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inhabitants to pass over, and which may be very receding from my duty: And conscious that I an detrimental in case of any invasion or otheround to consider the subject of a confederation emergency, and hope that due attention may be had of the United States, upon the broad basis of equa!in remedying this evil.

IV. We return our thanks to his honor the chief justice, for his excellent and patriotic charge delivered at the opening of this sessions, and beg the same, with our presentments, may be forthwith printed and published.

Edward Lightwood, foreman, [L. S.]
Philip Tidyman,
[L. s.]
[L. S.]

John Webb,

John Creighton,

[L. S.]

Henry Samwuyes,

[L. S.]

John Lyon,

[L. S.]

Samuel Legare,

[L. S.]

Josiah Bonneau,

[L. S.]

Samuel Dunlap,

John Rivers,

[L. S.]

Robert Murrell, jun.

[L. S.]

James Witter, jun.

[L S.]

William Royall,

Benjamin Edings,

[L. S.]

[L. S.]
[L. S.]

ity, I shall endeavor to discharge this obligation, first, by viewing the plan before us, with liberality, and with that decency and respect, due to the high authority from which it is derived; and then, by taking the liberty of throwing out my ideas of such terms, as in my opinion are desirable, attainable, and likely to forin a beneficial confederation.

The best writers upon government, agree in this as a political truth; that were the liberties of the people are to be preserved, the legislative and executive should ever be separate and distinct; and that the first should consist of parts mutually forming a check upon each other. The consuls, senate and people, constituted such a government in Rome: The king, lords and commons, erected such a gor. ernment in Britain. The first, one of the best of antiquity-the last, the most perfect system, the wit of man ever devised: But both, as it is the case with all things temporal, lost their capability of ac tion, and changed their very nature.

We are about to establish a confederated goJudge Drayton's Speech. vernment which I religiously hope will last for The speech of the hon. William Henry Drayton, esq. agrs. And, I must be pardoned when I say, that chief justice of South Carolina, delivered on the this government does not appear likely to be form. twentieth January, 1778, in the general assemblyresolved into the committee of the whole, upon the ed upon those principles, which the wisest men articles of the confederation of the United States have deemed, and which long and invariable exof America. perience prove, to be the most secure defences to Mr. CHAIRMAN—A plan of a confederation of liberty. The congress seem to have lost sight of the United States of America, is at length by con- this wise mode of government: At least it is cergress, given to the continent: A subject of as high tain, that they have rejected it. I lament their de. importance as can be presented to their attention. cision: I have apprehensions for the consequences. Upon the wise formation of this, their independen-Into their own hands, they appear inclined to ascy, glory and happiness ultimately depend. The sume almost all the important powers of govern. plan is delivered abroad for private and public in- ment. The second article speaks of the sovereignformation: It is sent to us for consideration. Sir, ty of the respective states, but by the time we ar my mind labors under the load that is thus thrown rive at the last, scarce the shadow of sovereignupon it.--Millions are to experience the effects of ty remains to any. "No two or more States shall the judgment of those few, whom the laws per- enter into any treaty," but by consent of congress mit to think and to act for them in this grand bu- ..."nor shall any body of forces be kept up by siness. Millions-posterity innumerable, will bless any state, in time of peace, except such number or curse our conduct!-Their happiness or misery only," as congress shall deem requisite..."no vesdepend upon us-their fate is now in our hands! sels of war, shall be kept up in time of peace by 1 almost tremble, while I assist in holding the im- any state, except such number only," as congress portant balance!-But sir, the great disposer of sball deem necessary..."nor shall any state grant all things, has placed us in this important period, commissions to any ships or vessels of war, except pregnant with vast events. He has called us forth it be after a declaration of war by," Congressto legislate for the new world; and to endeavor and, these are great and humiliating restrictions to bind the various people of it, in durable bands upon their sovereignty. It is of necessity, that the of friendship and union. We must obey: and 1 sovereignty of the states should be restricte – but trust we shall obey, with courage and integrity I would do this with a gentle hand. Caunot a good Actuated by these principles, 1 am incapable of confederation be had, without these humiliating

restrictions? I think it may. However, independ consider the subsequent proviso, worded in these ent of the settlement of this point; the two last most peremptory terms, that "no treaty of com. restrictions require another observation. From merce shall be made whereby the legislative power the first of them, it ought to be presumed, that up- of the respective states shall be restrained from im. on a vacancy in any of the vessels of war, kept up posing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their by any state in time of peace by the permission of own people are subject to, or from prohibiting the congress, the state to which they belong shall in exportation or importation of any species of goods time of peace, be at liberty to issue a new com- or commodities whatsoever." I know, that the rule mission: But if this is to be presumed, the senti- of construction in law, is capable of warranting ment ought to have been precisely expressed; for it is the meaning I have extended to the first clause, obvious, a doubt upon this matter, may arise from and of giving efficacy to both: But then it.must, the restriction, that no state shall grant commis. destroy the positive terins in the second, qualifying sions to any ships or vessels of war, except it be af by giving them an operation only respecting treater a declaration of war. These clauses, if we ties of commerce, which shall be made exclusive and give due efficacy to the signification of words, re-independent of the foreign stipulations of congress ally clash--at least displaying an ambiguity, they in treaties already proposed. And unless this rule require a rule of construction, that must destroy takes place, the first clause is absolutely in effect the peremptoriness of words. A rule which ought repealed, by that which is subsequent. We expenot to be admitted into an instrument of this kind; rimentally know, that men will not always admit for it should be maturely considered; and it may that to be reason, which really is so; and that where be precisely worded, without the formality in a there is a doubt, they will obstinately contend for, statute law. and persist in opposite constructions. Those two clauses will undoubtedly admit of contention; and the least consequence that can arise, will be, either that the first clause must be considered as repealed, or the matural import of the positive terms in the last must be destroyed, and qualified. And independent of these disagreeable alternatives, the last clause appears to be an intolerable clog to foreign negociation....I could wish here to finish particularizing matter of doub:: but it is necessary to select one instance more, and then I will shew the

There seems to be a dangerous inaccuracy in that part of the sixth article, prohibiting the states respectively from entering into any conference with any king, prince or state. I presume this ought to be understood, to respect a foreign state only: But it may be insisted upon, that the prohibition includes even the United States. And why should not two or more of these have any conference? would have the doubt absolutely destroyed.

main tendency of these objections.

In the fourth section of the ninth article, congress is vested with the power of "regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not

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The third section of the article now under my observation, declares, that "no state shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties, entered into by congress with any king, prince or state, in pursuance of any members of any of the states, provided that the treaties already proposed by congress to the courts of France and Spain:" And I must contrast this, be not infringed or violated." I much approve legislative right of any state within its own limits, with the provision in the ninth article, "that no trea ty of commerce shall be made whereby the legis. the grant, but I confess I do not un lers and the grant and proviso combmed. For I cannot conceive lative power of the respective states shall be rein what manner the legislative right of a stats strained from imposing such imposts and duties within its own limits, can be infringed, by an act on foreigners, as their own people are subject to, of congress relative to Indians not members of any or from prohibiting the exportation or impor state; and therefore not within the limits of any so as tation of any species of goods or commodities to be subject to the operation of its legislative right. whatsoever."....I am of opinion, we are to understand from the first of these clauses, that no It is of no moment with me, whether the doubts state shall lay any imposts or duties, which may inter. have raised, are deemed obvious and important, fere with the present foreign stipulations of con or rather refined and of little consequence. Grau, gress, in treaties already proposed; and that such and it must be admitted, that they have the ap. stipulations, free of such interference, may be con pearance of doubts-I ask no more. The ho cluded by treaty: But this latter meaning, is not and interest of America require, that their grand expressed. Indeed a great doubt arises, whether act of confederation, should be a noble monun.ent, this be the true intent of that clause, when we free, as far as human wisdom can enable it to se

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from defect and flaw: Every thing unnecessary, through which the free white inhabitants of that should be critically removed...every appearance of state are by law entitled This article also prodoubt, should be carefully eradicated out of it. It vides for the "removal of property imported into is not to be thought, but that the present congress any state;" but the removal of property acquired clearly understand the confederation. But other in it, into that "of which the owner is an inhabicongresses will look for the spirit of the law. This tant," is neglected. Has not the owner an equal "will then be the result of their good or bad logic; right to enjoy at bome, the last kind of property as and this will depend on their good or bad digestion; the first? The provision in behalf of the congress, on the violence of their passions; on the rank and or a state, is manifestly in contradistinction, to condition of the partics, or on their connections that in favor of a private owner. with congress; and on all those little circumstances, The fifth article directs, that delegates shall be which change the appearance of objects in the annually appointed to meet in congress, on the Auctuating mind of man." Thus thought the illus-first Monday in November; and this is a matter retrious marquis Beccaria, of Milan, a sublime phi-quiring particular attention. Our climate instructs Josopher, reasoning on the interpretation of laws.— I must be permitted to continue his ideas, yet a little further upon this subject--they are so exacte ly in point. He says, "there is nothing more dangerous than the common axiom: The spirit of the laws is to be considered. To adopt it, is to give way to the torrent of opinions." "When the code of laws is once fixed, it should be observed in the literal sense." "When the rule of right which ought to direct the actions of the philosopher, as well as the ignorant, is a matter of controversy, not of fact, the people are slaves to the magis

us, that the general assembly should make their long and important session in winter; and but a short one in summer, rather to finish than begin even common business. Indeed this is assented to by the members, and of course but few, and those too, in the vicinity of Charleston, attend the summer sitting, which cannot even with prudence be had between the months of July and November. When then, sir, are the delegates to be elected for the November congress? Are they to be chosen in the summer session; and in a very thin house of course? Congress cannot intend this—our country cannot admit of it; because such delegates, a representation of the highest nature, should ever be chosen in a full house, as the most obvious sign that they are the real delegates of the people. Nor can it be expected, they should be chosen in January, the time, which the climate and local circumstances point out, as the most proper for be ginning our long and important session. For this would be reducing us to the necessity of appointing delegates, almost twelve months before they

trates."Is it not the intention of the confederation, that the people shall be free?--Let it then be adapted to the meanest capacity---let the rule of right be not matter of controversy, but of fact---let the confederation be understood according to that strict rule by which we understand penal laws. The confederation is of at least as much importance to America, as penal laws are in a small society-safety to the people is the object of both. In a word, the spirit of laws, lays down this maxim, that in republics, the very nature of the constituwere to serve a measure neither necessary, nor tion requires the judges to follow the letter of the law. to be admitted, if we can avoid it, Those months The fourth articles declares, "that the free in- comprehend an inclement summer and autumn; and habitants of each of these states, paupers, vaga- death or sickness may destroy the intended reprebonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall sentation: In which case the state may not, by the be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free united voice of the people, be represented in concitizens in the several states:" A position, in my gress from the beginning of November to the midopinion, absolutely inadmissible. Would the peo- dle of February—an event, that might be of fatal ple of Massachusetts, have the free Negroes of consequences. I shall therefore be very glad to see, Carolina, eligible to their general court? Can it either the month of February, March or April sub. be intended, that the free inhabitants of one state, stituted instead of November. These reasons will alshall have power to go into another, there to vote so support me, in objecting to that part of the same for representatives in the legislature?-And yet article, relative to the recal of delegates, within their these things are clearly included in that clause. 1 year. A thin house may cast an unmerited censure think there ought to be no doubt, but that the upon a worthy delegate. I do not wish to see such free inhabitants should be white, and that such of a power existing. Not that I expect if there was one state, should be entitled to the privileges and such, that it would be abused, but we ought, as immunities in another, only by the same means far as we can, to guard against the possible abuse

of power. And, in addition to these principal ob-¡pected, that a general assessment will ascertain, jections against the fifth article, I must, add, that the true value? More or less than this, ought not I think it is utterly impolitic, to exclude a mem-to be rated: In the first case, the state would be ber of congress from being nominated to a commis-injured-in the last, the other states would be desion under the United States: The clause upon frauded; and that course should be taken, which this subject is rather dark. Many a delegate, may seems most likely to avoid this Sylla and Charyb. be able to render much more important service to dis. All movements in politics, as in mechanics, the confederacy, in such a station, than in congress are difficult and hazardous in proportion to their -the occasion of such service may be pressing-complexedness. Now, in order to raise the geneas fit a person out of congress may not then be ral aid, a complex motion of government is necesknown-a member of congress may be most capa-sary. First, to assess the value of the land-then ble of the station, because possessed of the secrets to ascertain the sum to arise from it-and then, to of congress-and shall the service of such a man raise the sum, by a variety of taxes, according to be lost to the confederacy, merely because he is a the discretion of the legislature. Is such a commember of congress? The answer is obvious I think plicated motion to raise the aid desirable, especial--No, but let his acceptance of the commission va-ly when it cannot possibly be done with equality cate his seat, and render him incapable of a re- to the several states; and also, when another prinelection during the time he holds it. ciple is at hand, perfectly simple in its nature, just and equal in its operation, and is the allowed criI have already said, the sovereignty of the states terion to ascertain the proportion that is desired? should be restricted with a gentle hand: I now I have been given to understand, that a capitation add it ought to be restricted, only in cases of absothroughout the United States, was in contempla. lute necessity.---What absolute necessity is there, tion of congress; and I have ever understood from the that congress should have the power of causing most approved writers upon this subject, that the the value of all granted land, to be “estimated actrue riches and strength of a state were to be rated cording to such mode, as they shall from time to in proportion to the number of people sustained in direct?" Congress should have no power, but what it. I would then have this, the criterion of the is clearly defined in the nature of its operation.--public aid from each state. It is, in my humble But I am absolutely against the position, that the opinion, in every respect preferable to the other. public aids shall be raised by the several states, The criterion may be ascertained, and the tax in proportion to the value of their granted lands, raised by one act of government. Such a criterion buildings and improvements. At the first blush and mode of taxation, has long been in use in some of this proposition, nothing seems more equitable: parts of this continent; and it is best, under a new But viewing the subject with more attention, I government, to continue customs in use under the think I see, that it is unequal, injurious and impoliold, as long as they are salutary and practicabletic. It is unequal, because it seems to be in vain this is the north point in my political compass. If to expect, that such lands, &c. will be equally aswe can attach the people, by exempting them from sessed in their true value. To have any chance of old impositions, such as quit rents in particular, it doing this, the assessors must actually know every is the soundest policy to do so; for this interests acre; and the multitude of them must have an equal them in support of the new establishment: But we judgment: But can either be even hoped for? Do cannot be too cautious in trying projects of a conwe not positively know, that this mode of assesstrary nature. I said, the capitation criterion of ment does not answer the end---an equal and just proportion, was in every respect preferable to the assessment of the value? The assessors in Charlesland assessment: I now add, that it will be an imton, are men of knowledge, diligence and integrity, and is it not notorious, that the landed property inhabitants, to be taken in order to rate the mili portant check upon the numeration of the white in Charleston, although minutely known, and with. tary quota of each state; and this is a very material in a small circle is unequally valued? Shall we, reason in support of the capitation criterion-we with our reason in full vigor, wish to extend to cannot well have too many proofs, to establish the an immense circle, a principle that we are sensitrue number of white inhabitants. ble fails us even in a small one? Is there any cer. tain criterion of value? Does not value altogether depend on opinion, imagination, caprice? Hence or more states seems full of delay, and therefore it is, that we see the ideas of men upon this mat- it ought to be amended. The fifth article provides, ter, infinitely wide. How then can it be ex-that the representation of each state, shall not be

The mode of trial of disputes between any two

less than two delegates: But the mode of trial spe to each of the quotas; and they rank with reg i. cifies, that in a certain case, "congress shall name mental officers. I cannot see the shadow of a three persons out of each of the United States, from good reason, why the states should not have the whom the judges shall be selected. Now, a state appointment of all officers necessary to complete may be represented by only two delegates, and their respective quotas. Their honor, interest and then, the trial cannot be had, and considering the safety arc immediately and primarily effected, by expense of paying delegates-the inconvenience of the proper formation and regulation of their quotheir attendance upon congress at a distance from tas. Their respective spheres of action, being their private affairs, and from constant experience, within a very small circle, in comparison of that, a bare representation is oftener to be expected, in which the congress preside; they must of cons ethan a supernumerary one. If it is meant, the quence be enabled to view objects at a nearer disthree shall be taken from the people at large, [tance-to penetrate into the characters and abiliwhich I will not imagine to be the case, a court ties of candidates, and to make a proper choice may be picked; and therefore, that plan ought not with more accuracy and precision, than congress to be heard of.-In this case, I would prefer judges can be supposed to do. They will have enough during good behavior, eminent for their knowledge upon their hands, in actuating the great machine in the law of nations; and who should be obliged of government. Their attention necessarily ento assign at large, the reasons upon which they gaged in general and important affairs, ought not ground their decrees. to be permitted to be drawn off, by those inferior The congress would be vested with the sole and objects which can more minutely and therefore betexclusive right and power of regulating the alloy ter be examined by the respective states. This and value of coin struck by the authority of the re- ought to be a fundamental maxim in the confedespective states; and of fixing the standard of rated policy. There is justice in it; and I will be weights and measures throughout the U. States: bold to say, it arises from principles of true wisBut I see no necessity for such delegation. To re- dom. It will display a confidence on the part of gulate the alloy and value of coin is one of the congress in the several states; and this must most distinguishing prerogatives of sovereignty, be the grand basis of their independency and freenor can any of the united states part with it with-dom. We do not mean, unnecessarily to delegate out exposing itself to be drained of specie. Did any part of our sovereignty: We are willing to sawe not a few years ago, encrease the value of dol- crifice only such parts of it, as are necessary to lars and half johannesses, in order to retain those be sacrificed for the general safety. In short, we coins; and shall we now part with the very ability enter into this confederacy, on the same principle of retaining coin among us? The balance of trade only, that men enter into society.

may be against us, then remittances will be made But independent of this position, as a matter in coin, and our produce will be left upon our hands. of right, I will consider the claim upon the footIt is our business to endeavor to reverse the case, ing of common prudence and experience. Whenand I hope we shall, by refusing to vest the con-ever congress sit, there will be a number of pergress with a power that we have hitherto been able sons, especially from the nearer states, soliciting to exercise ourselves with advantage in a time of offices: They will form acquaintances with the necessity. Nor do I see any reason for our resign-members; and we know the common effect of such ing the power of fixing the standard of our weights connections. In consequence, congress may apand measures. The states are very competent to point even an unexceptionable person, as to kis this business. Let the weights and measures be character and capacity, to a post in a state in which ever so variable in the several states, the price of he has no connections, and of which he is not a commodities will ever be adequate to the varia tion in the respective markets.

member: This may occasion an envy against the officer, even to the detriment of the public service; and a displeasure against congress, for having made, as it may be deemed, an appointment injurious to those individuals of that state, who were in every respect capable of the office, and whom

Congress desire to be invested with the "appointing all officers in the land forces, excepting regimental officers." And far from seeing any ab solute necessity for their having such a power, can see no degree of common propriety to war- the public would wish to see in it. Or congress rant the claim. The several states are to raise may be induced to appoint a member of the state, the regiments composing the land forces. Deputy but such a one as the people never would have staff officers in particular are absolutely necessary chosen, because they know him to be unequal to

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