but the word tree does not mean any thing in nature, diftinct from the various fpecies of trees, nor the word fruit any thing distinct from the various kinds of fruit. In the like manner, there are fuch perceptions as pleasure and pain; we all feel them, when by thofe words you mean to make a general expreffion for the parti cular pleasures and pains we have experienced; abftracted from which, they are mere founds, that have no reality in life, but lefs than fick mens dreams.

From what has been obferved, it is obvious that it can no more be faid with propriety or truth, that pleasures and pains are the firft fprings and movers of human action, when we have not a tacit reference to the particular fpecies of pleasures and pains, than it can be faid, that we make a fire of wood in general, without any particular species of wood and as it is neither self-love, nor a love of pleasure, makes an infant eat when he is hungry, or drink when he is thirsty, but the appetites; by looking clofely into the motives of human actions, we shall find thofe univerfal paffions, that make fuch a parade in modern philofophy, wholly ufelefs and inactive; and that all the operations attributed to them, are really performed by ambition, envy, pride, and the other particular inclinations and appetites of the human breaft.'

Whether pleasure and pain be acknowledged as the first movers of human action, or we fuppofe mankind to be ftimulated by the appetites and paflions, independently of thofe principles, we do not fee that pleasure and pain ought to be excluded from any operation on the human mind, upon the hypothefis only of their not being fimple ideas, but confifting of various fpecies. The influence of the appetites and paffions on human action might be denied on the very fame principle; for to us it appears, that the objecs of them are as various as thofe of the former; and it is certain, that the appetites of hunger and thirst are attended with a sensation of pain The author likewife combats the opinion of those philofophers, who maintain felf-love, or felf-intereft to be the primary principle of human action. It is evident, he thinks, that if felf love, or felf intereft, ultimately formed the springs of action and plan of life, we would never give up our ease and content, nor fuffer the growth of pride, anxiety, jealoufy, nor envy, which fo much torture the human breaft. This argument, indeed, we have ever confidered as unanswerable on the principle of the felfish fyftem of morals.

The second section treats of the confufion which has been introduced into philofophy by the metaphorical use of the words motive, impression, and fubftance, applied to the mind; on this abuse of language the author makes many pertinent' obfervations.

The third fection is employed on inftina, a part of which we shall lay before our readers.

Let us now quit this excurfion into the department of brutes to return to the human fyftem; and let us examine whether or no

man

man has his instincts to direct him in the concerns of life. I hope that the explanations I have already made, will keep me from cavils that interfere not with my meaning or defign. I am not going in queft of innate characters, nor innate propofitions impreffed on the understanding; but in order to give the most diftinct idea poffible of the object of my enquiry, I will quote a paffage from Mr. Locke, that comes up exactly to my purpose: "I deny not that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that from the very first inftances of fenfe and perception, there are fome things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; fome things that they incline to, and others that they fly but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge, regulating our practice; fuch natural impreffions on the understanding, are fo far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument against them; fince, if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them conftantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge, as we do thofe others on the will and appetite, which never ceafe to be the conftant springs and motives of all our actions; to which we perpetually feel them ftrongly impelling us." It is plain from this paffage, that he diftinguishes between natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men, which are the conftant fprings and motives of our actions ; and innate characters, which are the principles of knowledge, and appear in the form of rules and maxims: the firft he acknowledges, and only argues against the second. Here then, once for all, before I proceed to the theory of the human mind, I declare that I think it extremely abfurd to imagine that infants come to the world with rules, maxims, principles, or ideas imprinted on their understanding; and that my attempt is only to bring to open light, tendencies or inftincts that cannot be acquired by reason, and which are diftinguished from principles or propofitions in this respect, that no reason can be given for them; and as they are not acquired, they appear to be appendages to human nature, univerfally felt, that may be traced in every nation and fociety of men, that ever came to our knowledge, whether favage or civilized.

To proceed then, mankind know by instinct the paffions on the human countenance, when they become violent, and are not difguifed. This is a fcience fo clearly fettled by nature, that painters are able to reprefent the paffions with force and life to all nations upon earth, fo that the wildeft favages the moment they caft their eyes on the picture, fhall understand with the utmost evidence, the emotions of mind delineated; it is because all the race of man know the paffions by inftinct, that the ftatutes of ancient Greece and Rome fpeak their emotions this day as intelligibly to the travellers of all countries, as they did to the fculptor's cotemporaries and acquaintances. Love, grief, anger, envy, corporal pain, pity, have each their unerring fymptoms that discover the agitations of the foul at a glance. It may be alledged, that thefe fymptoms were at firft ufed by accident, and continued after by custom fo conftantly, that every one learns them, and understands the paffions to which they are become figns; as by ufe, the words which indifputably are factitious, bring to our thoughts their correfpondent ideas; in fhort, that the fymptoms of the paffions acquired in youth, and by comitant ufe are become an univerfal language.

The

The fymptoms of the paffions indeed form an univerfal language well understood; but they do fo, only because they are taught by nature. An artificial language is alterable, and, like all the other works of man, is fubject to variation and decay; and there is no fuch thing as fixing it for a perpetuity, while it continues in public ufe. Affectation and novelty will be always bufy, making changes and deviations, which although flender in any one age, yet, like the flow touches of time, they become fenfible at length; but the picturefque language of the paffions has never varied a tittle, nor is it within the reach of human art or power to vary them. Alexander or Cæfar, who governed the known world, were not able to make a laughter pafs for a fign of melancholy, or a frown for the expreffion of approbation : befides, every one is confcious of the fuperior force of the expreffions of nature to that of words, and confequently of their difference. It is idle to purfue this argument farther, because hardly any one who can fee, will difpute that the fymptoms of the paffions are both produced and understood by inftin&.

The paffions alfo difcover themselves by peculiar founds; a figh, a groan, laughter, the piercing cries of agony, and the flow wailings of forrow, are understood by every ear. There are fill flighter emotions, and gentler modulations of found taught by eloquent nature, that enter into familiar difcourfe, and are undertood by every one without grammar or profody, that concur much to the charms of elocution, and difcover a fenfibility of tafte! The foft bewitching tone of love, as well as the fmile, give a brief, but a very intelligible account of the heart. Raillery, grief, anger, fear, vary the found as well as the features, and discover to us, by the light of instinct, the speaker's fentiments, although he ufes a language we do not understand.

:

The attitudes and flexions of the body alfo, ftrongly exprefs the motions of the mind; whence it is, that orators choose to speak standing, and in a moving pofture. Thefe three I have mentioned, the gefture, tone and attitude, form the spirit and foul of language and if nature had not endowed man with an instinctive knowledge of them, he would be hardly capable of fpeech: the ufe they are of to us, in rendering us intelligible to each other, and fmoothing the way to language, may be obferved in the geftures and modulations of children, who come flowly to the power of fpeech, and of ftrangers who endeavour to converfe and become in telligible, without understanding each other's language; for in fuch cafes, neceffity brings them back to the principles and elements of natural expreffion.

There is nothing has puzzled philofophers more than the peculiar marks and diagnostics of the human fpecies: it is not that they are unknown, or that they are not obvious; it is manifeft that every one perceives and knows them by the ability of every one to diftinguish a man; but the difficulty lies in felecting out thofe univerfal marks. Is it not furprizing, that however eafy this tafk appears, the whole fucceffion of philofophers miffed of it, and were not able to tell what every clown and favage easily perceives? In fhort, the diftinguishing marks of the fpecies, are the fymptoms of the human mind appearing in open view, in the countenance and gefture, modulating the voice to the hearer's confcious feelings,, and painting to both the fenfes, if I may fay fo, the well known emotions and fentiments of the mind: untaught inftinct discovers them, and thefe being found constantly joined to the human hape VOL. XXXIII. January, 1772. and

D

and countenance, and being naturally expreffed by them, as I juft obferved, the shape and countenance ferve, as a label does on a grocer's cheft, to let us know the repofitory of the human mind, even although fleep at present feals up the man's intellects."

In regard to the characteristics mentioned by the author in the laft paragraph, they are undoubtedly just; but we can by no means admit, that any philofopher was ever puzzled to afcertain the diagnoftics of the human fpecies. The idea of communicating any fuch diagnoftic, to mankind at leaft, would be equally fuperfluous and extravagant. The characteristic of the human shape is neceffarily implied in every confideration of the human species. We must acknowledge, however, that the fymptoms of the human mind appearing in the countenance, as remarked by our author, afford a more obvious and general characteristic of the fpecies, than either reason, imagination, or rifibility, which have been severally adopted by philofophers, and which are, no doubt, the qualities alluded to Ey our author in the above paffage, though we cannot admit, with him, that even this criterion is applicable during sleep, when all the paffions are lulled to repofe.

After illuftrating feveral kinds of inftinct, the author has ftopt his enquiry, till he fhall know the opinion of his cotemporaries refpecting what he has hitherto advanced. As far as he has proceeded in the theory of the human mind, his principles in general are fupported by reafon; and we muft own, that the clear and ingenious manner in which he treats the fubject, induces us to entertain a defire, that he may perfevere in the profecution of his plan, which evidently tends to eftablish natural religion on the principles of philofophy. But what particular fupport Chriftianity will derive from this investigation, is not fo apparent from the principles which have as yet been delineated; though it muft, indeed, be acknowledged, that a demonftration of the coincidence of its precepts with the dictates of natural religion, is no inconfiderable argument in favour of its divine original; and to prove this point, we prefume, is the intention of the author.

IV. An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Oppofition to Sophiftry and Scepticifm. By James Beattie, LLD. 800. 6s. Dilly. [Concluded.]

IN

N our last Review we gave an account of the plan of this work, and extracted the author's obfervations on the perception of truth in general. After having diftinguifhed and afcertained the feparate provinces of reafon and common fenfe, Dr. Beattie proceeds more particularly to investigate their connection and mutual dependence, and the extent of their jurifdictions. This forms the fubject of the fecond chap

ter,

ter, in which he endeavours to prove, that all reasoning terminates in first principles, that all evidence is ultimately intuitive, and that common fenfe is the ftandard of truth. As it would have been in nite labour to comprehend every fort of evidence, and every mode of reafoning, the author has reftricted himself to inveftigate the origin of thofe kinds of evidence which are the most important, and of the most extenfive influence in fcience, and in common life. He begins with the fimpleft and cleareft, and advances gradually to those which are more complicated, or lefs perfpicuous. The first subject of his enquiry is the evidence which takes place in pure mathematics, and produces the highest degree of certainty in the mind of him who attends to it, and understands it. On the neceffity of our affent to this fpecies of evidence, the author's remarks are rational and just.

The next fection treats of the evidence of external sense. An opinion of the invalidity of this fpecies of evidence is the grand bafis on which the fceptical fyftem of philofophy is founded. The author here ingenioufly traces the steps by which the perception of external objects may amount to a well grounded conviction. That our readers may have a specimen of the manner in which he inveftigates the fubject of evidence, we fhall lay this whole fection before them.

• Another class of truths producing conviction, and abfolute certainty, are thofe which depend upon the evidence of the external fenfes; hearing, feeing, touching, tafting, and fmelling. On this evidence depends all our knowledge of external or material things; and therefore all conclufions in natural philofophy, and all thofe prudential maxims which regard the prefervation of our body, as it is liable to be affected by the fenfible qualities of matter, muft finally be refolved into this principle, That things are as our fenfes represent them. When I touch a ftone, I am confcious of a certain fenfation, which I call a fenfation of baraness. But this fenfation is not hardness itself, nor any thing like hardness it is nothing more than a sensation or feeling in my mind; accompanied, however, with an irrefiftible belief, that this fenfation is excited by the application of an external and hard fubftance to fome part of my body. This belief as certainly accompanies the fenfation, as the fenfation accompanies the application of the ftone to my organ of fenfe. I believe, with as much affurance, and as unavoidably, that the external thing exists, and is hard, as I believe that I receive, and am conscious of, the fenfation of hardness, or, to speak more strictly, the fenfation which by experience I know to be the fign of my touching a hard body. Now, why do I believe that this fenfation