was introduced in similar terms to those in which the conclusion of that most important war was mentioned which, terminated with the capture of Seringapatam and destruction of the Mysore powerthe most formidable, dangerous, and most inveterately hostile to the British authority in India. He certainly was surprised, and he be lieved those concerned in the Mysore war would be astonished, to see this Nepaul contest noticed in terms similar to those in which a subject of such vast importance as the My. sore had been mentioned. Leaving that topic, however, he came to another point in the speech, in which he had the good fortune to agree with the noble lords. They rejoiced at the assurances given in the speech of the prospect of a long continuation of peace, and congratulated the house and the country on that satisfactory prospect. No one could more sincerely rejoice than he did at any well-founded hopes, if such could be entertained, of the long continuation of peace: but he must at the same time observe, that he had great doubts as to the policy of those arrangements made by the ministers of government at the close of the war; and yet it was on the soundness of the policy which dictated these arrangements that any well-founded hopes of a long interval of peace must essentially depend. The subject was much too large for full consideration at this time; but it was by far too important, too deeply interesting, to be passed over without the fullest examination and discussion when the proper period should arrive; and a communication would probably soon be made to the house with respect to some modifications and alterations in these arrangements, which must bring the subject under

their lordships' consideration. But if he might, even now, merely state his opinion, which he had not an opportunity of doing last year, he would say now, as he would have said last year, if he could have been present at the discussion of the arrangements, that he was not with out very strong apprehensions that the system of policy on which they had been formed was highly dan gerous to the security and constitution of this country, and to the peace and prosperity of Europe. These arrangements were, in his opinion, adverse to the indepen dence of nations, alien to every view of sound policy and justice, subversive of every principle on which the balance of Europe had been held to depend, and destructive of every principle on which our own security and the peace and prosperity of the country were founded; dangerous to the charac ter of the army employed in the support of the present government of France, and most dangerous to the constitution of this country. Without securing one great object of British interest in return, our ministers had assisted in transferring the minor states of Europe from government to government, while those who were at the head of these governments, at the moment they were aggrandizing their power by our assistance, hated us for our commercial eminence, hated us for our prosperity, made war upon us by adverse regulations, with as much inveteracy and detestation as ever Napoleon himself had felt against us. The noble lord (earl of Liverpool, we believe,) might smile, but the day would come for a more ample and particular consideration and discussion of that topic. That, however, was his (earl Grey's) view of the sub

ject,

ject, If the governors disliked us, the people answered with a correspond ing hatred, while they ascribed to this country the sacrifice of the rights and independence of nations. We called upon them to rise in defence of their own rights and independence, in opposition to France: the call was obeyed, and Europe was relieved from the power of France; and then, when their aid was no long. er required, they found their rights and independence violated by those to whom they had been taught to look for the support of both. The discontents produced by these proceedings were murmured in secret, and directed chiefly against this country, by which they considered themselves as having been most unjustly deceived. This, in his opinion, was the character of the policy which produced these arrangements; a policy which in France appeared already to threaten the most disastrous consequences,--With respect to France, one of two systems might have been adopted: we might have conciliated the population of that country, by not interfering in their internal concerns, after having overturned that government against which alone, as was professed, our hostility was directed. This was what he (earl Grey) would have preferred. If that, however, had been forbidden by the disordered state of that unhappy country, when we had unsheathed the sword and conquered, the ministers ought, if that course was open to them, to have assumed that right of conquest which their arms had given them, and demanded the utmost that they could think necessary for our security, and to have reduced the power of France in such a degree, that whatever might be the feelings of the population of that country, we might have looked on without fear

or apprehension of the consequences. Neither of these plans, however, did they pursue; but ad, opted a third course, which had the disadvantages of both the others, without the advantages of either. Without having reduced the power of France, so as to deprive her of the means of endangering our se curity, British troops were kept there to maintain the present family on the throne; and we increased her enmity without sufficiently diminishing her strength; and the time, he was greatly ap prehensive, might not be very distant, when, in order to gratify the general feeling of hostility, the government of France would find it necessary to go to war with this country, and employ against it that power which we ourselves had cre ated. He could hardly have had very sanguine hopes of a long continuation of peace under any arrangement that could have been made with France; but if there was any arrangement which was of all others calculated to render the long continuation of peace almost impossible, it was precisely that which has been adopted. That was his opinion of the arrangements under which the prospect of a long-continued tranquillity had been promised us: that was his view of the assurances which had been held out of permanent peace. Their lordships, however, would have an opportunity of considering and discussing that topic when the communication as to the change of the terms on which our troops were to remain in France should be made to them; and the subject would deserve their lordships' most particular attention, if it should appear that the changes and modifications were such, that any part of the expense of maintaining these troops

in France was to be borne by this already overburdened country.Having thus stated his opinion as to the first part of the prince regent's speech, and of the address in answer to it, he now came to that part of it which, in point of interest and importance, far surpassed all the other topics which it contained; he alluded to the internal state of the country; a state which the noble lords acknowledged to be of great distress, and which he considered as altogether unparalleled in the annals of this country. The ministers held out to us, as they had always done, that they hoped the distress was but temporary, and that the present pressure would soon be succeeded by a new era of increasing prosperity. That was a hope so congenial to the feelings of every man, whether considered as an individual, or as a member of a great community, that all must wish that the hope were well founded. But their lordships would ill discharge their duty, if they were to rely with implicit confidence on the hopes of ministers, cr of the noble lords who had concurred with them in such flattering expectations, without some exami nation of the grounds on which these hopes were founded. If it was desirable that the belief should prevail among the people, that their distresses were but of temporary duration, in order to encourage them to bear with patience and fortitude the pressure to which they were for the present exposed, that belief could operate only so far as the conviction went, that the expectation of a speedy termination of their distresses was not without foundation. That the causes of this unparalleled distress were partly temporary, and that some alleviation of the pressure might be ex

pected from the continuation of peace, he was not only disposed not to deny, but most anxiously desirous to believe: for, otherwise, the prospect must be neither more nor less than absolute despair. But he was at the same time of opinion that the causes of the evil were more deeply rooted, and more permanent in their nature, than some noble lords seemed willing to allow. The noble lord who moved the address had said, that similar difficulties had been experienced at the close of the American war. He had heard it stated on some occasions before, that the country had been in a similar state of distress at the close of the American war; and it had been held out to us that, as an æra of extraordinary prosperity had then succeeded, we might reasonably expect a similar termination to our present difficulties. He (earl Grey) was not then of an age to have a share in the deliberative councils of the country; but it did not appear to him, that either in degree, in extent, in character, in symptoms, or means of cure, the situation of the country was at all similar to that under which it at present laboured. There was a deficiency, it was said, in the produce of the revenue, as compared with the expenditure even at that time: but the amount of taxation then was about 12 millions ;-and was it the same thing, a deficiency on 12 millions, and a deficiency in a revenue of five times that amount? They might as well say, that as the country advanced in taxation, it was so much the better able to bear the weight of additional taxes; that the addition of the weight of one pound to the load of a horse already on the point of sinking under his bur den, was the same thing as the adding a pound weight to the burden

of

of a horse whose load was not greater nor heavier than he had full strength and powers to carry; that a drop of water added to the contents of a vessel already full to the brim, was the same thing as adding a drop to the contents of a vessel not more than three parts full; and that the diseases of age were as easily got rid of as the diseases of youth, A year had already elapsed since the close of the war in 1815; and nearly three years, or from two to three years, had elapsed since the close of the war in the year 1514, (with the exception of a three months' war,) and that with out any mitigation of the distresses of the country, which appeared to be rather increasing. In the year 1783, the year after the close of the Ame rican war, there was no settled government. Three different administrations had been in office during that period, and for three months there was hardly any administration at all; and, till the administration of Mr. Pitt was confirmed, in 1784, it was impossible that any regular system could then be adopted to alleviate or remedy the distress of the country. What was his remedy then? He imposed new taxes to the amount of a million. In 1785 he imposed new taxes: and in two years from the conclusion of the treaty of peace, instead of a growing deficiency in the consolidated fund, as was now experienced, there was a growing increase; and Mr. Pitt was enabled to show, as a proof of the growing prosperity of the country, an increase in one quarter to the amount of 600,0007. These circumstances proved that there was no similarity between the condition of the country at that time and its situation at present. The remedy then applied was that of additional taxation to the amount of a million, .1817

afterwards increased to 1,200,000% for the purposes of the sinking fund. If the country was now in no worse a situation, the same cure might be applied. At that time, in from two to three years from the conclusion of the peace (little more than the time that had elapsed since the close of the war in 1814), the country began to experience the blessings of peace, and there was a considerable clear surplus in the consolidated fund. Was that the case at the present period? What might he state to be the deficiency now? The supplies of last year were 35 millions, and the ways and means did not exceed 20 millions, leaving a difference of 14 millions between the revenue and the expenditure. But if the matter were examined more minutely, he was persuaded there would appear a much greater deficiency-a deficiency of no less than 18 millions; and while the surplus of the consolidated fund had been estimated at three mil lions, it would probably appear that there was no surplus at all, and that the deficiency was not less than 21 millions! He challenged ministers to meet that statement when the time of examination should arrive. The speech of the prince regent, and the noble lords who had spoken before him in their speeches then, adverted to reductions calculated on principles of sound policywords a great deal too loose and too general, and savouring strongly of a measure of reduction very different from that which the present situation of the country demanded;—but of that, a word presently. What was the amount of the intended reduction? Was it to be 5, 8, or 10 millions? If the noble earl (Liverpool) can say that the expenditure is to be reduced to 19 millions, then what means has he

to meet it? Was there any surplus of the consolidated fund? He would venture to say, that if the noble earl took the whole produce of the sinking fund, there would be a defici ency of nearly one million and a half. In addition to this, he had to advert to a subject not at all noticed in the speech, and one which was the chief cause and foundation of all the present distresses of the country-he alluded to the immense mass of paper currency, which had circulated at a depreciation of about 20 per cent., and was now in a great measure suddenly withdrawn, or restored to its proper level. There was no such difficulty at the close of the American war. For some time the evil of the bank restriction was not felt, and it afforded a facility in carrying on the war which astonished even the most sanguine ; so that some, with a new species of morality, considered it as a particular dispensation of Providence, as if it had been one of the blessings of Providence to afford facilities for war. In 1810 the consequences of the restriction began to appear. The chancellor of the exchequer then felt that it was impossible to add to the already almost intolerable load of taxation; that it was impossible to increase the taxes without serious injury to the foundations of the national prosperity. What followed? Retrenchment and economy? No; but shifts and expedients to disguise the evil for a time, and throw the burden upon some future period.What were the original causes of the restriction? The accommodation afforded by the bank to the government, and the quantity of specie sent to foreign countries. Yet last year the government had received a similar accommodation, which must be repaid before the bank could resume its cash

payments. (Earl of Liverpool, "No.") The noble lord said No: but their lordships would see how that would turn out when the subject came to be considered. They had heard, too, of a loan to be made by certain individuals of this country to the French government. It was always desirable to leave commerce free and unfettered; and it was said that the repayment of this loan was not guarantied by our government. He wished, however, that ministers would make an explicit declaration on that point. The effect of such a transaction was not doubtful, when it was considered how ill the country in its present situation could bear the loss of such a mass of capital: and ministers would incur a heavy responsibility if they afforded the least encou ragement to that loan. If ministers could state that they had given no countenance to the transaction, there was no object of British interest so minute that it ought not, in any future arrangements with the French government, to be preferred to the interests of those con cerned in this loan. He could hardly, however, conceive that so great a risk would be incurred without some communication to government: and if ministers had even gone the length of taking mea. sures to prevent it, the proceeding would not have been without precedent, for Walpole had brought a bill into parliament to prevent a si milar transaction. From the speech of the prince regent the only thing he could discover was, that there was to be no trenching on the pub. lic credit; by which he understood that the sinking fund was not to be touched, and that no new taxes were to be imposed. By what means, then, did they propose to meet the deficiency? Was it by adding to

the