however he may be puzzled by subtile difficulties, can really doubt the testimony of his senses and of his consciousness, or the intuitive perceptions of his intellect.

Dogmatism.

Locke, and

quoted.

That school in philosophy which maintains that the mind Ueberweg, has the power of immediately perceiving fundamental truth in the form of general abstract principles, has been called the Aristotle dogmatic. "Dogmatism," says Ueberweg, "has an immediate faith in the power of human thought to transcend, by the aid of perfect clearness and distinctness in its ideas, the limits of experience, and attain to truth." This doctrine is an improvement on scepticism; but it sets out from a wrong starting-point, and tends to the acceptance of abstractions whose truth and authority may be denied.

Locke attacks dogmatism when he denies that maxims, or axioms, are "the principles and foundations of all our knowledge," and maintains that 66 all the materials of reason and knowledge come from experience." In Locke's writings, experience is to be taken in a broad sense for presentational perception in general.

But the doctrine that all cognition is primarily a perception of the singular, has been struggling for recognition from the earliest beginnings of philosophy. That famous saying which Aristotle borrowed from the Stoics, In intellectu nihil est quod non prius fuerit in sensu," is no obscure anticipation of Locke's assertion that all knowledge originates in experience; for in this statement aloŋois is to be taken broadly to siguify every kind of immediate perception.

The doctrine of Kant was an attempt to explain and defend Kantianism. the truth which dogmatism inaccurately taught, that is, the Idealism. intellectual origin of our cognitions. But Kant failed to see that experience is as intellectual as intuition, and that intuition is not a mere power of forming conceptions, but a cognition of things as they truly exist. His a priori ideas are far more fanciful things than the general principles assumed by dogmatism. Kantianism has this only in its favor, that it contains more of truth than any of those systems of pure idealism to which it gave rise, and which agree with it in substituting conceptions for cognitions.

Association

Finally, associationalism presents the weakest and most alism. Mate- unsatisfactory account possible of our original perceptions and rialism. Sen- beliefs. This form of error is plausible and captivating, sationalism. especially when divorced from the grosser schemes with which it is commonly united. Materialism, which confounds molecular with psychical activity, and sensationalism, which confounds all thought and feeling with bodily impressions and their reproduction, inevitably ally themselves with associationalism, which confounds the objective laws of inference with the subjective laws of the succession of our ideas.

The weakness of all these modes of philosophy is nowhere more apparent than in their attempt to account for the radical conceptions and convictions of the mind. The harder one tries to form such notions as those of space and time and substance and power, from the association of "feelings, or impressions, or states of consciousness," the more he will realize the impossibility of doing so. And the more one

endeavors to identify our conviction of logical necessity with that of an acquired psychical necessity governing the sequence of our thoughts, the more he will find that logical necessity pertains to objects, and is truly perceived by the mind viewing them.

The convictions that all things must exist in space and time; that power must reside in substance; that action comes only from power, and change only from action; that nothing can be existent and nonexistent at the same time, and that a thing must be either existent or non-existent; that the nature of space admits geometrical figures and relations, and necessitates certain connections between them; and that quantity, in like manner, admits and necessitates arithmetical relations, these, and many other principles, irresistibly assert themselves as simple, ultimate, objective verities.

INDEX.

NOTE.

THIS index may be useful to students as a vocabulary of philosophical terms;
these are explained here and there throughout the book. It will also enable one to
trace the interpenetration of doctrines and discussions. But students who may desire
to make specific examination of authorities will find the "Human Mind" more
helpful than the present manual. This index simply shows when and how often
writers have been quoted and referred to in "Mental Science."

ABELARD, Peter, 226.

Abercrombie, Dr., 175, 326, 357.

Abstraction, 205, 215, 403.

Accident, wide sense of, 211.

"

Belief, 19, 93, 100, 108, 111, 118, 242.
Bell, Sir Charles, his discoveries, 43.
Berkeley, Bishop, 227, 264, 266, 316.
Bessie's chickens, 320.

Acquired sense-perception, 266, 270, 310, Blackstone, quoted, 119.

313.

Boethius, quoted, 222.

Acquisition, mental, 170.

Action, 210, 408.

Brown, Dr. Thomas, 17, 68, 362.
Bruckner, quoted, 193.

Budæus, 170.

Action and passion, as categories of predi- Brutes, 48, 379.

Αίσθησις, 261.

cation, 111.

Burns, quoted, 336.

CABANIS' experiments, 355.

Calculation of chances, 396. (See
"Human Mind.")

Campbell, a nominalist, 227.
Cardan, 170.

Categorical, or ostensive, syllogism, 391.
Categories, of predication and of entity,
110, 210, 408.

Cause and effect, 214.
Chances, 162, 165.
Characteristic, 211.

Cheselden's report, 310, 319.

Cicero, his "De Officiis," 175; quoted,

275.

Clarke, Dr. Samuel, quoted, 264.
Co-existence, 148.

Coherency of truth, 277.

Coleridge, 175, 353.

"Common sense," 12, 40, 273, 276.
Comte, Auguste, 39, 173.
Conception, 83, 87, 206, 230.
Conceptualism, 229.

Concomitant perception, 129, 300, 396.
Condillac, 51.

Condition, as a category of predication
110.

Conditions, necessary and logical, 140, GOD, has no brain, 47; conceivable, 97;

Existence, 72: real and imaginary, 80; Ideals, 366, 374, 375.