preserve amity between the soldiery and the Spaniards. Besides, as in Gallicia, and the north of Spain, there is more specie than real property, our soldiers were frequently incensed at finding that the offer of a dollar would not induce a peasant to part with a morsel of rusty bacon, a few garlic sausages, or a bit of bread, which often, in fact, were not intrinsically worth one-third of the sum. On arriving of an evening at their villages, after a most fatiguing march-wet to the skin, yet expiring with thirst, these unfeeling mortals often refused, when requested by our men, to run to the adjoining fountain for a pitcher of water, or to procure a few heath-roots to make a fire. Hence frequent bickerings ensued, and sometimes a few blows, which the Spaniards generally deserved. That the breast of the British soldier is incapable of wanton cruelty, and is warmed by the best affections, I could convince you by several anecdotes; but you may judge of his character by the following:

At the battle of Vimiera, our men who belonged to the pickets, and who had fallen down wounded, were passed over by the French in their advance, but were inhumanly stabbed by them in the limbs or trunk afterwards. How did the British behave towards them under the same circumstances? Their first act, on coming up with a wounded Frenchman, was to unsling the canteen from

their shoulders, and pour a portion of its contents into his quivering lips. This happened in innumerable instances. I will then go on and ask, what such men may effect, if properly managed and ably led on?Do you not recognize in them the real descendants of that handful of brave men who, conducted by a Black Prince, in two succeeding summers chased, from shore to shore of their extensive realm, the forefathers of the myrmidons who are now ravaging and depopulating Europe? Can you have any difficulty in believing that our army might soon, with a little management, be made equal to that of vain-glorious France? It is already equal, and more than equal, in every thing but numbers. Consider the facility with which, upon all occasions, we vanquish the foe when not absolutely overpowered by numbers.

Our battalion-officers are at present, and have long been esteemed the best in Europe. Our artillery is at length much superior to that of France; and inferior as our com missariat must always be to that of a continental army, yet, with a little attention, it might soon be rendered nearly as effective. As to the French generals of the present day, they are mostly ignorant and uneducated men, and in every respect inferior to the generals of the English army. How then, you will naturally ask, has it happened that they' have overrun the greater part of Europe? Partly from

the general corruption of their opponents, and their weak, bigoted policy; but chiefly from the force of opinion, which has done more for them than all other causes. The opinion of every nation, our own alone excepted, seems to be, that the French, especially with Bonaparte at their head, are invincible. And I must add that, by the most minute attention to geographical and topographical details, they have acquired a method of combining a series of complicated movements with a degree of mathematical certainty a thing never before attempted. With each corps d'armee are two or three men, named imperial geographers, who, with the largest and best maps of Europe under their eyes, direct the march of every detachment, and compute the half hours, nay minutes, which will be necessary to effect each movement.

Hence their attacks are characterized by a simultaneous impulse and rapidity which, at first sight, appears astonishing. How much have we not lost from a defect in this species of knowledge. Consider the failure of our first attempt on Seringapatam, and our late march to attack. Buenos Ayres.

Nay, during our late retreat in Spain, should it not have been known that it was impossible for the enemy to get between us and the sea by any lateral road on our left,

and that before he could come round our right, he must have beaten and dispersed Generals Crawford and Alten's brigade, and the Marquis de la Romana's army? Sir John Moore, it is presumed, would not have retreated so rapidly through the strongest country in Europe, had it not been from a defect of knowledge such as that of which I speak.

As to the force of opinion, already mentioned, every day shows us more and more its paralysing effects. Let the modern Alexander make but a promise, we already begin to believe it half accomplished. If he should say, "I will crown Berthier at Constantinople, and place my eagles on the minarets of Jerusalem, before the end of August;" immediately half the newspapers of Europe will say, Alas! its all over with Turkey and Syria!" But it is time to awaken from this sort of lethargy, and make use of common sense.

Let Austria say to her soldiers, Nobility shall no longer be necessary to qualify my people for becoming officers; fight with courage and energy, for the contest is no longer for me solely, but for your country and yourselves."

Let Spain dismiss her miserable Juntas, and say to