the one hand, and Scepticism on the other. Yet neither the Stoic nor the Epicurean system attained a permanent success; neither proved sufficient to resist the Neoplatonism and Mysticism of the first centuries of the Christian era.

In subsequent times, Scholasticism, applying Aristotelian ideas to the doctrines of the Church, showed great dialectic power, but added little to scientific knowledge. Finally, after the theological awakening of the sixteenth century, came the speculative activity of the seventeenth; and towards the close of the seventeenth century, in the year 1689, John Locke gave to the world the beginning of a great philosophy.

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5. Locke founds all knowledge on "experience," and has, therefore, been styled the founder of an empirical," or associationalist, philosophy; but erroneously. By "experience" Locke means simply presentational perception, the aionois · αἴσθησις * of Aristotle, and of the Stoics; "sensation and reflection" are the names which he gives to the outward and to the inward modes of this perception. Moreover, he teaches that the perception of necessary relations occurs in connection with the cognition of simple fact, and is absolutely and objectively intuitive. These initial principles of Perceptionalism were obtained by Locke from the critical observation of the phenomena of mind. Yet his "Treatise on Human Understanding," defective in the development and yet more in the expression of its thought, did not save the eighteenth century from the Associationalism of Hartley, the Idealism of Berkeley, and the Scepticism of Hume.

In opposition to these destructive theories, the "Essays" of Thomas Reid, the Glasgow professor, were written towards the close of the eighteenth century. In these the natural force of the ordinary convictions of mankind was powerfully directed

*Atonous with the Greeks referred pre-eminently, but not exclusively, to sense-perception. Aristotle speaks of reason as a higher kind of ato@nois; and also of the moral faculty in the same way. Thus, in his Ethics we read: “Τοῦτο πρὸς τἄλλα ζῶα τοὺς ἄνθρωποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν.” The verbs αἰσθάνομαι, sentio and perceive, all have about the same significance and the same breadth of application.

against the subtle errors of that day. But the thought of Reid is lacking in theoretic discrimination and construction. He often assumes first principles, sometimes leaves difficulties unexplained, and can scarcely be said to have produced a philosophic system. His excellence and his deficiency are both expressed when he is characterized as "the apostle of common sense." Mightily defending the truth, he left it as he found it, without analysis and without systematization.

6. During this nineteenth century some advance has been made by eminent philosophers, who have called themselves Intuitionalists. Their writings thoroughly discuss both original (or presentational) and acquired (or inferential) perception; and also throw much light on those immediate cognitions of necessary truth which, because they take place hypothetically as well as actualistically, and in the absence as well as in the presence of objects, have been called "the intuitions of the mind." Nevertheless, so far as we can learn, no teacher of Intuitionalism has succeeded in founding a school in which, like the patriarch," he will command his children after him." Ambitious pupils, however carefully instructed, do not become permanent disciples. They read and study further as they ought to do and then are more or less influenced by some imposing and skilfully constructed system of error.

We ascribe this to the narrowness and incompleteness of Intuitionalism. Correct, so far as it goes, it is but the commencement of a philosophy. Its teachings regarding the immediate perception of fact and the necessary relations of fact should be united with others, equally important, concerning the rational and discursive intellect, and concerning thought and conviction in general. In short, with sincere respect and consideration both for ancient tradition and for modern theory, we assert the need of a new and comprehensive elaboration of mental science.

The name "Intuitionalism" of late years has been very properly abandoned as the designation of a system of philosophy; it is not only confined in its suggestions, but is also affected with an obscurity arising from the ambiguities of the word "intuition." And the name "Realism," which some propose, is yet

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more unsatisfactory. This title belongs historically to the doctrine of the reality of "universals"-a doctrine rejected by those who would now call themselves Realists. It also furnishes ground for quibbling controversy. For those philosophers who reject the ordinary beliefs of men do not admit that they deny reality. They say, "The question is not, 'Is there reality?' but What is it?' and 'How shall we think about it?'" And they protest against the settlement of such questions dogmatically, or in any other way than by a process of critical investigation.

Moreover, it is to be remembered that a most important class of human perceptions — including general judgments, and among these axioms, or the principiated intuitions of necessary sequences do not, properly speaking, assert reality, but only hypothetical truth.

7. On the whole, PERCEPTIONALISM appears to be the best designation for a philosophy which teaches that man's immediate or intuitive convictions are never mistaken, and that, under certain conditions and limitations, even his inferential conclusions may be relied upon. For us, this name defines a system of doctrines to which scientific method leads, and which, we believe, is destined to be generally accepted by thinking men. At the same time we are far from saying that the doctrines of Perceptionalism have reached perfection or completion; that would be too great a claim. We assert only that many leading positions have been established, and that the future of this system is assured beyond a peradventure.

Some learned professors condemn this confidence of ours as that of "a rustic philosopher who has never adequately studied the deeper phases of the cognitive problem"; and many others regard a system which prefers the views of the vulgar to those of illustrious theorizers to be of very dubious value. It must even be acknowledged that a certain presumption against our philosophy is natural and reasonable. We trust, however, that we shall not be excluded from a candid and attentive hearing while stating some doctrines in the connected assertion of which Perceptionalism mayas we think not only claim to be a

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system, but also challenge comparison with other systems. shall simply state these doctrines, without discussing them at any length.

8. First of all, we need scarcely say that Perceptionalism agrees with assertive, and differs from sceptical, systems in holding that there is such a thing as knowledge, and that some things are self-evident, or immediately cognizable. For, as Aristotle says, it is folly to seek proof for everything. If there be knowledge at all if we have absolute and well-founded conviction about anything-some knowledge must be immediate, or intuitive"; and other knowledge must be consequent upon that. Therefore earnest thinkers seldom ask, "Is there knowledge?" but "What is knowledge?" and also, "How do we know?" and, "What do we know?"

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9. Again, Perceptionalism teaches that cognition and, in particular, cognition by the senses is an extremely different thing from sensation. Cognition is an intellectual operation; sensation is a feeling a psychical commotion produced by the action of the nerves upon the spirit. Sense-perception is conditioned on sensation because it involves a cognition of the sensation, but it does not include the sensation. The cognition of the sensation, but not the sensation itself, is an element in sense-perception. In order to perceive the acidity of a lemon, this juicy fruit must be applied to the tongue so as to produce a specific feeling. Thereupon - and in one and the same act we perceive the sensation and its causal correlative.

The thought, or conception, of a sensation should not be identified with the sensation. The thought of the feeling of sourness, or of the feeling of hunger or thirst, or heat or cold, or hardness or softness, is a different thing from that feeling; so, likewise, the cognition of a sensation is not the sensation. Therefore, the act of sense-perception does not include the sensation, but only the cognition of it, together with that of its cause.

are so

Some corporeal sensibilities. especially the visual delicate and so intellectual in their use that their character as feelings is eclipsed by their service as the instruments of perception; yet, even in such cases, we distinguish the feeling

from our cognition of it. For example, the pleasure derived from certain sensations of color arises from feeling rather than from perception.

But if thought and sensation are things radically different, then the teachings of Sensationalism must be rejected; for this doctrine affirms that cognition, memory, conception, imagination, and intellectual activity of every kind, are either bodily feelings or the reproduction and refinement of such feelings. Not only so, we must reject also that more specious theory which speaks of "the sensational elements of knowledge," and according to which sense-perception is the combined action of the reason and the sensibility. The error involved in this For no

theory is double, and is the beginning of further error. one can rightly explain sense-perception if he do not see both that sensation is not, and that the cognition of the sensation is, a constituent part of the perception; and no one can correctly understand the nature of thought in general who fails to see that sense-perception, though conditioned on sensation, is wholly intellectual, and contains no sensational element whatever.

10. In the next place, Perceptionalism distinctly recognizes that mode of cognition which we have called concomitant perception. Our bodily parts and things in contact with them become known to us in sense-perception, and this originates our knowledge of material substances and qualities. Consciousness reveals the soul and its powers in various states and operations; and thus our acquaintance with the spiritual world begins. By concomitant perception we learn of things which are less directly, though not less immediately, perceived than are the objects of sense-perception and consciousness. For example,

the relations of both material and spiritual things, and those portions of space and time which are immediately related to one's body and one's soul, are perceived concomitantly.

Neither this mode of perception nor the objects of it can be properly recognized by those who hold that sense-perception and consciousness are the only modes of immediate cognition, and who confine the former of these to things that can be touched or felt, and the latter to the experiences of one's own