employ the expression secondary qualities to denote those phenomenal affections determined in our sentient organism by the agency of external bodies, and not, unless when otherwise stated, the occult powers themselves from which that agency proceeds.' Only confusion can result if we identify sense-affecting qualities with the affections which they produce. But we may conceive of powers without reference to the physical conditions out of which they arise. We may do so even while ignorant of the nature of such conditions, the essential or differentiating element in our conception being purely relative, and based on the effect which the power produces; thus we conceive of the secondary qualities of matter.

The real ground of the division of properties, which we have now considered, lies in the different ways in which our perception and conception of solidity-or of extension and solidity, the essential properties of matier

are related to our perception and conception of material properties in general. While all the qualities, according to our ultimate understanding of them, belong exclusively to matter, the primary attributes are perceived, and conceived of, as necessarily belonging to all extended and solid substances; the secundo-primary as belonging only to matter or the solid substance, yet, so far as we can see, contingently; while the secondary qualities are perceived, and conceived of, without any such perception of their relation to an extended solid. From the first they are perceived as powers belonging to a substance other than the soul, and external to it; but it is by subsequent comparison and judgment that they are connected with solidity in the substances which they characterize. Hence our conceptions of them do not ordinarily contain any reference to solidity.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

CONCOMITANT PERCEPTION.

Concomitant 1. THE distinction between direct and concomitant perception defined and perception has not received the recognition which it established. deserves. Most writers, and in particular those who Locke, and have lived within the last one hundred years, have emReid quoted. braced all our immediate knowledge under the heads of consciousness and sense-perception.

Aristotle,

They have been induced to do so partly because the same discussion applies largely to all our original cognitions, and yet more because our concomitant perceptions are so intermingled and united with those which are more direct, that the former have naturally been treated as subordinate parts of the latter.

This method of treatment has a great disadvantage. It brings the language of philosophy into conflict with that of com

mon speech; it makes philosophy use words wrongly, and teach what is not strictly and literally correct. To say that space is perceived by sense-perception, and duration by consciousness, is to teach what is not true according to our ordinary conception of the operations and objects of these powers; neither can we say that the relations of number or quantity or causation are perceived by these powers, or by either one of them. But we can affirm that space, time, number, quantity, and causation are perceived in connection with the objects both of sense-perception and of consciousness.

a di

The adoption of language other than this has led some to make a division of these common objects so as to assign some of them to sense-perception and some to consciousness, vision arising solely from the assumption that there are only two modes of immediate cognition. The better plan in this case, as in every other in which it can be employed, is to conform the language of philosophy to that of daily life. Following this method, we may hope to obtain more correct apprehensions, both as to our perceptions and as to the objects of our perceptions, than can be obtained in any other way.

Although concomitant perception has not received any formal place in the systems of philosophers, their writings contain intimations which greatly justify its more perfect recognition. Aristotle teaches that there are three kinds of sensibles, or (as the word might be translated) of sense-perceptibles, and that two of these are perceived in themselves (kab avrà), while one is perceived by its accidents (Karà σνμßeßηкós). By this last we understand the object of acquired perception, as when, seeing a white thing, we recognize the son of Diares; for to be the son of Diares is something contingent, and not necessary, to the whiteness perceived. About this kind of perceptibles we are sometimes mistaken.

Of things sensible in themselves, and about which we do not mistake, there are two kinds, the proper, which belong severally to the several senses; and the common, which belong to all. The common are motion, rest, number, form, and size. But, adds Aristotle," of things sensible in themselves, the proper are pre-eminently objects of sense perception, and things to which the nature of each sense is adapted” (“ τῶν δὲ καθ ̓ αὑτὰ αἰσθητῶν, τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ, καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἡ οὐσία πέφυκεν ἑκάστης aiono ews"). Thus he makes the common sensibles to be the objects of sense only in a secondary and improper way. Elsewhere he styles them the concomitants and consequents (akoλOVθέντα, ἐπόμενα) of the proper.

Locke, though very inadequately, recognizes concomitant per

He says:

ception as a "suggestion" of the mind. "Existence and unity are two ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us, which is, that they exist or have existence; and whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real being or idea, suggests to the understanding the idea of unity. . . . Besides these there is another idea, which, though suggested by our senses, yet is more constantly offered us by what passes in our own minds, and that is the idea of succession; for if we look immediately into ourselves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake or have any thought, passing in train, one going and another coming, without intermission."

In much the same strain Reid writes: "Extension seems to be a quality suggested to us. We are commonly told by philosophers that we get the idea of extension by feeling along the extremities of a body, as if there was no manner of difficulty in the matter. I have sought with great pains, I confess, to find out how this idea can be got by feeling, but I have sought in vain.” Elsewhere he says: Space, whether tangible or visible, is not so properly an object of sense as a necessary concomitant of the objects both of sight and touch."

Concomitant differs from direct perception only as to its objects and our mode of viewing them, not at all in the radical character of its own action.

We style this perception and its objects indirect, not because they are any less immediate than those of other presentational cognitions, but because the attention and interest of the mind are less directly given to them than to the perceptions and objects which they accompany. The spectator of a horse-race attends primarily to the animals and their action. In connection with these he perceives - less directly, but no less certainly the space traversed, the time occupied, and the changing positions of the contestants with reference to one another. Hence we divide his cognitions into the direct and the indirect, or the principal and the concomitant.

The objects 2. The objects of perception in general are the same of concomi- as the elements of existence in general.

tant percep

These may

tion. Three be enumerated as substance, power, action, change, classes. space, time, quantity, and relation. These elements are never perceived save in the complexities which they form with one another. The first four may be regarded as the direct, and the last four as the indirect, objects of perception. When a ball is rolled on the ground, we perceive it as (1) a body, (2) en

dowed with inertia, and (3) exercising a momentum which causes (4) motion, or change of place. At the same time these things are seen as (1) related to one another and to other similar objects, and to (2) space and (3) time, and as having (4) quantity. So, also, if the ball be propelled by one's own hands, he perceives (1) his own soul, and (2) his locomotive energy and (3) its action, and (4) the change in himself from one kind of activity to another. And these things are seen under their (1) mutual relations, and those of (2) space, (3) time, and (4) quantity.

This distinction, however, between modes of cognition refers primarily to the action of the mind, and only secondarily, and in a less rigorous way, to the objects of the cognition. It might especially be a question, in some particular case, whether change, or quantity, were perceived directly or indirectly; and the question would be unimportant.

The advantage of making our indirect perceptions a special object of study will become particularly apparent from two considerations: first, the fact that necessary as well as contingent relations are, primarily, matters of immediate perception has not hitherto had that prominence which is due to it in philosophy; and, secondly, it is clear that the cognition of non-existence can have no place in a system of the human mind, unless it also be assigned to the sphere of concomitant perception.

For the sake of method in further discussion, the presentations of this power may be regarded as having three classes of objects, and so, with reference to their objects, as being embraced under three heads. Under the first head let us consider the intuitions of space, time, and quantity; under the second, our perception of relations of whatever kind, including those of contingency and necessity; and under the third, our cognition of the nonexistent and the impossible of every kind of entity.

Space, time, and quan

The objects of the first class are perceived in connection with relations which depend on them, yet they tity. themselves are not relations: they are fundamenta between which and other fundamenta relations exist. To say, with Leibnitz and others, that " space is an order of co-existences, and time an order of successions," may be profoundly philosophical; but it is a violation of common sense. Space and time are the antecedent conditions of co-existence and of succession.

Moreover, not only are things related to these entities, but such relations may, in their turn, become the fundamenta of new relations. Two fields, as occupying certain positions, are related to space; and by reason of these positions, they may be contiguous to, or separated from, each other. The lives of two men are each related to those periods of time during which they

are passed; and by reason of these relations, they may be contemporaneous with one another, or the contrary. Two bodies each contain a fixed quantity of matter; and with reference to their respective quantities, they are equal, or unequal, to each other.

Space, with its relations, is especially perceived in connection with body and its changes. Exact measurements of space are possible for us only through the use of material standards; yet spatial perceptions take place also in connection with the experiences of spirit. On the other hand, time is perceived especially in connection with the changes which occur in our own souls. Being conscious at once of the enduring sameness of the ego itself and of its fleeting states and operations, we cannot but notice that peculiar kind of entity in relation to which some things are permanent and others transitory. But body, no less than spirit, is intuitively seen as a permanent entity with transitory states; therefore, we doubt not, time is immediately perceived in connection with the existence and the changes of the non-ego.

The term

66 present"

phy.

Here we must remark that in the doctrine of im

in philoso- mediate perception the term "present" should not be limited absolutely to one point of duration, but should include so much time as may be occupied by any act or object of unbroken attention. We claim for the mind a power to perceive immediately the continuity of time as well as the continuity of space; and we include this among our presentational perceptions. This is no violation of ordinary thought and language. On the contrary, it is unnatural to call a continuous perception of the continued present a recollection of the past.

This ability to perceive the continued must be admitted if there be any such thing as an intuition of time. It may be regarded as the initial exercise of that power which develops itself into memory; in which light it furnishes a key, perhaps the only possible key, to an understanding of the faculty of reminiscence.

The element of quantity is so intimately united in existence and perception with the other elements of entity, that only some special analysis, caused by the comparison of quanta, or things as having quantity, makes it a distinct object of thought. For this reason the perception of it does not have the character of concomitance to the same degree as the perception of space and time. But when two things - for example, two weights — alike in every respect save quantity, are compared and found to differ, then we give this name to that in respect to which they differ. We perceive, also, that the possession of quantity is the foundation for certain relations between things. It is as quanta