have been as it is, without one; and if that be the cafe, you will next defy us to prove that there is one. Том. Fiat juftitia, ruat cælum. I muft ftick to truth, let what will come of it. I am not bound to answer for confequences. I must own I look upon the argument to be inconclufive. TIM. All very well; but why could not you fay fo at firft? What occafion to be mealy mouthed, in an age like this? Now matters are in a train, and we can proceed regularly. What is your objection to the argument? Wherein does it fail? TOM. IV. TOм. It will fail, d'ye fee, if there LET. be not an exact fimilarity in the cafes. You will not fay, that there is an exact fimilitude between the universe and a house, or between God and Nor TIM. Why really, Toм, I never imagined the world had a door and a chimney, like a houfe; or that God had hands and feet, like a man. is it at all neceffary that it fhould be fo, for the strength and validity of the argument, which is plainly and fimply this-If ftones and trees have not thought and defign to form themfelves into a houfe, there must have. been fome one, who had thought and defign, to do it for them; and fo, as, I faid before, a fortiori, with respect to the universe, where the thought * Dialogues, P. 50, 51, 58. and IV. LET. and design appear infinitely fuperior to those required in building a house. We have no occafion to fuppofe a refemblance of the univerfe to a house, or of God to man, in every particular. TOм. "But why felect fo minute, "fo weak, fo bounded a principle, "as the reason and design of animals "is found to be upon this planet? "What peculiar privilege has this "little agitation of the brain which "we call thought, that we must thus "make it the model of the whole "univerfe? Our partiality in our "own favour does indeed prefent it upon all occafions; but found philofophy ought carefully to guard against fo natural an illufion." * TIM. It is not "our partiality in "our own favour that prefents it to * P. 60. ૯ ]s |