The import Platonism. laws of the association of ideas, which careful observation had established, into the comprehensive law of redintegration; that is, that the mind tends to repeat fully any complex operation which it may formerly have experienced, and which it has now in any degree begun. In short, the laws of psychical no less than those of physical Nature are to be learned through the ascertainment and co-ordination, the analysis and generalization, of facts. Such being the case, the student of philosophy may boldly question any doctrine, though upheld by the highest ability and learning, which can claim no record of experience or observation in its support, and as confidently hold any opinion sustained by accurately recorded and carefully analyzed phenomena. 4. The statement that facts are the necessary founance of these dation for philosophy may seem to some too evident principles. to require emphasis. But the neglect of it in times. past, and even in our own day, has been the source of many and great errors. The metaphysical worthlessness of almost all the ancient and of much of modern philosophy originates in the admission of high-sounding notions, the truth of which never was proved, and never could be proved, from any examination of things really existing. Only fanciful and unsatisfactory systems could be constructed after such beginnings. Plato and his followers, in ancient days, carried out the separation of philosophy from actuality more fully than any other class of thinkers; and, in modern times, this has been done most signally by the German idealists. Plato adopted the principle that general or universal ideas are the only proper sources of knowledge and objects of study. The individual or specific he rejected as transitory and, in a sense, unreal. Such a commencement destroyed the possibility of progress. A revival of these Platonic. views in an exaggerated form gave rise to the systems of Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, by which the thought of continental Europe was powerfully debauched. These philosophers, being too wise to appeal to experience, sought truth by the immediate beholding of reason," and evolved it out of the depths of their consciousness." The spirit of Hegelianism, even at the present time, may be inferred from the condemnation, by Dr. Schwegler, of Lord Bacon, as "the author of scientific empiricism," and by his contemptuous assertion regarding Locke's philosophy, that its "empiricism is clear as day." It is a strange perversion of judgment when learned men condemn a philosophy on account of its chief excellence, and simply because it has been carefully deduced from facts! 66 Aristotle schoolmen. Of those investigators, ancient and modern, who and the have rejected Platonic methods as dreamy and mystical, very few, until comparatively recent times, have systematically based their doctrines on the analysis of observed phenomena. Aristotle, the illustrious rival of Plato, did not do So. The acuteness of this great man cannot be over-estimated, but the intrinsic value of his metaphysical writings has been grossly over-estimated. He did, indeed, recognize the truth that all our general knowledge is an induction from the observation of particulars; yet he did not sufficiently perceive the practical importance of this principle, that it is the only true starting-point of all philosophy. The patient reader of his works can see that he has accepted from previous teachers many absurd doctrines which admit of no proof, and that he forms his own theories depending, first on his own penetration, then on the opinions of preceding philosophers, then on the logical support which other doctrines may give the one under discussion, and then, last and least of all, on facts. Remarks similar to these might be made respecting the schoolmen of the Middle Ages, and regarding the authors of some famous systems of speculation. We might also trace the progress of the last few generations, in psychology, to a more faithful observation and a more patient analysis of mental phenomena than were formerly attempted. Induction and analysis. 5. The Baconian method of philosophizing is termed "The Inductive System," because the induction of principles from facts is its distinguishing characteristic. This work largely consists in the observation and classification of facts as similar. But it includes more than this: it reaches from the past to the future, from that which has been seen to that which has not as yet been seen; and, indeed, the most essential part of it is the exercise of a power of judgment natural to us. Every fact, that is, every causal fact — for of such only we speak at present-consists of certain antecedents and consequents; and it is an intuition of the intellect that similar antecedents must be accompanied or followed by similar consequents. Whenever a fact seems to contradict this principle, it is because some element which should exist in the antecedent to make the case similar to one previously observed, has escaped observation, and is not seen to be wanting. Thus, by means of an inductive judgment, the observation of facts results in the ascertainment of laws. But, in the conjunction of circumstances which make up the antecedent in any particular fact, some circumstances only are essential elements of the antecedent; others are merely accidental and no part of the true cause. Hence the necessity of analysis, of discrimination, without which induction alone could not obtain the exact statement of any law. Moreover, as the laws of existence do not operate singly but in combination, there is yet more need of analysis to resolve these combinations, and in this way to ascertain laws which are simple and ultimate. In the ruder attainments of philosophy induction is more prominent than analysis, — the latter takes place spontaneously, — but in the more abstruse inquiries this state of things is reversed. It is difficult to say whether of the two is more necessary to philosophical progress. They are equally the indispensable instruments of science. All the rules of philosophizing simply assist and direct us to the successful employment of these two modes of thought. CHAPTER II. THE SOURCES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INFORMATION. 1. As science arises from the investigation of facts, an important question with respect to any department of knowledge is, whether there be abundant and reliable sources of information. In this respect the mental philosopher is peculiarly fortunate. The study of psychical phenomena demands attention and thoughtfulness; and it is a work of some difficulty to those unaccustomed to it, just as reading or mental application of any kind is commonly irksome and laborious to uneducated persons. Yet the student of mind has this great advantage, that the operations and states of this wonderful agent are continually subject to his observation, and even, in a considerable measure, to his control. Besides, the facts thus. submitted to him are those respecting the truth of which it is impossible to entertain a doubt. The most extravagant sceptic cannot question the existence of those thoughts, feelings, wishes, and actions which constitute his restless life of unbelief. The radical The radical source of all information regarding source of in- mind is consciousness, or that immediate knowledge formation. which the mind has of its own states and operations. All other means of knowledge are of use only as they co-operate with this. Our knowledge, through consciousness, of the nature and workings of our own spirits is our only means of understanding the life of other spiritual beings and of comprehending the indications of their psychical activity. Each of us, knowing what passes within his own bosom, learns to understand the experience of others. A child not more than two or three years of age can speak of its thoughts and affections, wishes and pleasures, pains, hopes, and disappointments; and knows, also, that others are similarly exercised. This statement can be easily verified question the little prattler, and you will find that he uses terms expressive of mental, just as intelligently as those indicative of bodily, operations. And these cognitions of spirit, thus early begun, are continued throughout life, pertain to every form of experience, and are free from all uncertainty. Two important difficulties are to be encountered in using the testimony of consciousness. In the first place, the changeful rapidity of our psychical operations interferes with the steadiness of our gaze. What the poet says of pleasures is true of mental phenomena in general; they are "Like that Borealis race Which flit ere you can point their place." And even when the current of inward life is partially arrested, that special phase of experience which is made the object of scrutiny often changes its nature while we are endeavoring to look upon it. The feeling grows cold; the mental image becomes dim; the concrete practical notion resolves itself into its elements. Psychological facts call for a keen and quick observation. They resemble those sea-birds which are ever on the wing, which move even while at rest, and must be shot while flying. The second hindrance experienced in using the testimony of consciousness arises from the impossibility of proving the correctness of one's observation by exhibiting to others those phenomena which are visible directly only to one's self. This difficulty is more formidable in appearance than in reality. The earnest and patient student can generally sympathize sufficiently with his teacher to understand and appreciate an appeal to consciousness. Nevertheless, there is here some opportunity for difference; the disputatious opponent and even the honest inquirer may sometimes say, "That may be your experience, but it is not mine." 2. Because, therefore, of the subtile and evanescent Secondary character of mental phenomena, and because of the information. impossibility of presenting the facts of consciousness Language. to the immediate observation of others, great value attaches to certain indirect revelations of mind, which are subject to public and general scrutiny. sources of The most important of these is language, that marvellous instrument, the expression and embodiment of human thought. Not only every word, but also every change, construction, and combination of words, in language, represents some form or mood of man's intelligence. And so well suited is this instrument for its office, that no idea, however delicate, which may have secured the interest of men, fails of expression in their speech. He who has mastered the vocabulary and linguistic forms of any people has obtained a perfect measure of their mental development. Moreover, every word in any language has a certain fixed meaning, which can be ascertained; and this circumstance is of great assistance when we would study the thoughts of men. For the transitory idea is made fixed and permanent by its sign, and is shown also to be an existing reality. No matter how much we may question the truthfulness of any conceptions, we cannot deny the existence of the notions themselves if they only have become established in the speech of any people. The relations of words, also, illustrate the relations of ideas; so that many points concerning the contents and combinations, changes and successions, agreements and differences, of thoughts can be understood better through a critical study of language than in any other way. The accom men. Another source of information is found in those volplishments untary actions, labors, and accomplishments which and deeds of result from mental activity. Every human being has the power of perceiving both his own actions and those of his companions; and as he refers his own conduct to his own inward life as its cause, he intuitively adopts a similar rule with regard to the conduct of others. Moreover, as different thoughts and aims result in different actions corresponding to them, we learn to use specific deeds as the indicators of specific thoughts. Sometimes the thoughts of men are even better understood from their actions than from their language. We not only trace actions to thoughts; we also ascribe accomplished results to actions. This is a yet greater exercise of mental penetration; and by means of it we can perceive most plainly the former presence and activity of departed laborers. Beholding a field fenced and tilled, we are as sure that husbandmen have wrought in it as if we had seen them with our eyes. Nor is it necessary to such a judgment that we should have previously witnessed the performance of a work in every respect the same as that submitted to our consideration. There is need only of an essential sameness or similarity. One who might be acquainted with the manufacture of locomotives, but who had never seen a steamship, could affirm, on an inspection of the latter, that it was the product of a similar exercise of intelligence, and intended for a similar purpose. In like manner we think that there is as much |