veyed by both may prove of confiderable utility. The moft important and difficult ftudy, as he obferves, is that of hu man nature; it leads to that felf-knowledge which was confidered by the ancient philofophers as including the fum of all human wisdom, and inscribed upon the porch of the temple of Delphi in these emphatical words, Know thyfelf.

From page 183 to page 200, the author proves, both by arguments and ftriking examples, that integrity of heart, and an honeft candid behaviour lead on to fortune, even at courts, and that their contraries generally involve men in mifery and contempt: in a word, that in political tranfactions, as well as in all other occurrences of life, virtue is generally its own reward. To inculcate these truths is doing a real fervice to mankind, as a prepoffeffion has perhaps too generally prevailed in the world, that the court is a foil where heaven's influence scarce can penetrate, and that politics in themselves are nothing but knavery and artifice. It is laudable in an author to endeavour to perfuade mankind of the goodness and rectitude of human nature; and no writers have done more injury to the caufe of virtue than Tacitus, Machiavel, Rochefoucault, and others, who have reprefented it in an unfavour able light. To perfuade men that they are by nature vicious and corrupt, is a fure way to make them fo.-From page 201 to the close of this chapter our author inculcates a very impoftant truth, namely, that a negotiator fhould make it his chief study to come at the knowledge of the true character of the prince at whofe court he refides; this he should endeavour to do, not from report, which is often fallacious, but from real facts.

We come now to Chap. xiii. which treats of the manner of conducting negotiations with the Porte; and here we shall content ourselves with obferving in general, that it fets in the most striking point of view the various frauds, artifices, and chicanery practifed by the viziers and their fubftitutes; their avarice and felf-intereftedness; the various impofitions of the dragomans or interpreters; in a word, the many and great difadvantages which a Chriftian ambaffador at the Porte has to ftruggle with.

This is followed by the laft, and perhaps the most important article of this curious work, namely, the State of the Turkey Commerce confidered. Prefixed to this is an ad-. vertisement, in which the author gives the reader to underftand, that a fincere zeal to promote the welfare of his country, the nobleft motive by which a fubject can be actuated, was his inducement to lay the present ftate of the Turkey trade before the public. We shall not pretend to give an analyfis

of this laft article, which is too important to be abridged; it contains feveral curious and interefting, anecdotes that are not to be found any where else. We fhall therefore refer the reader to the work itself, which upon the whole he will find to be a moft judicious and useful performance.

VIII. The Roman Hiftory, from the Building of Rome to the Ruin of the Commonwealth. Illuftrated with Maps and other Plates. By N. Hooke, Efq. Vol. IV. 410. 18s. boards. Longman.

T the expiration of a civil war, when, as is generally the cafe, the people find themselves enflaved by the victorious party, although both parties always pretend to take up arms for the public good, the vanquished are not only beheld with pity, but highly extolled as unfortunate friends to their coun try, to which the chance of war has prevented them being ferviceable; and their memory is frequently tranfmitted to pofterity as that of unblemished patriots, who had no other motive for arming, than a defire to preserve the public liberty, while, had themselves been victorious, they would have acted in the fame manner as their opponents, making use of their victory, as they originally intended, to eftablish their own power, and to acquire private emolument. This, at least, appears to have been the cafe with the war betwixt Cæfar aud Pompey, the latter of whom, however he has been extolled as the defender of the liberties of Rome, would, had he been the conqueror, have trampled them under foot as much as Cæfar did, having done it in fome degree before the civil war commenced. Had Pompey earnestly defired to avoid involving his country in a civil war, would he not have agreed to Cæfar's propofal, that both fhould diveft themselves of the power they poffeffed, rather than, by refufing his confent, oblige Cæfar, in his own defence, to continue in his government; for, as to what may be urged, that he acted herein only in conformity to the pleasure of the fenate, no one will believe that when the whole power of the fate was in a manner divided betwixt two commanders, the oppofition of whom to each other alone prevented either of them from ufurping an arbitrary power, and preferved the tottering liberties of the republic, the fenate fhould freely, with an unanimous voice, command one of them to refign his power, and thereby throw themselves on the mercy of the other; especially, as this command was given without any qualifying hint of good will towards him, but on the contrary, with irritating menaces if he fhould not comply, and with circumftances which indicated

fevere treatment, if he fhould. The fenate could not be fo blind to their own intereft, and certainly acted in this manner only in confequence of being in fear of Pompey, whom, as they deemed him the moft able to protect them, they thought. it prudent to favour.

It may ftill be alledged, that Cæfar acted not the part of a good citizen in difobeying the command of the fenate, in whom all legal power was vefted, and that it was not a fufficient excuse for his behaviour, that the command appeared to him to be unfairly obtained by his antagonist: we cannot pretend to exculpate him wholly from this charge, but will present our readers with the apology which Mr. Hooke has made for him.

It must be remembered,' fays he, that a certain destruction would have attended Cæfar if he had fubmitted to the decree made against him by the fenate. He would thereby have been disarmed at once, and been reduced to the condition of a private citizen and Pompey, with all the power of the ftate in his hands, would eafily have difappointed him of the confulfhip. He intended, it is certain, to do so, and even to bring him to trial, as Cato, and others, were continually threatening him; and of this last circumftance, Cæfar, according to Suetonius, was really apprehensive. He engaged in the war, fays that hiftorian, becaufe he was afraid of being called to an account for what he had done in his first confulfhip contrary to the religion, the laws, and the authority of the tribunes; for Cato often declared, and with an oath too, that he would impeach him as foon as he disbanded his army and it was commonly talked, that if he returned a private perfon, he would, like Milo, be tried, with a guard to attend the court, This circumftance Afinius Pollio has confirmed, when he says, that Cæfar, upon viewing his enemies flaughtered and put to flight upon the plains of Pharfalia, fpoke thefe words; They would have it fo: Ì Caius Cæfar, who have performed fuch great things, muft have undergone a sentence of condemnation, had I not defired the affiftance of my army,'

This volume, which completes the work, opens with the breaking out of the civil war at the end of the year 703, from the building of the city. Our author firtt difcuffes the rife and progress of that conteft which proved fo fatal to the yet remaining liberties of Rome., We cannot help here remarking with wonder, the infatuation of Pompey, who could think himself fo fecure against the power of Cæfar, who was entering Italy at the head of his victorious legions, that he even laughed at thofe who feemed to dread the war, which he was himself fo unable to maintain, that he abandoned Italy to his antagonist at the very beginning of it: for although fome have been of opinion, that he faw from the beginning that he fhould be obliged to quit it, and endeavoured only to keep up the fpirits of his party, by pretending to be under no fuch apprehenfions, yet we concur in opinion with our author, that there appears nothing in the hiftory of the commence

ment

ment of this war which countenances fuch an opinion. He attempted to stop the progress of Cæfar, but without effect, having little more than the two legions of veteran foldiers which had been taken from his competitor, who had not lefs than ten legions in his fervice; but if he had defpaired at first of keeping Italy, to what purpose fhould he wafte his time and his force in that country ?.

It was doubtless a capital error in Pompey, when he found it impoffible to defend Rome, that he did not take with him the public money. Dr. Middleton, in his Life of Cicero, has faid, in defence of it, that it is a common case in civil diffenfions for the honefter fide, through the fear of difcrediting their caufe by any irregular act, to ruin it by unreasonable moderation. The public money was kept in the Temple of Saturn, and the confuls contented themselves with carrying away the keys, fancying that the fanctity of the place would fecure it from violence, especially when the greatest part of it was a fund of the facred kind, fet apart by the laws for occafions only of the last exigency, or the terror of a Gallic invafion. On this Mr. Hooke remarks, that Cicero advised the carrying away of this facred treasure, and adds to this remark, that it was all along the intention of Pompey and the confuls fo to do, and it would have been done, had not their fears deprived them of their fenfes.' Whether or not it was reverence towards the facred treasure which induced Pompey to leave it untouched, it is evident enough he had no fcruple on that head afterwards, when he fent the tribune C. Caffius to Capua, with directions to the confuls to return to the city, and to bring away the money out of the facred treasury, but it was not then fafe for them to attempt it; it fell therefore into Cæfar's hands, who, when it was represented to him that it ought not to be employed but under the terror of a Gallic invafion, replied, that he had removed that fcruple by fubduing the Gauls. When Cæfar had made himself mafter of Italy he took a great deal of pains to win over to his interest those who had not declared themselves his enemies; amongst those was Cicero, to gain whom he left no means untried and here our historian takes occafion to censure that orator's timidity, in hefitating about the part which he should take. Cicero's Epiftles furnish him with plentiful proofs of this. one time he excufes himself to Pompey for not following him, because, while he was actually on the road for that purpose, he learnt that it was dangerous to proceed, as Cæfar's troops might intercept him; being fo ingenuous, however, as to own in the fame letter, that while there was the leaft hopes of peace being preferved, it would not be prudent to be too active against

againft Cæfar, remembering, he fays, how much he had for merly fuffered from the latter in the affair of his exile. When Pompey had fet fail for Greece, Hitherto, he writes, I was vexed and unealy, becaufe unable to come to any, refolution ; but now it is no longer vexation and grief, it is anguish and distraction.' And now he determined to follow Pompey; but on hearing afterwards that Pompey's affairs were in a difadvantageous pofture, he again changed his intention; yet af terward, when thofe affairs feemed to wear a more promifing afpect, he finally determined to join Pompey. Cicero, our author remarks, very well knew, from the beginning, which was the most honourable part for a man of his political printiples to act, under his connection with the chiefs of the ariftocracy, and his formal engagement to Pompey; but the prudential part was not fo clear a point. He dreaded Cæfar's refentment, but he was ftill more afraid of the refentment of Pompey. I find I am either way in danger from the one party by not doing my duty, and from the other by doing it; and fo distracted are public affairs, that I can fteer no course but what is full of perils." There is, however, fomething to be offered in Cicero's favour; what he meant by doing his duty, was, perhaps, no more than what he thought would be expected from him by the party of which he was a member; if this was the cafe, he is very juftifiable in feeking the fafelt fide, when it became no longer fafe to remain neuter, as he feems not to have had a high opinion of the uprightness of either fide. Pompey had indeed been high in his estimation, but he saw well enough, as he wrote to his friends, that, which way foever the conteft fhould be decided, the liberty of the people would undoubtedly be deftroyed; it is, therefore, no wonder that he fhould be defirous to retire quietly to his villas, and that he fhould lament his being diftinguished with his title (of imperator) and his bearing about his embarrafling parade of lictors. Had his irrefolution been fo deferving of contempt as Mr. Hooke pretends, he would not probably have avowed it fo freely, and in joining that which he at last thought to be the strongest party, he was countenanced by many other Romans of note.

Our historian after reciting the measures which Cæfar took to fettle every thing in the fouth of Italy, and to fecure Sicily and Sardinia, mentions the fiege of Marfilles. We were dif appointed here in finding that Mr. Hooke, who has cenfured Cicero for not readily fharing the danger of his friends and allies, fhould not take this opportunity of commending the Mafilians for taking part with Pompey and the fenate.

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