whether the tyranny of revolutionary France shall terminate its destructive career in the temporary sufferings of the nations now subject to its dominion; whether it shall exhaust its force upon the persons and properties of the present generation in the temporary exactions of conquest; or, whether that dominion shall extend itself over the human mind in all countries and in all ages; whether it shall repeal and trample in the dust all the sanctions of morals and policy, which the wisdom of ages has ripened into universal law, for universal security and peace.

Great Britain alone can answer this question for the world: she alone can pronounce, whether the injustice of France shall be received as a warrant for universal injustice, or whether, standing, as we do, upon this proud eminence, surrounded by that impregnable moat with which the Divine Providence has fortified this island, we can say, as the instrument of that Providence, to the portentous evils which so remarkably characterize this unexampled period, "THUS FAR SHALL YE ADVANCE, AND NO FARTHER."

My Lords, although this momentous subject bas been repeatedly, and in various shapes,

presented for your consideration, I am sorry to be obliged to observe, that it has not as yet been received by his Majesty's Ministers in such a manner, as either the House or the public, but, above all, as other nations, had a right to expect from a British Parliament. The breach of the law of nations by Ministers has been put aside by irrelevant recriminations upon supposed breaches of the same law by others; and the facts, from the establishment of which the legal argument could alone be brought to a decision, have been put aside by the previous question.

It has therefore been thought right to prepare the Resolutions, which I am presently to propose to you, and to frame them in such a manner as to embrace the whole subject: they therefore declare the right of neutral nations to the commerce secured to them by the general law of the civilized world, and by the particular laws and statutes of this realm; they deny the legality of the Order of Council of the 11th of November, and the others dependent upon it, as being a gross violation of both, and they maintain these propositions, not in loose and general terms, so as to lead again to the shelter of a desultory debate, but, in language

most technically precise, they point out the law as it exists, and mark all the departures from it which they condemn.

When the matter is therefore brought to this direct issue-i. e. whether the late Orders in Council are justified by, or contrary to, the law of nations, and the law of the land, and when, as a Peer of the realm, I arraign them in this great public council as a violation of both, can it possibly be any answer to such charges, that a former Administration of the King's Government was guilty of a similar violation? Can we, sitting here as statesmen representing the whole British people, so abuse their interests

and insult their feelings in such distressing and perilous times?

If indeed the breach of the law had been established or admitted, and the question before us were the degree of blame imputable to Ministers for having so mistaken the public interests and the law, it might deserve consideration whether they had been led into such error by the conduct of their predecessors, and the faith reposed in their administration. But when the question is thus brought to a PRECISE LEGAL ISSUE, in which Ministers and their predecessors are not the contending parties: but

where the rights of the whole British empire, and of all nations, are to be settled by Parliament, every man, I should think, must admit how inadmissible, or rather how perfectly frivolous, such an argument must be. If, for instance, the question were, what punishment I, who have the honour of addressing your Lordships, should receive from a court of justice, whose judgment was discretionary, for an offence against the law, of which I had been convicted, every topic would undoubtedly be relevant to shew that my mind was innocent, and that I had offended from ignorance of my duty but if the question only were, whether the law had or had not been broken, would it be relevant that I had taken the advice of the ablest counsel, who had misled me, or that I had even relied upon a judicial decision, which had afterwards been determined to be erroneous? I must therefore earnestly entreat your Lordships to entertain the question like statesmen, in a case where the interests of your country and of the world are so deeply involved in the decision. If the Resolutions, which I am about to submit to your Lordships, are unfounded or erroneous, I shall most humbly and sincerely defer to the judgment of the

House which rejects them; but if, as formerly, you fly altogether from the question, I shall then say, and the world will say with me, that no answer could be given to them.

I should enter upon the subject, my Lords, with no satisfaction, if I believed the evils of these Orders in Council to be irretrievable. I hope it is not my temper to be malignant; I think, indeed, that if I were accused before your Lordships of any act, which could only be ascribed to such a base and unworthy disposition, you would not very willingly condemn me. What satisfaction could I have in merely making out, that several noble persons had involved their country in difficulties that were irrecoverable? What satisfaction could I have in wounding and alienating the minds of those, whom upon other accounts. I esteem, and whose regard I must wish to cultivate in private life? My Lords, I disavow most solemnly any such motive or purpose: I am convinced that it is not too late to retrace the false steps that have been taken; and if it can be shewn, by any proceeding directed to such object, that the late Ministers have also violated the law of nations, do not let the one breach of them be justified by the other:

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