The affirm illustrated. If The prevailing opinion at present is that the intelative main- lect is capable of a simultaneous plurality of states or tained and activities; and this view agrees with experience. We undoubtedly can perform several actions at once. this be so, may not the ideas which cause them be simultaneous too? When we rub one hand upon the other, the sensations as well as the actions appear to exist together. When one looks at the branches of a tree, the boards of a fence, or even a group of persons, only metaphysical subtilty can suggest that they are not seen at once. The stress of thought may easily be concentrated on one of the objects; but so long as no special interest is excited, all are viewed alike. The perception of relations, also, requires a single comprehensive perception of the objects related. How could we form any idea of a relation if we did not at the same time think of the objects between which the relation may exist? Who could conceive of marriage without also having both husband and wife in mind? In like manner every sentence, with its subject, predicate, copula, and modifying words, must be considered as the expression of one complexity of ideas. We may, it is true, compose part of a sentence without having a definite conception of the remaining part; but it is also true that we could not even begin the construction of a sentence if we did not, from the first, have thoughts, more or less definite, of the plurality of objects involved, and of their mutual relations. When Cicero, in the commencement of his oration for Archias, said, "Si in me est ingenium, judices," he certainly understood well in what way he was about to continue and to terminate that long, graceful sentence, and had in view the several parts of it and their mutual connections. A simple experiment, illustrative of this point, can easily be tried by any one. Let him take some statement, the sense of which he fully comprehends, and let him think only one thought in it at a time. He will find that, in doing so, he loses also the meaning of the statement. For example, in the sentence "Cæsar conquered the Gauls," we may think of Cæsar, of conquest, and of the Gauls, separately; but we fail to possess ourselves of the assertion if we do not think all three thoughts together. Moreover, those mental products which we call complex ideas are composed of many constituents, each of them an idea by itself, but all of them existing simultaneously in composition. The vast majority of our thoughts are such combinations. Nor can we find any important difference between them and the collection of ideas contained in them, save this only, that the constituent ideas exist and adhere together. The analysis of any common conception · that, for instance, of a coin, a knife, a book, or a pen — will illustrate this remark. We think, therefore, that a belief in the co-existence of mental states is conformable with facts. And why should it not be so? A ball of iron may, at the same time, receive and transmit heat, be influenced by gravitation, attract the magnetic needle, move onward through the air, displace opposing obstacles, and perform many other functions. Why may not the soul, an infinitely more subtile substance, act in many ways at once? Indeed, to one exercising attentive consideration, the question arises whether the possible rapidity of the soul's successive movements be not surpassed in wonderfulness by the possible multitude of its co-existent activities. Attention At the same time we are far from saying that the distin- mind has the power of directing its attention equally guished from to many objects at once. Not every act of intellect is thought. accompanied with that special exercise of vigor which is commonly called attention. Hence the inquiry, whether we can attend to many things simultaneously, is to be distinguished from the inquiry, whether we can think of many things simultaneously. As a good sportsman can only bring down one or two or three birds at a time, though a whole covey may rise before him, so the mind, while many thoughts may be present to it, can address itself to the consideration only of a few. It is to be noticed, also, that a concentration of the power of thinking on one object sensibly withdraws it from other objects. While one looks carelessly upon his open hand, all the fingers may be seen distinctly; but if he attend particularly to a point or mark on one finger, the perception of the others is immediately weakened. In the case of complex ideas, in which a whole is formed out of several constituents, the full attention of the mind probably can be given to the conception in all its parts; generally, however, one element becomes specially prominent; and this appears to be always the case where the conception is made a subject of study. Every human mind has a certain limited amount of intellectual energy. This can be devoted almost entirely to one thought, leaving but a small residuum for division among other thoughts that may exist within one's consciousness; or if the energy be directed towards several objects, the share given to each is less in proportion to their number. We can conceive, however, of a mind of infinite energy, whose knowledge most perfectly and fully, and at the same instant of time, comprehends every object, and every part of every object, in the wide universe. CHAPTER X. THE OBJECTIVITY OF THOUGHT. 1. THE chief importance of thought does not arise from its character as a mental experience, but from the fact that it is the instrument of knowledge, the agency by which the soul is brought into conscious relations with the universe. The whole wonderful life of man as a spiritual being originates from thought; and this, too, simply because thought brings the soul into connection with being in its various forms. It is of the very nature of thought to have that peculiar relation to existence which is indicated in saying that thought is the reflex of existence: every thought, however feeble, is thus related to some being, or form of being, which is, therefore, styled the object of the thought. That essential characteristic of thought by reason of which it is correspondent to existence, may be called the objectivity of thought. The terms "being" ence." 66 99 66 Being" and "existence" are terms exactly equivalent to each other in their proper and original use; and "exist- and, as such, they are employed in two different senses. Their abstract meaning is expressed when we speak of the being or existence of anything, or when we predicate being or existence of anything, saying, "It is," It exists," or, "It has being," "It has existence." Thus, if asked about the Emperor of China, we might say that we know that there is such a person, or that such a person exists. With this abstract sense of these terms we shall have more to do hereafter. Their other meaning is that which they have when employed concretely. They then signify, not the attribute of being or existence, but whatever possesses this attribute as having it; in other words, anything which exists. The human body is a material, and the human soul a spiritual, existence; and we speak of an existence and of existences, of a being and of beings, and, using the terms collectively, of existence in general, and of being in general. In this concrete sense the terms are employed both with a narrower and with a wider application. In the narrower, they signify any kind of substantial existence, whether spiritual or material. God, angels, men, mountains, seas, plains, are beings, or existences. But it is to be noticed that in this signification the term "being " is not used so freely as "existence" for every kind of substance; it is generally restricted to living beings. In the wider application, "being" and "existence" signify anything whatever that exists; and in this sense the word "existence is generally preferred to the word "being." Thus space, time, power, actions, changes, and relations, as well as material and spiritual substances, are existences; and all things whatever, taken collectively, constitute existence in general. Now, when we say that every thought has objectivity, and is related to some form of being or existence, we use these terms, not in their abstract, but in their concrete sense, and that, too, in this last and most unrestricted application; for there is no form of existence which does not find its reflex in a corresponding form of thought. The relation between 2. This relation between thought and the existence, or form of existence, to which it corresponds, is of a thought and objects of peculiar nature, and should be distinguished from all thought. other relations. It is not the relation of an effect to a cause; for the object of thought is wholly inactive, and the exercise of intelligence is the work of the mind itself. Neither is it that of the conditioned to the condition: existence is a condition of thought, in a certain sense; but the correspondence in question is a relation other than this. A mirror cannot form a reflection without an object, but the correspondence between reflection and object is distinguishable from the dependence of the former upon the latter. Again, the relation of thought and object is not that of similarity. Things which are utterly unlike may yet correspond. One part of an invention may correspond to another, as a key to a lock; an instrument may correspond to its use, as an oar to rowing; or a sign may correspond to the thing signified, as a printed to a spoken word. But this does not involve any similarity. The correspondence between thought and its objects is probably closer and more minute than any other correspondence; but so far as we can judge, there is no likeness between them. What resemblance can there be between hardness and the idea of hardness, sharpness and the idea of sharpness, weight and the idea of weight, solidity and the idea of solidity? What similarity is there between the Roman people, with their history of war and empire, and our knowledge of that people? Mind is so different from matter that we cannot suppose our conceptions of material things to be like the things themselves; and as for psychical objects, we know that our ideas of actions, desires, emotions, virtues, vices, weaknesses, and abilities have no likeness to these things. The only thought in which we can discover any similarity to its object is the thought of a thought, for in such a conception the original thought is repeated and incorporated. This likeness, however, is accidental. Moreover, it is insufficient to say that the relation between thought and its objects is one of correspondence. To say that food is useful to man does not express its peculiar mode of usefulness. So, in this case, the term “ correspondence" does not express the full essence of the matter; there is also a simple and indefinable peculiarity. At the same time the nature of the relation in question is well known and easily understood. When a merchant says he is thinking of some enterprise, we know what he means, and perceive the relation between the enterprise and his thought. We see, too, how this relation arises out of, and belongs to, the very nature of thought, and how it contributes to make thought a moving and impelling power. The terms We give the name "objectivity" to that character"objectivity" istic of thought which we regard as the most essential and "ob- and distinguishing, because we can find no other name jectuality." more appropriate. It may be said that the term is more properly applicable to that which is the object of thought than to thought itself. To this we reply that thought itself, as related to its object, is in a certain sense connected with it, and therefore is sometimes styled objective. For example, speaking of some idea of the imagination, we may say that although of subjective origin, it has in it, nevertheless, an objective reference. If authority be needed to justify our use of language, that of Sir William Hamilton may suffice. In his "Logic," distinguishing two inward experiences, knowledge and belief, he says: "The one is perspicuous and objective; the other is obscure and subjective." He says, also, that error often arises from the commutation of what is subjective with what is objective in thought." In these statements the term "objective" corresponds exactly with our objectivity. Could any better term be found, we would gladly use it. Here let us remark that it would be advantageous to distinguish, by our use of terms, between the character of thought as related to its object, and the character of any object, or part or quality of an object, as related to our thought of it. When it should be desirable to indicate the latter character unequivocally, we would suggest the use of the word objectuality." We might then say that thought, as such, has objectivity, but not objectuality; and that existences, as the objects of thought, have objectuality, but not objectivity. Our doctrine 66 In saying that thought always has objectivity as a specifically part of its essence, we do not mean to affirm, literstated. ally, that thought always has objects. We often |