justification, is not that which shall supply a defect of righteousness for the time being, but simply a defect in duration. Adam it has been said was innocent so long as he obeyed, but not justified. But he could be innocent only by being righteous, according to the existing demands of the law. Of course, righteousness was as necessary to his innocence, as to his justification. But it is said, there was a defect of righteousness, and therefore the sentence of reward could not be pronounced. True; nor could the sentence of final acquittal be pronounced, and there is precisely the same defect in one case as in the other, viz. a defect in the duration of obedience. Hence, that the sentence of acquittal may be pronounced, a righteousness through his probation is as necessary, as that the sentence of reward may be pronounced. Nor can this righteousness be supplied by any thing which shall not be the true ground of justification as well as of acquittal from punishment; for he would be justified by law were this defect supplied, and he cannot be acquitted unless it be supplied. Precisely the same influence then, which is necessary to his justification, secures his acquittal, and the same that secures his acquittal, secures his jus tification. "Some have thought that the cover for sin must be extended so far as to include a foundation for our reward, by cancelling not only the debitum pene, (debt of punishment,) but the debitum negligentia, (debt of negligence.) But negligence, after taking from it every thing which deserves punishment, is not sin, but a mere defect, and therefore is not to be remedied by the cover for sin. It is said that sin disabled us from gaining a legal title to a reward, and a cover for sin is not complete till it has provided for restoring the title by grace. But it was not sin that produc ed the disability which remains after the debt of punishment is cancelled. All sin is then covered, but even then we have not a perfect righteousness from the beginning to show, and it is too late to produce one. This is the only difficulty.But that omission of obedience, you say, was sin, and defrauded God of his rights, and drew down a sentence of disfranchisement, cutting us off from ever gaining a reward. The omission was indeed sin, because it was disobedience. The whole sin lay in the disobedience, "for sin is the transgression of the law." But there was something more in the omission than sin, there was a defect; there was something more in it than disobedience, there was the want of obedience. As it stood related to the rights and demands of God, it was positive injury and disobedience; as it stood related to the promise, it was a mere failure to produce that positive good to was promised, not to the absence of sin, but which the promise was made. The reward to positive obedience; and the mere want of that positive thing, without the presence of sin, is enough to vitiate our title, and remains a defect after all sin, even the sin of "negligence," is covered. On the oth er hand, all that was threatened to sin was punishment, not the loss of reward; that followed the mere want of obedience, not These remarks, substituting pardon for final acquittal, apply to the viewed as disobedience, but as the bare case of the sinner. The sinner canabsence of good. There was no need of not be pardoned consistently with the a sentence of disfranchisement to cut us honour of the law, unless he present off from reward. The mere failure to a substitution for a finished righteous- render that to which the promise was made, without such a sentence, was eness, and this is necessary to his jus-nough to exclude us. If I promise a man tification and reward. But if the same influence is necessary to his pardon which is necessary to his reward, then the distinction between Christ's atonement as the ground of pardon, and his obedience as the ground of reward, is not founded in the principle of law, now under examination. We now proceed to examine another principle of the author, viz. that there is a distinction between the absence of sin, and a positive righteousness. a certain reward for a day's work, and he comes at noon, there is no need of a punitive sentence to vitiate bis title to the stiphim off without involving the idea of punulated recompense. His mere failure cuts ishment. You say the cases are not parallel, because his failure violated no obligation. But so far as our omission violated obligation, it was sin, it was disobedience, and stands related,not to the loss of reward, but to positive punishment. In that omission there are two things, a sin and a detect, the presence of that which entitles to that which entitles to reward; and punishmement, and the absence of when all the sin of the omission is cov ered, there still remains a defect which prevents our title to a recompense. When the debitum pence is cancelled all the sin of the omission is covered, and the debibum negligentie which remains must be discharged by another influence. That other influence is the merit of Christ's obe dience, and the way in which it procured our positive good, was by first obtaining it as a legal reward to himself. As certainly then as we spread the cover for sin over the debitum negligentia, and make it the foundation of our reward, we put merit, and not merely the testimony of obedience into the atonement."-pp. 17, 18. In this statement, (and we do not remember to have seen the same point presented with equal ingenuity,) we strongly suspect, that there are distinctions without a difference, positions without proof, and conclusions without premises. On points like these few minds can successfully make those discriminations which the subject demands, and we are far from feeling entirely safe, lest in our remarks we should justly expose ourselves to a retort of the charges, which we suspect lie against the author. We have however so much confidence that our insinuations are just, that we shall venture on some remarks in their vindication. "Negligence," says Dr. G. after taking from it every thing which deserves punishment is not sin, but a defect, &c."-"There was something more in the omission than sin, there was a defect; there was something more in it than disobedience, there was the want of obedience." The question we raise is not whether negligence, or the omission of obedience, after taking from it every thing which deserves punishment, is sin, but whether after such a subtraction of ill-desert, there still remains a defect? We might suppose a sinless want of obedience to remain, could we for a moment look at man as exempt from obligation to obey the law. But our difficulty is to see, how one who is bound to render constant obedience, can be viewed as exempt from sin, while such obedience is wanting. If obedience be wanting, it is wanting simply as the fulfilment of the demands of the law; if it be wanting as the ground of reward, still it is the ground of reward only as it is the fulfilling of the law. Obedience cannot be said to be wanting nor the want of it be said to be a defect, except in the subject of law, and if wanting in him, it is a defect only in reference to the obligation under which he is placed. which he is placed. What then is that defect in the subject of law to which no sin pertains? Either the demands of the law are satisfied or they are not; if they are satisfied there is no defect; if they are not satisfied, there is a defect; and either sin pertains to that defect, or the law is satisfied with the want of obedience in the subject. Dr. G. supposes that the defect of obedience not as sin, but without the presence of sin, vitiates the title to reward.' Of course the sinner is excluded from reward precisely on the same principle, as he would be, were he not the subject of law. The exclusion has no reference to moral action, unless a moral nature can be predicated of that to which neither sin nor holiness pertains. The sinner then is excluded on the same account, that an animal is excluded from the reward of law, the sinless want of obedience. But if he is excluded for that to which no sin pertains, he is excluded for that which violates no obligation. The defect therefore which is the ground of exclusion, is no violation of obligation, and did it not exist, or should it be supplied, were this possible, there would be no fulfilment of obligation, and therefore no more reason why the reward should be given than already exists. If it be supposed that the obligation to obedience may remain when all sin is taken from the omission, this is to suppose that obligation may be violated without sin; for it supposes a defect, an obligation to supply the defect and yet no sin in the defect; i. e. no sin in violating the obligation. On the other the science of positives and negatives, nor shall we stop to enquire with what reason philosophers have doubted, band if no obligation to supply the defect exist, after the sin is taken away, then there is no defect, for the law has no demands on the sinner.-"whether rest be any more a privaAccordingly, in the example to illustrate his meaning, the author takes a case in which no obligation exists to comply with the condition on which the reward is promised. He supposes that the sinner vitiates his title to a reward on the same principle that a man, to whom he should promise a reward for a day's work, and who was under no obligation to perform it, would forfeit the stipulated reward by the omission of the service. It is plain then that the supply of that in each case which would entitle to reward, would be the fulfilment of no obligation. But that the sinner is entitled to a reward for that which is the fulfilment of no obligation, and that he is excluded from reward for that which is the violation of no obligation, is a sentiment to which we cannot subscribe. It subverts, if we are not misguided by our own reaJasoning, that fundamental principle of moral government, of rendering to men according to their deeds. No other or better reason appears in the moral character of a subject of law, why he should be rewarded, or excluded from a reward, than exists in the case of beings who are not accountable. That reason is simply a sinless defect of obedience; and animals and trees, so far as the principles of moral legislation are concerned, may be summoned to account and admitted to the reward of law or excluded from it, with the same propriiety as men. Again Dr. G. says, that "the reward was not promised to the absence of sin, but to a positive obedience "Here is a distinction,but we ask for a difference between the absence of sin and positive obedience in the subject of law. We can see the difference in a stock or tree, but we can discover the absence of sin in a subject of law, only in his perfect obedience to law. We know not what acquisitions others may have made in tion than motion;" or to maintain as some have done, that even the term "nothing has both a positive and a negative import," nor how far the latter opinion is sanctioned by the authority of those wits who have amusingly quibbled on the term. We are well satisfied that the absence of rest in a body, is motion and that the absence of motion is rest; and nothing which Dr. G. has said in his work, has convinced us that positive and negative terms are not used as convertible, especially in their application to holiness and sin. Thus innocence, moral purity, and (as we think) the absence of sin, denote holiness; and impiety, irreligion, and the want of obedience, denote sin. The terms may be changed from negative to positive, and vice versa, but our ideas are still the same. The absence of sin, in the subject of law, is obedience, and obedience is the absence of sin. And after having plied to their utmost, our mental energies for the purpose of discrimination, we are almost sufficiently emboldened, to challenge any mind to trace the difference between the absence of sin and positive obedience, at the same time keeping in view the constant accountability of man.— While therefore we agree with Dr. G. that the reward was promised to positive obedience, we cannot subscribe to the position that it was not promised to the absence of sin. In the nature of things we see no ground for the distinction which he maintains, and so far as the use of terms is concerned, we think the form in which the original law of Eden was promul gated, is decisively on our side of the question. The promise of that law was contained in the implication, if thou eatest not thou shall live, and thus reward was promised to the absence of sin. The author proceeds: "All that was threatened to sin was punish ment, not the loss of reward." We might here ask him to explain his consistency with himself. He tells us, page 16, that the curse of the law consisted in the everlasting loss of the sanctifying agency of God. But this agency he also considers as a reward promised to obedience, pp. 18, 19. How then can the loss of the blessing be a part of the curse, the blessing itself be a reward, and yet the loss of reward not be threatened to sin? We will not here revert to the case of Adam and of the fallen angels, and enquire whether they were ever in possession of the reward of law, and forfeited the blessing by sin. We will simply enquire why the sinner is not rewarded according to law. Is there no reason other than that which exists in the case of beings not under law? If there is another reason, what is it, except sin? God in awarding the retributions of law, certainly acts on the principles of moral government. But if sinners are excluded from reward merely for a sinless defect, the character of the moral Governor is as really concealed in their exclusion, as it would be without a moral government. And when we reflect on the character and destiny of man, as a moral agent, sustaining under law no other relation to God but that of an accountable being, we find it impossible to believe that the retributions of law will not be wholly decided, in reference to moral character. Indeed in every view of the subject, the conviction is forced upon us, that sin is the real and only ground of the sinner's exclusion from happiness, and that such exclusion, or the loss of reward, was as really a part of the penalty of the law, as positive suffering. The first denunciation against sin comprised the loss of that life, (for what is death but the loss of life,) which was to be perpetuated as the reward of continued obedience. The principles of retribution revealed in the bible, are undeniably the principles of moral government, and substantially the same as those which pertain to the law. But in this book the distinctions of Dr. G. are certainly not recognized. The reward is promised interchangeably to the absence of sin, and to positive obedience. The loss of reward with scarcely less frequency than positive punishment, is denounced against sin. The punishment is everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power. And we would put the question to every attentive and candid reader of the scriptures, and let his unbiassed impressions decide it; when the sentence of the Judge, "DEPART FROM ME, all ye workers of iniquity," shall be pronounced, and when from the regions of darkness and woe, they shall look up to the bright hosts of heaven, and see the exaltation and bliss of which themselves were capable, will they ascribe their loss to a blameless defect, or with shame and self reproach, regard those glories as the forfeiture of sin ? Again, Dr. G. says, "when the debitum pence is cancelled, all the sin of the omission is covered." If by the debitum pena, (that which deserves punishment,) be meant all that which tends to prostrate the authority of law, and if all this be cancelled or taken away, we admit that the sin of the omission is covered. But if "the law as it stood related to transgressors had two parts, precept and penalty," i. e. if the violated precept still claims fulfilment, and nothing can fulfil it but obedience or "a perfect righteousness from the beginning," then how all sin can be covered without satisfying the claim to perfect obedience, we are at a loss to discov er. How can a law which demands perfect obedience, or inflicts death, remit its penalty without a perfect obedience, or without that which is equally honourable to itself? How can the law of God be magnified in withholding its righteous penalty from a subject who has rendered it no obedience? Would no honour ac * 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10. Luke xvi. 23, 24. Matt vii. 23. 2 Thess. i. 8, 9. crue to the law. from the perfect obedience of its subjects? Does not the law demand a perfect obedience, as the only condition of withholding its curse? To suppose, therefore, that the necessity of punishment is cancelled by that which furnishes neither obedience nor an equivalent for obedience, is to suppose that the law is shorn of half its honours, and that its high and holy demand for the per fect obedience of the subject is wholly abandoned. From our preceding remarks it will be seen, that we consider the distinc tion which Dr. G. makes between the absence of sin and a positive righteousness, wholly groundless; and, of course, the distinct influences ascribed to the atonement and obedience of Christ, as not founded in the divine law. (To be continued.) Literary and Philosophical Intelligence. The Synod of New-York and NewJersey have resolved to endow a Professorship in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. Nassau-Hall.-The following gentlemen compose the Faculty of this institution: ASHBEL GREEN, D. D. LL. D. President. The instruction of the College in the Holy Scriptures, the Evidences of Divine Revelation, Moral Philosophy, and Logick, is conducted by the President.' Rev. PHILIP LINDSLY, A. M. Vice-President, and Professor of Languages and Belles Lettres. HENRY VETHAKE, A. M. Professor of Mathematics and Mechanical Philosophy. JACOB GREEN, A. M. Professor of Chemistry, Experimental Philosophy, and Natural History. David Magee, A. B.; Benjamin Ogden, A. B.; John Maclean, A. M. Tutors. The number of students, actually pursuing their studies at the College, is 142. The late Dr. Bentley, of Salem, Mass. made by his will the following bequests: To the American Antiquarian Society -of which he was one of the original founders, and counsellors, and one of its most ardent friends and patrons 1. All his fine collection of German Literature, which the Doctor highly valued, and spoke of with delight. 2. All his New-England printed books, comprising a copy of all the works which issued from the American press from the first settlement of the country to the Revolution; and many later publications. The writings of the Fathers of New-England form an interesting part of this collection. S. All his manuscripts, not of his own hand. These VOL. 2-No. I. 5 comprise many rich Oriental MSS. sent him by wise men of the East, with whom he corresponded in their own languages. His 'Koran, and Persian, and Chinese MSS. are rich and splendid specimens of chirography. Many MSS. of the first Puritans of New-England are to be found in this collection. 4. His Cabinet, containing a rich and rare collection of curiosities, medals, &c. These it is well known, the Doctor had been many years accumulating; and the Register mentions, that the Doctor's parishioners-mostly commercial people-even to the sailors, seldom returned from a voyage without bringing him something rare and curious, as a token of their remembrance, and a contribution to his Museum. The following anecdote is given in illustration:-"When Bonaparte was robbing the Italian Churches, a sailor belonging to Salem was present in one of them while the French soldiers were stripping it, and supposing it no harm to take stolen goods from a robber, he seized an opportunity, brought off a most beautiful painting of St. John the Baptist, and presented it to his minister; no doubt concealing the manner in which it had been obtained." 5. His Paintings, Engravings, &c. a rich and choice collection-including Heads of all the great men of our country, particularly of the New-England Clergy, with which bis study was surrounded:-"Where," he used to say, "he had collected around him the great and good men of every age and country, to prompt him by their presence to the constant discharge of his duties to his God, to his profession, to his country, and to his fellow men." |