probably a vegetable product: this gives the hypothetical and probable inference that the stone in question is of vegetable origin. The absoluteness of conviction ascribed to hypothetical argument belongs to it only accidentally, and is assumed in order that discussions respecting the dependence of conclusions on premises may not be complicated with questions touching degrees of probability. But we can easily fashion for ourselves probable hypothetical inferences. There is, therefore, no difference between actualistic and hypothetical inferences, as to the construction of thought employed, or as to the degree of confidence produced by them. Degrees of probability are more frequently considered in actualistic reasoning; and the consequence, or necessity of co-existence, is commonly more emphasized in hypothetical inference. In actualistic conclusions the interest of the mind tends to leave the consequence and gather upon the consequent. But these differences are not essential or necessary. The true It is, however, a most important difference that, in point of dif- actualistic inference, the antecedent is known or beference. lieved actually to exist, and that the consequence and consequent are therefore asserted actually to exist; while no such belief or assertion is found in hypothetical inference. This latter mode of conviction occurs without any belief in the actual existence of its objects, and simply in connection with a special exercise of thought; for the antecedent of a hypothetical inference is only supposed to exist, or thought of as existing, and the consequence and consequent are conceived of as existing without any belief in their actual existence. A peculiar able mode of At the same time it is clear that a certain belief or and undefin- confidence is exercised, in hypothetical inference, in confidence. connection with the conception of the consequence All belief in and consequent as existing. This belief is expressed by saying that the consequent would exist; and it is evident that hypothetical inference is as much distinguished by the presence of this mode of belief as it is by the absence of the other. some sense concerns existence. Here is the essential or internal difference between actualistic and hypothetical inferences, considered as modes of intellectual conviction. It lies in the difference of the modes of confidence with which they accept the same thought, that is, the thought of the consequent and of its necessary co-existence. This difference is an ultimate fact in mental science. It reveals two kinds of belief or confidence, similar in nature, yet also radically diverse. For hypothetical conviction cannot be explained as a special development of actualistic confidence: it is something simple, peculiar, and incapable of definition, save through its relations, of which those to actualistic belief are the most important. It is distinguished from this latter belief by reason of its being founded on merely supposed antecedents; and it is also provisional for, and preparatory to, actualistic inference. For, so soon as belief in the reality of the antecedent takes the place of mere supposition, bypothetical conviction disappears, and is replaced by actualistic. As all the interest and importance of hypothetical inference lies in its being ministerial to the inference of fact from fact, we see how subordinate it is to actualistic belief. Evidently, also, the whole doctrine of hypothetical conviction confirms the more primary doctrine of actualistic knowledge and belief, and proves that belief always, in some sense, concerns existence. CHAPTER XVII. EVIDENCE. 1. In the primary sense, that only is knowledge or belief which is conviction concerning what is, or is held to be, actual fact. Whatever other mental states go under these names are so called because they partly partake of the nature of true knowledge or belief, or are preparations for its exercise. We have seen how the definition of actualistic belief, as confidence in actual existence, enables us to understand the nature of secondary forms of belief and knowledge, and especially that of hypothetical conviction; this last being closely related to the inferential form of actualistic belief. We have now further to remark that a statement of the causes of actualistic belief will prepare us to understand the origin of every mode of belief and knowledge. Since even those secondary mental states which are called belief and knowledge, without strictly being so, presuppose belief as to actuality, and that knowledge of fact which all belief strives to be, realities may be considered the first condition of all knowledge and belief whatever; they certainly are the immediate condition of all true knowledge. The efficient cause of be lief is wholly in the mind. But the existence of objects, though a condition of belief, exerts no efficiency in the production of it; nor, indeed, can belief be accounted for by any potency outside of the mind. The producing cause lies wholly within; and it may be regarded as partly remote and partly immediate. The remote cause lies in the constitution of the soul as having innate and immanent powers of perception and of judgment; the immediate is the action of these powers. The special nature of a power is shown only in its action or operation; and that of the action only in the phenomena. that is, the changes and states - immediately produced by it. For this reason, as we have already considered belief as a phenomenon, we have therein considered it also as a specific power and as a specific operation. We need not discuss further the efficiency producing belief. Evidence is the conditional cause of conviction. But a condition devoid of efficiency is sometimes called a cause, when, not being involved in our conception of a phenomenon, it is regarded as the chief or only condition needful for its occurrence. Many other conditions may be as necessary to the event as that thus signalized, but they are regarded as already existing or as already secured, and so as no longer needful to be supplied. Thus the insufficiency of water might be assigned as the cause of the explosion of a boiler, though such insufficiency in itself has no power, and only leaves the way open for the excessive generation of steam. In such cases the efficient cause is supposed already to exist, and to be in readiness to act; the idea of it may be involved in the very conception of the phenomenon ; and the thought of the mind is principally directed to that condition, on the supply of which the effect takes place. In this way we come to regard a mere condition as if it exercised the power producing some result, when really it is only the occasion, or, at the most, the excitant, of the efficiency. Now such generally seems to be our use of language when we speak of the cause or causes of conviction, and when we define "evidence as that which naturally produces conviction. Blackstone says: "Evidence signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascertains the truth of the very fact, or point at issue, either on the one side or on the other." Strictly speaking, evidence has no efficiency, and is only the special condition, on the occurrence of which conviction takes place. This being understood, evidence may be defined as that which is immediately productive of belief. Probable The words of Blackstone might be taken to mean evidence. that nothing is evidence which does not remove all doubt as to the point at issue. But this is not intended. Evidence includes all that may be the ground of rational conviction as to alleged fact, whether the conviction produced be absolute and certain or merely probable. Whatever exists, exists certainly, and may be the object of absolute knowledge, and hence also may be perceived through that certain or perfect evidence which is the cause of such knowledge. But often, not from any difference in the degree of the reality of things, since whatever is real is perfectly real, but from something lacking in our means of knowing, we have to be content with evidence which is fit only to produce probable conviction. Frequently, too, we have to act upon such evidence. Now that which is partial or imperfect can be understood only by reference to the complete or perfect; therefore let us first study the nature of certain evidence, and after that we may consider probable evidence. The word fined. The word "fact" is commonly used to signify the "fact" de- actual existence, or non-existence, of anything considered as assertible of that thing. Factum originally meant that which has been done or made;" but as an accomplished result is a real thing, which it is not so long as it is merely purposed or contemplated, and since the question, Has the thing been effected? chiefly asks, Does it, as a result, exist? the term "fact" came to be applied to that which has an actual existence, whether it be the product of some agency or not. We say it is a fact that there is a moon, and another fact that there are mountains in the moon; and in this we set forth simply the existence of the moon and of the mountains in it. The essential point in every fact that which makes it a fact is the existence, and not the nature, of the object, although of course no object could exist without having a definite nature. Whenever anything exists, its existence is a fact, no matter what the thing may be. In like manner, when anything does not exist, we extend the term, and call the non-existence of it a fact. In short, this word signifies that which corresponds to, and is the object of, any proposition which is literally true. may therefore be employed to designate the object of literal knowledge, that is, of certain and well-founded belief as to the actual existence of things. The evidence of fact is of two kinds. Perception It Now this knowledge · - this absolute and correct actualistic belief, the knowledge of literal fact seems to arise from the connection of the soul, as a thinkand this connection is In the former case the soul, or, if we may so or cognition ing substance, with the fact; defined. either immediate or mediate. fact is either included in the life of the speak, exists in contact with that life. In the latter case the fact is perceived, not directly, but through the knowledge of another fact with which it is necessarily co-existent. These two modes of knowing may be distinguished as presentational and as inferential perception. Both are forms of judgment, when this latter term is used in the widest sense, covering every mode of forming convictions, and not in its stricter meaning, which includes only probable inference. Perception, in the broad signification now employed, is precisely the equivalent of cognition; so that, in actualistic belief, there are two kinds of judgments, first, perception or cognition, by which we perceive or cognize fact, either in itself or through other fact, and thus have knowledge; and secondly, judgment proper, which is the probable inference of fact from fact, and which originates belief proper, or probable conviction. With the latter we have nothing to do at present. Presentative and illative evidence. The evidence, in any case of presentational perception, is simply the fact itself, considered, of course, as immediately subject to the cognizance of the thinking being. Hence we say that the fact is self-evident. If one has a thought or a pain or a desire, what evidence has he of its existence save that it exists within the sphere of his immediate consciousness and notice? The fact as thus related is its own evidence; nor can we conceive of any other cause of immediate knowledge than the fact itself as immediately related to our power of cognition. On the other hand, the evidence in inferential perception is not the fact perceived, but some other fact or facts with which it is necessarily co-existent. Seeing a bird flying over a grove suddenly collapse and fall immediately upon the report of a fowling-piece, we perceive that some unseen sportsman is successfully practising his art. Comparing these two kinds of evidence together, we may name the first presentative, because, in a sense, it presents the existing object immediately to our perception. "Intuitional" might be a better term, had not "intuition" of late come to mean, not the immediate perception of fact, but only the immediate apprehension of necessitudinal, or ontological, relations and sequences. And the second kind of evidence may be named illative, because in a sense it brings the existence of an object not immediately cognizable within the compass of our perception. Presentative evi dence is originative, illative evidence is ap This radical distinction, which refers to the use or non-use of means in cognition, is allied to, and coincident with, two other distinctions. First, with reference to the thought, or the conceptions, of the mind, plicative, of presentative evidence may be called originative, bethought. cause our ideas of the things perceived originate in the very perception of them; while illative evidence may be termed applicative, since it merely enables us, according to certain rational methods, to apply conceptions or propositions which |