particular, but general; not barely to advantage his constituents, but the common wealth; to advise his majesty (as appears from the writ of summons) "de communi consilio super negotiis quibusdam arduis et urgentibus, regem, statum, et defensionem regni Angliae et ecclesiae Anglicanae concernentibus." And therefore he is not bound, like a deputy in the united provinces, to consult with, or take the advice, of his constituents upon any particular point, unless he himself thinks it proper or prudent so to do.

III. We are next to examine the laws and customs relating to parliament, thus united together and considered as one aggregate body.

Parliament hath sovereign and uncontrolable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that absolute despotic power which must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new model the succession to the crown. It can alter the established religion of the land. It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves. It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled

to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True it is, that what the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo.

In order to prevent the mischiefs that might arise, by placing this extensive authority in hands that are either incapable, or else improper, to manage it, it is provided by the custom and law of parliament, that no one shall sit nor vote in either house, unless he be twenty-one years of age. It is also enacted by statute 7 Jac. I. c. 6. that no member be permitted to enter into the house of commons, till he hath taken the oath of allegiance before the lord steward or his deputy: and by 30 Car. II. st. 2. and 1 Geo. I. c. 13. that no member shall vote nor sit in either house, till he hath in the presence of the house taken the oath of allegiance, supremacy, and abjuration, and subscribed and repeated the declaration against transubstantiation, and invocation of saints, and the sacrifice of the mass. That no alien, even though he be naturalized, shall be capable of being a member of either house of parliament. And there are not only these standing incapacities; but if any person is made a peer by the king, or elected to serve in the house of commons by the people, yet may the respective houses, upon complaint of any crime in such person, and proof thereof, adjudge him disabled and incapable to sit as a member, and this by the law and custom of parliament.

The privileges of parliament are likewise very large and indefinite. Privilege of parliament was

principally established, in order to protect its members not only from being molested by their fellowsubjects, but also more especially from being oppressed by the power of the crown. The dignity and independence of the two houses are therefore in great measure preserved by keeping their privileges indefinite. Some however of the more notorious privileges of the members of either house are, privilege of speech, of person, of their domestics, and their lands and goods. And this freedom of speech is particularly demanded of the king in person, by the speaker of the house of commons, at the opening of every new parliament. To assault by violence a member of either house, or his menial servants, is a high contempt of parliament, and there punished with the utmost severity. Neither can any member of either house be arrested and taken into custody, unless for some indictable offence, without a breach of the privilege of parliament.

But all other privileges, which derogate from the common law in matters of civil right, are now at an end, save only as to the freedom of the member's person: which in a peer (by the privilege of peerage) is for ever sacred and inviolable: and in a commoner (by the privilege of parliament) for forty days after every prorogation, and forty days before the next appointed meeting: which is now in effect as long as the parliament subsists, it seldom being prorogued for more than fourscore days at a time.

IV. The laws and customs relating to the house of lords in particular. These, if we exclude their

judicial capacity, which will be more properly treated of in the third and fourth books of these commentaries, will take up but little of our time.

That every peer, by licence obtained from the king, may make another lord of parliament his proxy, to vote for him in his absence. "By the orders of the house no peer can have more than two proxies; nor can proxies vote upon a question of guilty or not guilty." A privilege, which a member of the other house can by no means have, as he is himself but a proxy for a multitude of othe people.

Each peer has also a right, by leave of the house, when a vote passes contrary to his sentiments, to enter his dissent on the journals of the house, with the reasons for such dissent: which is usually styled his protest.

All bills likewise, that may in their consequences any wise affect the rights of the peerage, are, by the custom of parliament, to have their first rise and beginning in the house of peers, and to suffer no changes or amendments in the house of commons.

There is also one statute peculiarly relative to the house of lords; 6 Ann. c. 23. which regulates the election of the sixteen representative peers of North Britain, and 39 and 40 Geo. III. relative to Ireland.

V. The peculiar laws and customs of the house of commons relate principally to the raising of taxes, and the election of members to serve in parliament.

First, with regard to taxes: it is the ancient in

disputable privilege and right of the house of commons, that all grants of subsidies or parliamentary aids, do begin in their house, and are first bestowed by them; although their grants are not effectual to all intents and purposes, until they have the assent of the other two branches of the legislature. The true reason arising from the spirit of our constitution, seems to be this; the lords being a permanent hereditary body, created at pleasure by the king, are supposed more liable to be influenced by the crown, and when once influenced to continue so, than the commons, who are a temporary elective body, freely nominated by the people.

Next, with regard to the elections of knights, citizens, and burgesses; we may observe, that herein consists the exercise of the democratical part of our constitution: for in a democracy there can be no exercise of sovereignty but by suffrage, which is the declaration of the people's will. In all democracies therefore it is of the utmost importance to regulate by whom, and in what manner, the suffrages are to be given. In England, where the people do not debate in a collective body but by representation, the exercise of this sovereignty consists in the choice of representatives. The laws have therefore very strictly guarded against usurpation or abuse of this power, by many salutary provisions; which may be reduced to these three points, 1. The qualifications of the electors. 2. The qualifications of the elected. 3. The pro

ceedings at elections.

1. As to the qualifications of the electors; and